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BEEF IS BEEF?   
AN ACTOR-NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE 2012 LFTB FOOD SCARE 
TRENTON ELLIS 
2015 
 During March of 2012 a food scare erupted concerning the beef product lean 
finely-textured beef (LFTB) or, as it became pejoratively named, “pink slime.”  This 
2012 “pink slime” food scare resulted in major changes to the beef agrifood network 
including increases in U.S. ground beef imports and changes to ground beef purchasing 
policies in the public and private sectors.  This dissertation utilized an actor-network 
theory-guided content analysis of videos produced by key network-buildings actors, ABC 
News and Beef Products Incorporated (BPI).  The goal of the study was to uncover the 
process by which ABC News and BPI attempted to order the LFTB actor-network during 
the 2012 “pink slime” food scare.  The analysis afforded special attention to the 
discourses employed and actors enrolled by ABC News and BPI to support their desired 
orderings of the LFTB actor-network.  Finally, an actor-network conceptualization of 
habitus was utilized to explain the divergent network-building practices of these pro- and 









- Introduction and Background -  
 
Introduction 
 “Dude, it’s beef!” was the refrain as South Dakota beef processing company Beef 
Products Incorporated (BPI), Iowa Governor Terry Branstad, Iowa State University 
students and faculty, farmers, livestock producers, and various representatives from the 
meat and poultry industry rallied together in ISU’s Kildee Hall to save the imperiled 
processed beef product lean finely-textured beef (LFTB) (Vinchattle 2012).  Meanwhile 
other actors representing Occupy Ames, the Iowa Farmers Union, and ISU’s Leopold 
Center for Sustainable Agriculture coalesced outside the auditorium to express their 
frustration with the unlabeled sale of ground beef containing the LFTB product they 
termed “pink slime” in restaurants, grocers, and school cafeterias throughout the country 
(Vinchattle 2012).  These “dueling rallies” (Vinchattle 2012) crystalize the fault lines of 
the conflicting discourses and actors comprising the 2012 LFTB food scare.  Prior to 
following this controversy, however, it is necessary to provide some context to the scare.   
What is lean finely-textured beef? 
Understanding lean finely-texture beef entails an exploration of its origins.  Lean 
finely-textured beef is a beef product invented by inventor and entrepreneur Eldon Roth.  
Roth is an influential figure in the industrial meat processing business with a career 
spanning over thirty years (Beef Products Incorporated 2012b).  The founder and current 
owner of Beef Products Incorporated, headquartered in Dakota Dunes, South Dakota, 
Eldon Roth’s success accelerated when in the early 1970s he invented a revolutionary 





minutes (Beef Products Incorporated 2012b).  In the late 1980s, Roth devised a 
processing method to recover small bits of beef from trimmings leftover from making 
other cuts of meat (e.g. steaks, roasts, ribs).  Roth’s process heated the beef trimmings to 
around 100 degrees Fahrenheit, which melted their fat content (Greene 2012; Levenstein 
2012).  The trimmings were then placed in a centrifuge to spin out the fat and harvest the 
lean bits of muscle tissue left behind (Beef Products Incorporated 2012b).  These bits of 
lean meat were then frozen to form the final product, dubbed “lean finely-textured beef,” 
and shipped out for mixture with ground beef products at supermarkets and other food 
processors (Levenstein 2012).  When LFTB is added to ground beef, the mixture 
constitutes an overall leaner finished ground beef product (Levenstein 2012).  Beef 
Products Incorporated claims that LFTB was created as a response to consumer demand 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s for leaner beef containing less fat (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012d).  Throughout the 1990s, mass outbreaks of foodborne illness 
stemming from the consumption of ground beef contaminated with Escherichia coli 
(E.coli) 0157:H7 influenced Roth to develop a new process that, in addition to meeting 
lean beef demands, could reduce pathogen contamination in ground beef from bacteria 
like E.coli (Greene 2012).   
According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), ground beef 
is the most commonly consumed beef product in the United States (Greene 2012).  Its 
popularity coupled with its physical properties mean that “pathogen contamination is of 
special concern for ground beef” (Greene 2012:3).  While on other cuts of beef (e.g. 
steaks, roasts) pathogens that are on the outside of the item are killed via the application 





thus present an increased case for contamination if not cooked to a high enough 
temperature throughout (Greene 2012).  Roth’s solution for addressing this concern was 
to add an ammonia gas (anhydrous ammonia) treatment to LFTB in order to raise its pH 
and by doing so create a less habitable environment for bacteria like E.coli (Beef 
Products Incorporated 2012b; Greene 2012).  The overall hope was that the addition of 
LFTB to other ground beef would then raise the pH of the entire product and thus reduce 
the overall amount of E.coli 0157:H7 bacteria inhabiting the ground beef supply (Beef 
Products Incorporated 2012b; Greene 2012).  Roth’s anhydrous ammonia process to 
produce LFTB was approved by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 
2001 (Greene 2012).   
While the effectiveness of the ammonia treatment process in reducing E.coli 
contamination is debated, the arrival of the new ammonia-treated lean finely-textured 
beef spurred growth for Roth’s company as BPI opened and operated facilities in five 
different states (South Dakota, Iowa, Kansas, Texas, and Nebraska) by 2012 (Beef 
Products Incorporated 2012b).  Prior to the 2012 LFTB food scare, lean finely-textured 
beef was within an estimated 70 percent of the US ground beef products (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012b; Bittman 2012).  In addition to other food processing companies, 
major grocery retail chains, global fast food corporations, and the USDA’s National 
School Lunch Program (NSLP) were all major purchasers of BPI-produced lean finely-
textured beef (Ross 2011).  Despite BPI’s success, their profitability and LFTB’s 
presence within the ground beef agrifood chain experienced major challenges in March of 
2012 when the American Broadcasting Corporation’s (ABC) flagship news program, 





consumer concern over a product they dubbed “pink slime.”  Prior to unfolding the 
events of the 2012 LFTB food scare, however, it is necessary to define exactly what 
constitutes a “food scare.”  
What was the 2012 LFTB food scare? 
 Despite the success of BPI and the fixture of LFTB in the US food supply, in 
March of 2012 BPI and their product were embroiled in a nationwide food scare.  Lean 
finely-textured beef moved from banal beef product within most of the U.S. beef supply 
to a hot topic in the news media, on college campuses, and eventually in the South 
Dakota court system (ABC News 2012a; Beef Products Incorporated 2012l; Furfaro 
2012).  The problem for BPI was that the moniker under which LFTB came to be known 
was the unwelcomed epithet “pink slime.”  After receiving numerous customer inquiries 
regarding whether they used “pink slime” in their burgers, the restaurant chain Red Robin 
commissioned Harris Interactive Inc. to conduct an online poll of American adults to 
examine, among other consumer feedback, how many consumers were aware of and 
concerned with “pink slime” (Caulfield 2012).  Results of Red Robin’s survey found that 
88 percent of the approximately 2,000 respondents had heard of “pink slime,” of which 
76 percent were “at least somewhat concerned” about the product (Caulfield 2012).  
Though the events that ultimately propelled consumers to this awareness occurred 
primarily over March of 2012, as displayed in the LFTB food scare timeline in Appendix 
A., the origins of “pink slime” stretch further back.   
Before “pink slime” became a popular nickname for LFTB, the term was first 
shared in 2001 via a private email between two colleagues at the USDA (Moss 2009).  





work colleague explaining his disapproval with the use of LFTB in ground beef and 
referring to it as “pink slime” (Gillam 2012).  The term remained unknown outside of 
Zirnstein’s email until his words resurfaced via a Freedom of Information Act request by 
New York Times journalist Michael Moss (2009).  Moss featured Zirnstein’s concerns 
about “pink slime” in his article questioning the safety of ground beef, but his article 
caused little stir amongst consumers (2009).  Popular discussion of “pink slime” 
remained relatively dormant until nearly three years later when a dramatization of the 
process used to make the product appeared an ABC television program, Jamie Oliver’s 
Food Revolution (Oliver 2011).   
The premise of the ABC show Jamie Oliver’s Food Revolution was that British 
celebrity chef, Jamie Oliver, was on a mission to improve diets of students in the Los 
Angeles Unified School District (Oliver 2011).  During one episode Oliver conducted a 
crude demonstration of BPI’s LFTB process through utilizing household ammonia 
cleaner, beef trimmings, and a clothes washing-machine (Oliver 2011).  After dousing 
beef trimmings with household ammonia cleaner, Oliver dumped the mixture in a clothes 
washing machine (Oliver 2011).  Oliver reference the finished product as “pink slime” 
and explained to a shocked audience of children, parents, and teachers that it was in most 
of the ground beef purchased at supermarkets and used within school lunches (Oliver 
2011).  Despite this nationwide broadcast of Oliver’s alarming demonstration, still 
relatively little public attention was given to the presence of LFTB in U.S. ground beef 
until nearly one year later in March of 2012.   
Between March 7th and April 3rd of 2012, ABC News, the news broadcasting 





investigative-style reports covering “pink slime” (LFTB) on their nightly news program 
ABC World News with Diane Sawyer (See Appendix C).  While each report opened with 
head World News anchor Diane Sawyer, it was ABC News Senior National 
Correspondent Jim Avila who spearheaded the investigation (ABC News 2012a).  The 
reports alerted the public that ammonia-treated LFTB or “pink slime” was “hidden” in 
nearly 70 percent of all ground beef, including the ground beef in the National School 
Lunch Program (NSLP) (ABC News 2012a).  ABC News interviewed former USDA food 
scientist Gerald Zirnstein, organic butchers, food bloggers, consumers, and a number of 
other actors who were all concerned about the presence of “pink slime” in ground beef.  
What followed were reports of phone calls and emails from angry consumers to grocery 
retailers, restaurants, the USDA, and public schools, mostly demanding the labeling or 
complete removal of LFTB from their ground beef products (ABC News 2012b; Siegel 
2012).  “Pink slime” progressed from a clever term within an internal USDA email, 
entered the lexicon of the American vocabulary, and developed into a full-blown food 
scare.   
Within the month of March 2012, consumer concerns over “pink slime” impacted 
changes in private (e.g. grocery retailers) and public (e.g. USDA) policies regarding 
ground beef, led to the closure of three BPI processing plants, and had impacts upon the 
ground beef agrifood network at a national and global scale (ABC News 2012e; ABC 
News 2012f; Greene 2012).  Though its “pink slime” alias dates back to internal USDA 
emails in 2001, it is because of the acceleration of concern over LFTB and impact upon 
the LFTB network beginning in March of 2012 that this food scare is referred to as the 





to local and global food systems are a testament to the importance of examining the 2012 
LFTB food scare.  Though the aftermath of the 2012 LFTB food scare is still ongoing, 
some conclusions are drawn regarding its more permanent impacts upon the ground beef 
agrifood network, including BPI, the beef cattle industry, and U.S. food policy.   
BPI undisputedly incurred strong negative impacts to their business as a result of 
the 2012 LFTB food scare.  During the scare, BPI suspended operations in three of their 
four plants due to decreased demand for their flagship lean finely-textured beef product.  
According to Nick Roth, BPI engineer and son of Eldon and Regina Roth, the closure of 
these plants led to the loss of “700 jobs” and “80% of [BPI’s] sales” (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012l). While their formerly suspended plant in Garden City, Kansas 
reopened in August of 2014, two of BPI’s three shuttered plants remain closed 
(Huffstutter 2014).  Though drought and other recent disruptions in the beef cattle market 
pushed beef prices higher, influencing an uptick in demand for lower-cost beef like 
LFTB, it is not clear whether BPI’s two remaining “suspended” plants in Texas and Iowa 
will reopen (Huffstutter 2014).  Meanwhile, BPI’s defamation lawsuit filed against ABC 
News in September of 2012 is awaiting discovery pending an appeal to the South Dakota 
State Supreme Court (Cano 2014).  Apart from the impacts to BPI’s business, there is 
also evidence to suggest that the 2012 LFTB food scare caused some alterations to the 
global beef cattle supply chain. 
 The current drought impacting most of the Western United States translates to 
difficulty discerning some of the impacts the 2012 LFTB food scare has had upon the 
beef cattle industry.  Despite this difficulty, some studies indicate immediate short-term 





agriculture economists suggested a sharp increase in beef imports into the U.S. from 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as an immediate result of the scare (Greene 2012; 
Pruitt and Anderson 2012).  It is important to note that these economists recognized that 
the increased beef imports also occurred within the context of a Western U.S. drought 
(Pruitt and Anderson 2012).  Irrespective of the drought, some agriculture economists 
still argued that the events of the 2012 LFTB food scare added to beef importation (Pruitt 
and Anderson 2012).  Beyond this short-term spike in imports, studies on the impacts of 
the controversy also revealed more specific negative impacts upon the market for lean 
beef trimmings, the type of material used to make LFTB (Greene 2012; Pruitt and 
Anderson 2012).  The decreased demand of retailers, the USDA National School Lunch 
Program, and other LFTB customers is cited as forcing LFTB into other markets 
primarily not for human consumption (Greene 2012; Pruitt and Anderson 2012).  
According to Greene (2012), “the price of fresh 50% lean beef trimmings plunged 42%, 
from $1.01 per pound” at the beginning of March 2012 to “$.59 per pound” at the end of 
the same month (p.8).  The market for these fattier and less expensive trimmings is 
expected to stay lower in concern with the low demand for LFTB, while the “price of 
fresh 90% lean beef trimmings,” has risen and thus influenced overall higher prices for 
leaner ground beef (Greene 2012:9).  As the Western U.S. drought continues and the 
price of fresh beef increases, it is possible that the higher prices may lead to increased 
demand for the cheaper lean beef (Greene 2012).  Perhaps BPI’s recently reopened 
Kansas plant is a hint of better things to come for the lean beef market.   
 The third major change to the fresh ground beef supply chain came in the form of 





new ground beef labels as well as a new purchasing policy for public schools through the 
USDA-run National School Lunch Program.  Private policy changes included new 
LFTB-free ground beef purchasing policies for private grocery retail chains like Safeway 
and Kroger.   
As a result of the 2012 LFTB food scare, the USDA made changes to ground beef 
labeling policy as well as purchasing options within the National School Lunch Program.  
Despite initial resistance from pro-LFTB actors, the USDA introduced a series of new 
“contains LFTB” labels approved for voluntary application by retailers (Avila 2012).  
These labels were not alterations to the ingredients list on existing ground beef labels as 
the USDA does not consider LFTB to be an additive, ingredient, or anything other than 
ground beef (Greene 2012).  In a press release, BPI later supported the new policy and 
described it as an “important first step in restoring consumer confidence in their ground 
beef” (Avila 2012).  It is unclear how many, if any, retailers adopted the new labels.  
Within the National School Lunch Program, the USDA also moved to allow states 
a choice between purchasing ground beef containing LFTB or, at a higher price, ground 
beef without LFTB (Greene 2012).  As a consequence of this decision, nearly every state 
apart from Iowa, Nebraska, and South Dakota initially opted out of purchasing ground 
beef containing LFTB for their 2012-2013 lunch programs (Bottemiller 2012).  This 
move translated to states dropping their purchases of ground beef products containing 
LFTB.   Yearly orders placed to the USDA in May 2012 included about 20 million 
pounds of non-LFTB ground beef compared with only 1 million pounds of ground beef 
products containing LFTB (Bottemiller 2012).  Though four more states returned to 





out of using the product (Knowles 2013).  Drought, higher beef prices, and the 
diminished role of “pink slime” in the media and public consciousness may contribute to 
more states renewing their purchase orders for cheaper LFTB-containing beef products.   
 Examining the fallout of the 2012 LFTB food scare revealed that the scare yielded 
significant changes to the ground beef agrifood network.  The goal of this case study is to 
follow the practices of network-building actors, ABC News and BPI, through the 2012 
LFTB food scare in order to understand the process by which this event led to these 
national and global alterations of the ground beef agrifood network.  In this pursuit, this 
study aims to answer three key questions: 1) what were the discourses deployed by 
network-building actors in order to translate the 2012 LFTB food scare?, 2) who were the 
actors enrolled to support these conflicting discourses?, and finally 3) what are some 
ways in which these practices (discourses and actors enrolled) can be explained using the 
application of an actor-network conceptualization of habitus?  These questions move 
beyond the production-consumption dichotomy (i.e. examining food scares from either 
the perspective of the producer or consumer) and focus on the core network-building 
processes by which the reordering of the ground beef agrifood network occurred during 
the 2012 LFTB food scare.   
 In the discussion that follows, this research is first placed within in the context of 
the current literature, attending to both the literature covering food scares and the use of 
actor-network theory (ANT) in food and agriculture analysis.  Second, the theoretical 
foundations of ANT and food studies are discussed, emphasizing the key concepts used 
in this analysis and as operationalized in the methods and research design. Third, and in 





understandings on discourse coalitions, problematizations, and the explanatory habitus 
structure differentiating the opposing actors and networks.  The conclusion summarizes 
the findings, addresses the resolution in my research questions, examines limitations of 

























- Review of Literature - 
What are food scares?  
 In their pioneering text Sociology on the Menu: an Invitation to the Study of Food 
and Society, Alan Beardsworth and Theresa Keil (2001) asserted that while providing 
pleasure, energy, and health, food has a “paradoxical nature” in that it is also a source of 
ambivalence and anxiety.  Levenstein (2012) proposed that food is one of the most 
anxiety-producing interactions humans have with the natural world because food 
decisions occur within a context of contradictory health and nutrition information 
perpetuated by both governments and news media.  In addition to the uncertainty 
introduced by media, there is the real certainty that the consumption of food can indeed 
make the consumer ill or perhaps worse.  Beyond simply satisfying the palate, food can 
produce gustatory displeasure and, whether from allergens or other contaminants, 
introduce illness, disease, and even death.  Even with the great food safety improvements 
over the 20th century, the threat of illness or death from food consumption remains a 
modern 21st century reality (United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
1999).  In fact, a 2013 United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
study estimated that each year Americans experience approximately 9 million foodborne 
illnesses out of which nearly 57,000 people are hospitalized and 1,400 die (Painter et al. 
2013).  Within these statistics are the shared experiences of individuals sickened through 
consuming contaminated food products from the same, often mass-produced, sources, a 
phenomenon known as a “food scare.”   
According to Beardsworth and Keil (2001), a food scare is an “acute outbreak of 





significant short- and long-term consequences” (p.163).  Food scares are “acute” in the 
sense that they often suddenly appear in the consciousness of nervous consumers and 
airwaves of the news media, but then fade almost just as quickly.  Still, as Beardsworth 
and Keil (2001) highlighted, food scares often have substantial consequences for 
consumers, the food and agriculture industry, and both private and public food policy.  
Though food scares may involve a variety of different food products and manifest for 
multiple reasons, Beardsworth and Keil (2001:163) constructed an ideal-typical model 
through which food scares generally unfold (Table 1).   
 
  
During the first stage of a food scare, consumers are “largely unaware of or are 
unconcerned about, a potential food risk factor” (Beardsworth and Keil 2001:163).  It is 
in this stage that a consumer primarily interacts with a “blackboxed” network where 
relations that make up a given food item (e.g. farm laborers, factory workers, insects, 
chemical herbicides, genetic modification, processing agents, bacteria) are so tightly 
embedded and operating at such a level of efficiency that the consumer’s interaction with 
the food is wholly based upon their purchase of the finished product.  That is, the 
Table 1. Beardsworth and Keil’s Food Scare Sequence Model (2001:163). 
1.  Initial ‘equilibrium’ state in which the public are largely unaware of or are 
unconcerned about, a potential food risk factor.   
2.  Public initially sensitized to a novel potential food risk factor. 
3.  Public concern builds up as the risk factor becomes a focus of interest and 
concern within the various arenas of public debate.  
4.  Public response to the novel risk factor begins, often consisting of the avoidance 
of the suspect food item. (This response may be an ‘exaggerated’ one, apparently 
not in proportion to actual risk.) 
5.  Public concern gradually fades as attention switches away from the issue in 
question and a new ‘equilibrium’ state establishes itself.  However, chronic low-
level anxiety may persist, and can give rise to a resurgence of the issue at a later 





consumer knows the food came from somewhere and ended up on the shelf at their local 
grocery retailer, but has little knowledge of the relations at work to deliver the product to 
the shelf apart from what s/he can view on the label.  For the consumer, all they need to 
know is on the label.  The label provides them with all of the information that they can 
know about the relations represented by that item of food.  When this blackboxed 
understanding is interrupted by the exposure of some (real or perceived) risk associated 
with the food item, consumers are confronted with unknown actors and relations not 
appearing on the label.  Their familiar and comfortable relationship with that food 
becomes complicated and anxious.   
 In the second stage of food scares, consumers are “sensitized to a novel potential 
food risk factor” (Beardsworth and Keil 2001:163).  Apart from the unfortunate 
consumers who consume contaminated food items, most people are alerted to the 
presence of a food risk factor through the news media (Levenstein 2012; Lockie 2006).  
Depending on the scope of their audience, news media broadcasts can quickly alert 
millions of consumers about a food risk and in turn “set off food scares” (Freidberg 
2004:178).  Generally, two potential risk factors are at the heart of most food scares: 1) 
actual bacterial, viral, or chemical contamination of a food item resulting in consumer 
illnesses or even death, or 2) new information about the potential for bacterial, viral, or 
chemical contamination of a food item (e.g. new information about current practices).   
The first type of food scare occurs when consumer consumption of a 
contaminated mass-produced food item causes widespread acute illness.  Perhaps the 
most famous example of this type of food scare is the 1993 Jack-in-the-Box Escherichia 





undercooked ground beef in hamburgers from 73 Jack-in-the-Box restaurants (Flynn 
2009).  The Jack-in-the-Box E.coli scare resulted in the illnesses of approximately 700 
people and the deaths of two consumers (Flynn 2009).  More recent parallels to the Jack-
in-the-Box food scare include countless E.coli O157:H7 food scares involving raw 
sprouts (Jalonick 2012) and bagged spinach or lettuce (USDA 2012), and numerous 
salmonella scares involving chicken eggs (Associated Press 2010).  Not all food scares 
stem from the consumption, and resulting illness or death, of contaminated food items.   
The second type of food scare occurs when the public are alerted to new 
information (through research, whistleblowers, or regulatory agencies) about a potentially 
harmful ingredient, production aid, or processing agent contaminating a food item.  These 
scares still involve the threat of possible negative physiological consequences resulting 
from consuming a food item, but the threat is less salient and potential harm less 
immediate.  The Alar (daminozide) food scare during in the mid- to late 1980s is a well-
known example of this second form of food scare.  Public anxiety concerning this scare 
ballooned after research reports and warnings released from the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency and Natural Resource Defense Council revealed that 
exposure to Alar, a chemical applied to apples to prevent them from ripening too quickly, 
may pose a health risk due to releasing carcinogens upon breakdown (Herrmann 1997).  
Though it did not result in any traceable illnesses or deaths, the high anxieties comprising 
the Alar scare still negatively impacted the consumption of apples and apple products 
(Herrmann 1997).   
The Alar food scare also captured the attention of the public through multiple 





Minutes, as well as attention from concerned celebrity parents like actress Meryl Streep 
(Herrmann 1997).  The translation of the Alar debate to news specials, congressional 
hearings, and even celebrity activism reflects the third stage of Beardsworth and Keil’s 
(2001) food scare model.  In the third stage of food scares the concern over the risk 
factor, in this case Alar, spreads through “various arenas of public debate” (p.163).  One 
of the central actors in the spread of this information and is the news media.  Various 
studies on food scares have highlighted the magnifying affect that the news media play in 
precipitating food scares (Beardsworth and Keil 2001; Levenstein 2012; Lockie 2006).  
Beardsworth and Keil (2012:165) proposed that during food scares the news media create 
a “news spiral” or a feedback loop of concern where reporters alert consumers to a 
particular food risk and thus raise their anxieties, and then cover these anxieties in 
broadcasts to fuel further concerns over the food product in question.  The consumer 
response produced by these activities constitute the fourth stage of the food scare model.   
 Within the fourth stage of the food scare model presented by Beardsworth and 
Keil (2001:163), the public respond to the food scare – usually by avoiding the particular 
food associated with the risk factor.  During the Alar scare, many consumers abstained 
from the consumption of fresh apples, apple juice, apple sauce, and many other apple 
products (Hermann 1997).  Other food scares, including the 2012 LFTB scare, resulted in 
similar abstentions.  The immediate changes in consumption patterns have significant 
impacts upon the industries associated with the food item posing the risks.  The 1996 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or “mad cow disease” scare in the United 
Kingdom resulted in not only a crash in beef demand within the U.K., but also a drop in 





Seemingly local in nature, food scares may have international consequences.  These 
consequences generally outlast public attention. 
 The fifth stage in Beardsworth and Keil’s (2001:163) food scare model is when 
the public anxiety fades and a “new equilibrium” is reached regarding the risk factor.  In 
climate where news media depend upon a continuous cycle of fresh headlines, food 
scares are somewhat faddish and generally fade with little fanfare (Macintyre, Reilly, 
Miller, and Eldridge 1998).  Despite fading as quickly as they appeared, Beardsworth and 
Keil (2001) point out that “low-level anxiety may persist, and can give rise to a 
resurgence of the issue at a later date” (p.163).  Research by Stuart (2007) highlighted 
that food scares involving the same food items and the same contaminants can reoccur 
and likely will reoccur despite attempts by agrifood companies to control safety.  As a 
“natural” product, most foods are raised in bacteria-rich environments and thus subjected 
to variables that are difficult to control (e.g. feces or urine of wild animals like rats or 
birds).  This problem has plagued spinach and other leafy greens which have faced 
repeated food scares (Stuart 2007).  Other food scare events are less frequent or perhaps 
never repeated as the nature of the risk factors are much easier to control.  The ban of 
Alar by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, for example, ensured that apple 
growers halted their use of the chemical and thus it has faded from consumer 
consciousness (Hermann 1997).  Beardsworth and Keil (2001) highlighted that in this 
fifth stage demand for products at the center of a food scare can return.  The feasibility of 
the products return, however, is often dependent upon the “durability of the public 





availability of substitutes.  Because it is not an absolute requirement for successful apple 
production, consumers will probably never miss Alar.     
While Beardsworth and Keil’s (2001) food scare model provides a beneficial 
heuristic device for understanding the stages of most food scares, it is important to 
recognize the diversity and complexity of food scares.  Food scares can drastically differ 
from one another along the details of any given stage of the Beardsworth and Keil’s 
(2001) model.  Within the second stage of the food scare model, for example, the 2012 
LFTB food scare strays from the classic examples of past food scares.  Though 
contamination, both through inadvertent and deliberate means, and the risk of illness 
(either from acute or chronic exposure) is often the source of anxiety behind most food 
scares, the 2012 LFTB food scare presents a unique case in that no consumers were 
sickened or appeared to be under the threat of physiological harm from consuming the 
product.  This difference between the 2012 LFTB scare and other past food scares 
represents the diversity of food scare events as well as one reason among many why food 
scares deserve the attention of food and agriculture scholars.   
Why study the 2012 LFTB food scare? 
Controversies like the 2012 LFTB food scare are important moments for the 
analytical attentions of sociologists of food and agriculture.  David Goodman (1999), 
Stassart and Whatmore (2003), Beardsworth and Keil (2001), and other scholars (Delind 
and Howard 2007; Donaldson, Lowe, and Ward 2002) argue that food scares deserve 
examination for three important reasons: 1) food scares unravel relations of previously 
punctualized sets of actors thus providing a crevice into which scholars can drive an 





3) though seemingly brief, food scares can have tremendous consequences for the 
ordering of agrifood networks, including new alternative orderings resembling a move 
away from modern industrial rationality.  
“Hot Situations”  
According to Stassart and Whatmore (2003), food scares are the paragon of what 
Michael Callon (1998) deems “hot situations” or “hybrid forms” in which “everything 
becomes controversial [in] the absence of a stabilized knowledge base” (p.260).  During 
food scares the dominant forms of knowledge and production become interrupted, 
destabilized, and even translated into new arrangements (Goodman 1999; Stassart and 
Whatmore 2003).    The questioned item of consumption at the center of food scares is 
simultaneously an avatar for the contestation of the modern industrial rationality upon 
which the item and the network ordered around it are based.  For those actors attempting 
to arrange new orders of an agrifood network, food scares are thus opportunities for them 
to establish their new orderings (Stassart and Whatmore 2003).   
Through their study of food scares impacting the beef industry in Belgium, 
Stassart and Whatmore (2003) revealed that food scares often open agrifood networks to 
alternative orderings.  The beef scares examined by Stassart and Whatmore (2009) 
created spaces within which agricultural cooperatives could establish new locally-based 
orderings of beef production and consumption.  Other research by DeLind and Howard 
(2008) examined similar repeated food scares involving contaminated fresh, bagged 
spinach within the United States.  DeLind and Howard (2008) used the spinach scares as 





processing of spinach, and to suggest alternative small-scale, decentralized production 
and processing.  Both studies by Stassart and Whatmore (2003) and DeLind and Howard 
(2008) also highlighted the utility of food scares in their exposure of the previously 
obscured actors populating the agrifood networks in which the questioned food items are 
couched.  Goodman (1999) proposed that food scares “expose hybrid mediations 
inscribed on ‘food’” (p.29) making the actors in agrifood networks more visible for the 
analytical gaze of any food scholar willing to look (Goodman 1999).  Like Stassart and 
Whatmore (2003) and DeLind and Howard (2008), Goodman (1999) also advocated that 
scholars utilize this vantage point provided by food scares in order to explore the 
possibilities of alternative orderings.  Unfortunately, the insights provided by these food 
scholars into the relational exposures of food scares are reflective of a sparse body of 
literature relative to other food controversies like genetically-modified foods, raw milk, 
and sub-therapeutic antibiotic use in animal agriculture.  Furthermore, much of the 
literature on food scares is reflective of a production-consumption viewpoint that views 
scares as resulting from either failures of producers or consumers with little consideration 
of anything in between. 
Beyond “production-consumption”  
Despite the opportunities for network analysis offered by food scares, much of the 
food scare literature focuses heavily within the realm of responses to scares by producers 
(production) or consumers (consumption).  Concerning production, research within the 
area of organizational responses to food scares is populated by studies that evaluate 
responses to scares in order to craft better public relations and marketing strategies during 





2006; Johnson and Peppas 2006).  In juxtaposition to the use of food scares for 
exploration of alternative food system orderings, as offered by DeLind and Howard 
(2008) and Stassart and Whatmore (2003), the body of production-focused research 
examines new ways to further entrench modern industrial orderings of the food system 
via improved management techniques (Caswell 2006; Gellynck, Verbeke, and Vermeire 
2006) and/or marketing strategies (Carroll 2009; Johnson and Peppas 2006).   
In addition to various studies focused on the production impacts of food scares, 
another contingent of studies focused primarily on consumer responses to food scares 
(Böcker and Hanf 2000; Nayga 1996).  Nayga (1996) examined the sociodemographic 
factors correlated with anxieties about food safety and concluded that nonmetropolitan 
residents with higher education were less anxious about hormones, pesticides, and other 
industrial food production technologies. Nayga’s (1996) thus explained consumer 
concern as at least partially tied to a lack of consumer education.  As Nayga (1996) 
explained, “Most scientists and professional experts, however, agree that such concerns 
[with safety of the food supply] are, for the most part, unjustified and may be a reflection 
of consumers’ unfamiliarity with the technical or scientific aspects of the production 
process and of negative publicity from the media” (p.473).  In their study of consumer 
responses to food scares, Böcker and Hanf (2000) address concerns of a consumer 
knowledge deficit regarding industrial production techniques and suggest that producers 
“target their information strategies” to protect “against loss in trust” (p.480).  Again, 
similar to research focused on the impact of food scares on production, the attention of 





with food anxieties related to a need for agrifood industry to “target consumer education 
programs” (Nayga 1996:473) rather than reorder practices.  
Apart from conceptualizing food scares as the result of producer failings (e.g. 
poor management, lack of information communication to consumers) or consumer 
knowledge deficits (e.g. lack of modern food production knowledge), Goodman (1999; 
2002) and other scholars (Adams 1997; DeLind and Howard 2008; Stassart and 
Whatmore 2003) argued for an analytical turn that moves beyond a dichotomous 
production-consumption focus.  From this perspective, the emergence of food scares are 
not uncovered solely through examining producer or consumer responses, but instead 
through an investigation of how the networks are ordered.  Carol Adams’ (1997) 
ecofeminist critique of the 1996 mad cow disease scare in the U.K., for example, moves 
beyond criticizing producers for their safety practices or consumers for their inadequate 
understanding of risk and sees the issue as resulting from the anthropocentric ordering of 
the agrifood system.  Adams’ (1997) critique is that meat consumption itself is an issue 
worth revisiting as it gives rise to the oppression (e.g. confinement, growth hormone 
injections) of animals to fulfill the increasing demands of a diet centered on the practice 
of consuming their flesh.  The solution, according to Adams (1997) is to “restore the 
absent referent [animal subjectivity], not consumer confidence” and to “end the practice 
[of meat-eating], don’t protect it” (p.44).  Adams’ (1997) analysis was thus a radical shift 
away from the production-consumption analytical dichotomy.  This study of the 2012 
LFTB food scare aims to continue this analytical shift and examine the scare not from the 
production-consumption dichotomy reflective of the studies dominating food scare 





Impacts of Food Scares 
Finally, controversies like the 2012 LFTB food scare also deserve the attention of 
food and agriculture scholars because they often have lasting impacts on food production, 
consumption, and policy (Donaldson et al. 2002; Freidberg 2004; Hermann, Warland, 
and Sterngold 1997; Stassart and Whatmore 2003).  While the scares themselves are 
temporary events in consumer consciousness and news media broadcasts, the altered 
orderings of the agrifood networks affected by food scares are more permanent.  Because 
of the agrifood chains are networks, changes resulting from food scares are also 
networked and thus have impacts beyond the food item posing (or perceived as posing) a 
risk to consumers.  Three of the most famous food scare examples serve to illustrate the 
impacts of food scares: the Alar food scare of the late 1980s, the Jack-in-the-Box food 
scare of the mid 1990s, the more recent 2001 foot-in-mouth disease outbreak in the 
United Kingdom.  Though these scares all resulted in networked-effects beyond the 
localized food item or company involved, only the examination of the foot-in-mouth 
disease outbreak by Donaldson, Lowe, and Ward (2002) uncovered the practices through 
which network-building actors established these new orderings.  
During the mid-1980s, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted a 
risk assessment to investigate possible health impacts of the popular agricultural chemical 
Alar (Hermann 1997).  Alar, the brand name of the chemical daminozide, was a popular 
chemical used to delay ripening of apples and was suspected by the EPA and others as 
producing carcinogens as the product broke down (Hermann 1997).  The panel 
commissioned to conduct the risk assessment ultimately concluded that the amount of 





action (Hermann 1997).  Despite these findings, in 1985 the EPA lowered tolerance 
levels for daminozide in apples by about 33 percent (Hermann 1997).  Following this 
decision, a publication by the National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) targeted Alar 
as posing significant carcinogenic concern based upon the animal studies conducted by 
the EPA and the use of Alar on a food popular with children, apples (NRDC 2011).  In 
conjunction with the release of the NRDC study, a segment covering the content of their 
report was featured on the popular nightly news program 60 Minutes (Hermann 1997; 
NRDC 2011).  Pending the 60 Minutes segment, the Alar debate developed into a 
national food scare when various other media outlets began to focus on Alar and the 
NRDC report (Friedman, Villamil, Suriano, and Egolf. 1996)  Soon both immediate and 
irreversible changes occurred to the apple agrifood network and policy (Friedman, 
Villamil, Suriano, and Egolf. 1996; Hermann 1997).   
The Alar scare had two significant impacts within the apple agrifood network: 1) 
an immediate reduction in the demand for apples, and 2) an EPA ban on the use of Alar 
in food products. The reduction in demand for apples had immediate negative impacts 
upon apple growers, companies that processed apple products, and the retail businesses 
selling apples and apple products (Hermann 1997).  Additionally, since Alar was used as 
a harvesting and storage aid to keep apples from ripening too quickly, the EPA ban on the 
use of Alar translated to changes within the apple industry regarding the harvesting and 
storage methods of apples (Hermann 1997).  Though EPA studies found no evidence of 
immediate danger for the product, it is clear that the Alar scare had significant impacts on 





Unlike the murky health implications of the Alar scare, the 1993 U.S. Jack-in-the-
Box food scare had immediate negative impacts upon the physiological wellbeing of 
consumers.  Due to the large scale of the outbreak and the severity of the health 
consequences to consumers, journalist Jeff Benedict (2011), who wrote an extensive 
book investigating the scare, referred to the scare as “far and away the most infamous 
food poison outbreak in contemporary history” (Denn 2011).  Outside of the scope of the 
outbreak and severity of health outcomes, the scare also caused significant changes to the 
ground beef agrifood network.  One such policy change was by the United States Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) who altered the cooking temperature requirements of 
restaurants serving ground beef products (Benedict 2011).  As a result of the Jack-in-the-
Box scare, the required internal temperature for cooked ground beef products served by 
food retailers was raised from 140 degrees Fahrenheit to 155 degrees Fahrenheit in order 
to reduce the risk of consumers contracting foodborne illness from pathogenic bacteria 
like E.coli (Benedict 2011; FDA 2011).  Despite criticisms from industry, the USDA’s 
Food Safety and Inspection Service also introduced new labelling requirements for safe 
handling of ground beef (Detwiler 2014).  Perhaps one of the most significant changes, 
however, was the move by the USDA to legally classify E.coli as an “adulterant” and 
thus adopt a “zero-tolerance” policy for the presence of E.coli in ground beef prior to 
leaving processing facilities (Frame 2013).  The USDA move to classify E.coli as an 
“adulterant” translated to significant changes in the orderings of the regulatory system as 
it related to ground beef, but also for any processor for which there is a danger of E.coli 





Jack-in-the-Box food scare thus had ramifications that rippled throughout the agrifood 
system and impacted the orderings of multiple different agrifood networks.   
One of the most recent food scares spawning major changes for the ordering of 
agrifood networks, at least related to livestock production, was the 2001 foot-in-mouth 
disease epidemic that occurred in the United Kingdom (Donaldson et al. 2002).  Foot-in-
mouth disease (FMD) is a virus that causes fevers, blistering, and, if untreated, physical 
debilitations in the host organism (Donaldson et al. 2002).  The disease mainly affects 
livestock, but it can, in rare cases, infect human hosts as well (Donaldson et al. 2002).  
The “scare” from the presence of FMD in English livestock thus came not solely as a 
possible impact to humans, but also from its ramifications for the health of the livestock 
industry.  Donaldson et al. (2002) studied the process by which the FMD virus spread 
through enrolling other actors and the ramifications the scare had upon the rural U.K. 
economy.  Donaldson et al. (2002) found that the spread of the virus was made possible 
by the way in which the FMD virus could take advantage of the normal order and 
practices of the livestock production network.  After the FMD virus successfully enrolls a 
host, the virus then produces blisters on the host’s mouth and feet (hooves) where the 
virus reproduces and eventually spreads throughout the environment (e.g. pasture, barn, 
feeding/water trough, etc.) when the blisters burst (Donaldson et al. 2002).  Donaldson et 
al. (2002) found that the virus could attach to tools (e.g. tractors, shovels, troughs, trucks) 
and then transmit across hosts via the mobility of 21st century livestock production.  If a 
truck moving livestock from farms to processing facilities is not sanitized in a way that is 
unfavorable for its enrollment by FMD, it will thus be a perfect vehicle for the disease to 





Donaldson et al. (2002) laid out that it was this rapid spread of the virus (and the ease of 
which it could do so) that ultimately led to a reordering of the network by network-
building actors (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food).  This reordering 
included immediate massive slaughter of infected or suspected infected animals and a 
halt to exports and movements of livestock within and outside of the U.K. (Donaldson et 
al. 2002).  In this particular scare, the reordering of the livestock production network in 
the U.K. had longer-lasting external impacts upon the rural U.K. economies that 
dependent upon tourism as a significant portion of their economy (Donaldson et al. 
2002).  Media images of the quarantine zones and the “mass burial and funeral pyres” 
stemming from the mass slaughter of livestock negatively impacted the perception 
vacationers had of a rural country holiday and stoked fears of human FMD infections 
(Donaldson et al. 2002:208).  These negative economic impacts were not only felt within 
areas where the FMD virus was present, but throughout the English countryside 
(Donaldson et al. 2002).  Clearly this was one more scare with consequences beyond the 
temporal and geographical boundaries of the scare. 
Although not always observed as such (as in Donaldson et al. 2002), the literature 
covering these three significant food scares (Alar, the Jack-in-the-Box scare, and the 
FMD scare) demonstrates the degree to which food scares are a networked-effect.  
Though these scares had seemingly-localized fallout in their immediate impacts (e.g. 
illnesses, decline in consumer demand for the risk-associated product), they are events 
with consequences stretching beyond their immediate temporal and geographical 
boundaries.  While scares that impacted ground beef regulation translated to new E.coli 





effects on the rural U.K. stretching beyond the time it took to slaughter the animals and 
the communities where the virus was actually present.  This is why food scares, including 
the 2012 LFTB food scares, deserve the attention of food and agriculture scholars.  
Understanding food scares provides us a way to understand the processes through which 
they produce significant impacts upon the order of agrifood networks.  And as Donaldson 
et al. (2002) demonstrated with their discussion of the FMD scare’s impacts on rural 
tourism, gaining these insights might also help to make better policy decisions in order to 
refrain from inadvertently causing more harm in the name of safety.  Donaldson et al. 
(2002) also revealed that when analyzing the networked nature of food scares, it is 
important to follow all actors – human and nonhuman.  To understand more fully the 
emergence, manipulation and outcomes of food scares, food and agriculture scholars are 
beginning to utilize Actor Network Theory as both theory and method. 
Actor-Network Understanding of Food Scares 
In terms of actor-network theory, food scares expose the hybrid mediations 
inscribed on ‘food,’ and invite us to ‘follow the actors’ in the translation process 
as hybrid collectives are reconstituted (Goodman 1999: 29). 
 
As suggested by David Goodman’s (1999) quote above, actor-network theory just 
as much a method as it is a theoretical approach to thinking about networks and relations.  
ANT provides a blueprint for analyzing the mechanics of power through which networks 
come to fruition and, simultaneously, experience, overcome, and/or succumb to 
resistance and thus reconstitute into new fields of relations (Goodman 1999; Latour 2007; 
Law 1992).  In fact, ANT founders like John Law, Bruno Latour, and Michael Callon 
press for the methodological usefulness of ANT over a focus on its use as theory 





Latour held that ANT “far from being a theory of the social…always was, and 
this from its very inception, a very crude method to learn from actors without imposing 
an a priori definition of their world-building capacities” (Law and Hassard 1999:20).  
Here Latour echoes other ANT theorists’ concern with using theory to impose already 
pre-established explanations for the activities of social actors.  ANT “does not flee from 
generalization” (Venturini and Guido 2012:2), but “claims that speculations must follow 
data and not the other way around” (2).  These methodological principles of ANT place it 
most closely within the realm of Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodology and Glaser and 
Stauss’ (1999) grounded theory.  Similar to ethnography, the emphasis of an actor-
network analysis is on practices of actors or their “everyday actions, activities, and 
behaviors” (Nimmo 2011:113).  The primary way in which ANT diverges from 
ethnography, however, is in expanding the definition of “actors” to include nonhumans 
and considering the agency of nonhuman actors within any given network.  ANT 
suggests that the researcher “follow the actors” as they “deploy their networks” as this is 
all one “needs to know about sociology” (Venturini and Guido 2012:2).  Previous studies 
utilizing ANT demonstrate that one way to ‘follow the actors’ through the process of 
translation is to seek out and examine their practices.   
 The body of research employing the methods of ANT, especially in the areas of 
agrifood studies, remains relatively small.  With the urging of ANT proponents like 
David Goodman (1999), however, a growing body of agrifood research utilizing the 
methodological approach of ANT has emerged.  One of the few studies using ANT to 
examine food scares, Donaldson et al.  (2002) followed the “chains of heterogeneous 





from those crises to institutional change” (201) in their study of the 2001 FMD scare in 
the United Kingdom.  The FMD study by Donaldson et al. (2002) examined the practices 
of a variety of actors including the FMD virus, livestock, agricultural technology, 
farmers, and government regulators, and how these associations ultimately made 
irreversible impacts to rural communities in the UK.  Additionally, Donaldson et al. 
(2002) highlighted the way in which an ANT study might employ a temporal dimension 
to an ANT analysis as they followed the FMD scare using a timeline from the contraction 
of the disease to the diagnosis in the first animal all the way through the crisis.  This said, 
one issue with the Donaldson et al. (2002) study was the lack of specificity regarding 
how they collected their data.  It is unclear whether Donaldson et al. (2002) utilized 
interviews, news media coverage, government publications, or some combination of 
these data sources to build their analysis.  When following the actors utilizing an ANT 
methodological approach, other researchers were much more explicit in their data 
sources. 
 Similar to the approach of this analysis, other researchers within the area of 
agriculture and food studies followed the practices of actors.  Much of this past research 
was aimed at understanding farmer agency through examining the actor-networks within 
which farmers make decisions regarding cropping practices.  Researchers from 
Switzerland (Schneider, Steiger, Ledermann, Fry, and Rist 2012) and the United States 
(Coughenour 2003) utilized ANT to examine the adoption of no-till cropping by farmers.  
Both of these studies utilized interviews with farmers and other key informants to 
investigate the process by which no-till practices (a.k.a. conservation tillage) were 





adoption of no-tillage a ‘network-effect’ vs. some “individual creation” (Coughenour 
2003:298), this study is most heavily influence by the latter study which viewed the 
adoption of no-tillage via ANT’s process of translation.  Especially influential to this 
study was the way in which Schneider et al. (2012) operationalized the problematization 
phase of the translation process through which “focal actors” (i.e. primary network-
building actors – in their case farmers, scientists, and extension agents) laid out the 
problems and solutions concerning the adoption of no-till practices.  Schneider et al. 
(2012) demonstrated that various problematizations concerning the same practice (no-
tillage) are possible.  However, in Schneider et al.’s (2012) case, the network-building 
actors were portrayed as relatively harmonious and cooperative in their agendas, while in 
this study controversy and conflict are common denominators.   
From the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in swine production to the wide-
ranging debates over genetically modified foods (GMOs), contemporary agriculture and 
food studies are painted with controversies over practices.  Many of these controversies 
involve some overarching theme of “sustainable” or “alternative” versus “industrial” or 
“conventional” agricultural or food production practices.  Gray and Gibson (2013) 
explored the industrial vs. alternative/sustainable debate through examining the practices 
of conventional operators in the face of sustainability concerns such as drought, soil 
degradation, climate change, etc.  Through conceptualizing farmers as actor-networks 
and following them through the translation process via interviews, Gray and Gibson 
(2013) found that farmer identities and practices were networked-effects and thus not 
completely individualized phenomena.  Gray and Gibson’s (2013) findings were 





2012 LFTB food scare.  In addition to further solidifying the networked reality of agency, 
it also provided a way for me to conceptualize the network within which actors are 
making their decisions.  Gray and Gibson (2013) viewed the decisions of the farmers not 
to adopt certain conservation practices as reflective of their relations within the industrial 



















- Theory and Method - 
Theory 
The study of food scares occupies a relatively meager niche within the area of 
agro-food studies.  Most studies examining food scares were conducted in Western 
Europe and focused primarily on consumer perceptions and reactions, public relations, or 
some combination of these facets (Böcker and Hanf 2000; Jackson 2010).  Additionally, 
nearly all studies confine their focus to one or a small set of, usually human, actors within 
an agrifood network (e.g. consumers, regulatory bodies, processors, producers).  Through 
failing to consider the hybrid nature of agro-food systems in that they are comprised of 
both non-human (e.g. microorganisms, machines, chemical processing agents, cattle) and 
human actors (e.g. farmers, industry personnel, consumers), previous approaches to 
studying food scares are weakened as they neglect the agency of the conceptually 
distanced ‘natural’ actors (Goodman 1999).   
An actor-network theoretical (ANT) approach to understanding agro-food 
networks avoids narrow nature-culture/social-human dualisms through rejecting 
categorical notions of ‘nature’ and ‘society’ (Goodman 1999; Latour 1993).  From the 
perspective of ANT, no actor is either (or some level of) natural or social as no actor is 
able to act without embodying the intersection of relations between these mistakenly 
separated dimensions (Latour 2007).  This unique conceptualization of actors, according 
to Goodman (1999:25), makes ANT an appropriate approach for achieving more 
comprehensive understandings of agro-food networks since they are a highly visible 





“central analytical metaphor” of actor-network theory.  Furthermore, ANT’s 
methodological approach to tracing the formation, resistance, and reconstitution of 
relations within actor-networks places it in a unique position to understand those that 
occur in the event of food scares (Goodman 1999).  Prior to this examination, however, it 
is important to first understand how ANT conceptualizes the issues of agency and the 
social.     
While within sociology the idea of agency is often conceptualized as an a priori 
characteristic of individuals, roles, and/or groups, actor-network theory conceives of 
agency as the actions of actors in relation to other actors (Latour 2007).  Thus agency is 
not some a priori category, but an emergent property of actors only attributable through 
the interactions comprising their relations with one another.  
Actor-network theory also extends this concept of agency non-human actors.  The 
social, according to actor-network theory, is not some supposed “thing” embodied in any 
particular entity or role, but instead exists as associations and the continuous actions 
involved in forming, maintaining, renegotiating, and dissolving them.  This building of 
relationships and, consequently, networks does not occur in a vacuum since every actor 
requires engagement in relations with other actors, both human and nonhuman, for an 
action (an exercise of agency) to occur (Latour 2007).  While often void of conscious 
consideration regarding the actors involved, eating is a fitting example of the way in 
which action requires relations of heterogeneous actors comprising an entire agro-food 
actor-network (e.g. farmers/operators, regulatory actors, tractors and other technology, 





Without the associations of these diverse actors (the ‘social’), the action and, 
consequently, agency is rendered impossible.   
Although a rather generic description of an agrifood actor-network, this example 
illustrates the point that agency is impossible without relationships to other actors (human 
or otherwise) and allows us to peer inside a network normally rendered visible only by 
inputs (e.g. producers raising food) and outputs (e.g. food on the grocery retailer’s 
shelves) of the complex hybrid actor-network involved (and even these are somewhat 
opaque). The visibility of these heterogeneous actors and their associations, however, is 
progressively concealed as their relations tighten and agendas increasingly converge.  
Any breakdown or resistance in the routine operations and suddenly other actors in the 
network are exposed.   
As the goals of actors congeal and persist, their convergence or the “increasing 
agreement between the agendas of all actors in a network” (Donaldson et al. 2002) form 
routine and unquestioned associations so tightly bound that the end-result is the 
appearance of a network consisting only of inputs and outputs with little clarity of the 
action or actors in-between.  When this happens actor-networks are said to become 
“blackboxed” in that associations are so routine and unchallenged that they are rendered 
invisible.  Additionally, according to Callon (1991), these interconnections between 
actors may grow so tight and routine that a return to earlier phases of relationships 
between actors is questionable and possibly ‘irreversible’ to a certain extent (Donaldson 
et al. 2002).   
This irreversibility becomes apparent when previously blackboxed actor-networks 





relationships within the network (Latour 1987).  Following these controversies can reveal 
the associations, agendas, and conflicts found within actor-networks and provide better 
understanding of the ‘translation’ “process by which actors form associations with other 
actors and actor-networks come into being” (Donaldson et al. 2002:205).  Food scares are 
essentially the products of controversies from which blackboxed agro-food networks are 
reopened.  
Reopening the Blackbox 
It's my hypothesis that the individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on 
by the exercise of power. The individual with his identity and characteristics is the 
product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, 
desires, forces (Michel Foucault 1980:74).   
 
 Beardsworth and Keil (2001) identified the first stage of a food scare as a state of 
equilibrium during which the public is unaware of any potential risk presented by a 
particular food item or practice located somewhere along an agro-food chain (Table 1, 
p.14 in this document).  This stage is characteristic of the “blackboxed” or punctualized 
network at which point an actor-network is recognizable only by inputs and outputs while 
the actors and their actions within remain obscured.   
 While the punctualized actor-network achieves a seemingly monolithic stature, 
the event of a food scare demonstrates that the power held through the converged 
relationships within the actor-network is not, as Michel Foucault elucidated in the above 
quote, attained through an autonomous exercise of strength.  The strength and durability 
of the seemingly “macrosocial” system are generated through and dependent upon 
establishing successful (defined as those necessary to serve the ends of the network-
building project) relations and interactions between heterogeneous actors at a 





actor-network approach, the exploration of the “mechanics of power” or “how, in other 
words, size, power or organization are generated” (Law 1992:380).  Thus within the 
context of the proposed research, the cornerstone of inquiry is an exploration of how the 
LFTB actor-network built the heterogeneous associations which came to appear as a 
“single-point actor” (Law 1992:380) and, embodied by the 2012 LFTB food scare, 
experienced a shift away from its previous state of equilibrium as resistance to the food 
product grew and made seemingly irreversible alterations to the network and its previous 
trajectory.  In order to begin these inquiries, however, it is first necessary to define the 
translation process through which actor-network theory maps these experiences.   
Food scares are essentially the reopening of blackboxed agro-food actor-networks 
revealing the “hybrid collectives in which daily food habits and practices are enrolled” 
(Goodman 1999:29).  Ultimately, blackboxing is an advanced part of the ‘translation’ 
“process by which actors form associations with other actors and actor-networks come 
into being” (Donaldson et al. 2002:202).   
As displayed in Figure 1, the translation process involves four stages or 
“moments” as referred to by Callon (1986:1). First, problematization is “the stage where 
the network-building actor sets its agenda, designates the other actors it needs to help it 
and defines their roles” (Donaldson et al. 2002:202). Second, interessment is a series of 
processes by which the first actor presents its agenda in a way that ensures the roles it has 
set for other actors so that the “second actor might allow itself to be represented by the 
first” (Donaldson et al. 2002:202). Third, enrollment is an association arises in this stage 
when the second actor ‘agrees’ to the first actor’s agenda.  Last, mobilization is the final 





constraining network of relationships has been built” (Callon 1986:218).  However, as in 
the case of agrifood actor-networks in food scares, this “consensus and the alliances 
which it implies can be contested at any moment” (Callon 1986:219).  Translation is a 
continuous process, the stages of which might occur between any number of actors within 
the network at any time.  Additionally, activities supporting moments of translation 
include a variety of strategies or “methods of overcoming resistance” (Law 1992:387) 
which help maintain certain trajectories or agendas desirable by network-building actors.      
Figure 1. The Translation Process 
While Law (1992) characterized the strategies of translation as “contingent, local and 
variable” (p.387), he also outlined four general areas where relations are strategized (the 
arrows in Figure 2).  First, actors may invest in certain network relations to establish 
durability of the actor-network or persistence over time.  Durability, according to Law 
(1992), is difficult to maintain simply through thoughts and speech.  More durable are 
performed relations, such as when interactions are formally defined or built into 
particular roles (similar to Weber’s idea of formal rationality).   
Also rather durable, especially when effectively situated amongst a network of 





buildings” (Law 1992:387).  This is when relations are not only built into a role, but also 
exist materially (e.g. mission statements and/or standard operating procedures in an 
employee handbook, specialized tools or equipment, uniforms). Apart from persistence 
across time (durability), another strategy of translation concerns “ordering through space” 
(Law 1992:387) or mobility.  Mobility involves the “materials and processes of 
communication” (Law 1992:87) (i.e. writing, social networks, rallies, monetary 
donations, websites, television advertisements) which allow actors to act at a distance 
thus policing the center and periphery of the actor-network.   
A third strategy of translation with which actor-network theory is concerned is the 
degree to which actors “anticipate the responses and reactions of the materials to be 
translated” (Law 1992:388) thus attempt to order relations in a network in such a way 
that they can “contain the resistance that would dissolve them” (p.388).  Last, the scope is 
a strategy of translation itself (Law 1992:388).  While Law (1992) argued that this is 
most often local or from a centralized network-building actor, he also mentions that this 
activity may take place from periphery to center or perhaps from anywhere throughout 
the network as it is an effect of relations/interactions and if a location is indeed 
determined, this is only because there is a center with which to compare it.  The key 
research questions of this research are derived directly from the stages of translation and 
the strategies by which actors within the LFTB actor-network adopted to establish their 
desired orderings of the LFTB network during the 2012 LFTB food scare.  
Methodology  
 At its core, this study is an analysis of discourse where “discourse” is 





narratives, and statements that advance a particular version of ‘the truth’ about objects, 
persons, events, and the relations between them” (Long as cited in Wright and 
Middendorf 2008:75).  Specifically, guided by ANT, actors were followed through their 
process of translation to reveal how discourses were performed and materially embodied 
through the enrollment of particular actors, certain narratives, communicative techniques 
(i.e. ordering of language), and other strategies used by BPI and ABC News to order the 
LFTB network.  Following the actors involved an examination of their practices via a 
qualitative content analysis of 18 YouTube videos produced by Beef Products 
Incorporated (See Appendix B) and 14 video broadcasts from ABC News (See Appendix 
C).   These videos were transcribed and coded using qualitative analysis software from 
QSR International, NVivo.  Though special attention was paid to identities of actors, their 
relationships with one another, and their framing of LFTB, data was open-coded 
following the methodological guidelines of ANT. 
Qualitative Content Analysis 
 This study utilized a qualitative content analysis of 18 videos released by BPI and 
14 ABC News video broadcasts during the 2012 LFTB food scare. Though not without 
its limitations, there are two important reasons for this method of data collection: 1) it 
coincides with ANT methodology, 2) it adds to the ways in which ANT is deployed in 
sociological research, and 3) video was a significant medium used by network-building 







Qualitative Content Analysis and ANT 
 Qualitative content analysis is a method highly congruent with the methodological 
mission of actor-network theory in three important ways: 1) a shared emphasis on 
context, 2) the agnosticism of the analyst, and 3) the goals of the study are not to 
establish some objective reality of a given situation.  Quantitative content analysis 
focuses on reconstructing texts into numerical form in order to examine frequency or 
other measurements of phenomena.  In contrast to quantitative content analysis, the 
primary goal of qualitative content analysis is to reconstruct context by taking into 
account the context of the subjects, considering the multiple meanings of the texts, and 
placing a greater emphasis on latent content or that which does not readily appear in the 
text (Kohlbacher 2006). “Context” to ANT is usually expressed in relational terms and 
thus reconstructing context in this ANT study involved examining the practices through 
which actors related to one another in an attempt to order the network according to their 
specific agendas.  Additionally, as Cassell and Symon pointed out, qualitative content 
analyses are “less likely to impose restrictive a priori classifications on the collection of 
data” and are thus more driven by “emergent themes and idiographic descriptions” versus 
“specific hypotheses and categorical frameworks” (1994:4).  These characteristics of 
qualitative content analyses echo the wariness of actor-network theorists to approach 
cases with some predetermined understandings or categorizations of actors’ practices 
(Law and Hassard 1999).  Latour (2007) envisions the ANT analyst as the proverbial “fly 
on the wall” (136) whose job it is only to describe the action taking place and to not take 
a “free ride” (137) by constraining the actors within some preexisting “social structure” 





for building knowledge when not attempting to uncover some “clear-cut objectivity or 
reality” (Kohlbacher 2006).  This is an analysis of controversy.  It is not the goal of this 
ANT analysis, and Latour (2007) might well say any ANT analysis, to reveal some 
“objective facts” in the sense of vindicating a particular actors’ account of “what really 
happened” in the controversy. Coinciding with the constructivist tradition of a qualitative 
approach, ANT recognizes that “meaning emerges from interaction and is not 
standardized from place to place or person to person” (Rubin and Rubin 1995: 31).  There 
are multiple realities regarding “what really happened” during the 2012 LFTB food scare.  
The goal of this study is to identify these discourses and unpack the strategies through 
which the network-building actors, BPI and ABC News, supported them.  In using a 
content-analysis to accomplish this goal, the study is also adding to the ways in which 
ANT has been deployed.   
Building ANT Methodology  
While the use of ANT has gained some traction in food and agriculture studies, 
few examples exist of research conducted using content analysis.  The closest known 
example is Richard Nimmo’s (2011) documentary historiography of the socio-material 
history of milk in the US.  Similar to Nimmo’s (2011) study, texts, in the form of 
transcribed video narratives, were also an important source of data.  Nimmo argued that 
ANT “offers a distinctive way of seeing texts” as “relational inscriptions embedded in 
hybrid networks which they help to assemble” (2011:116).  Texts reveal relations within 
networks as they often act like a glue working to bond a network in a certain order.  
According to Nimmo, the goal of the analyst is to trace “what kinds of relations the texts 





they are inscribing” (2011:116).  Utilizing videos allows this analysis to expand beyond 
an examination of texts to consider how imagery, tones of voice, and even the editing of 
videos are sources of data providing information about how actors attempted to order 
their networks.  In addition to texts, the other sources of data provided by videos are also 
“vital conduits for the very processes of network assemblage and mediation taking place” 
(Nimmo 2011: 116).  Videos were also an integral source of data for this study as they 
played an important role in the 2012 LFTB food scare. 
Videos and 2012 LFTB Food Scare 
 Selecting videos as the data source for this study was highly practical since video 
was an important medium through which actors attempted to order the LFTB network 
during the 2012 LFTB food scare.  While BPI did release a website, 
www.beefisbeef.com, and ABC News encouraged viewers to send them questions via 
their website, video was the primary vehicle through which both network-building actors 
revealed their discourse and the other actors they enrolled to support it.  Perhaps obvious 
but nonetheless worth mentioning, it was through their video broadcasts that ABC News 
first exposed the use of LFTB in ground beef to viewers.  Through 14 broadcasts ABC 
News presented their narratives and enrolled viewers, broadcasted their comments, and 
deployed a variety of different actors to help support their discourse.  BPI also engaged 
those visiting their website by providing a “Resources” link directing visitors to their 
YouTube Channel, “Beef Products,” at which 25 videos could be viewed promoting their 
company and their LFTB product.  Through utilizing videos, the network-building actors 





or consumers the roles they hope to establish for them using various narratives and sets of 
actors enrolled to communicate them.   
 Altogether this qualitative content analysis included 32 videos with 14 videos 
consisting of ABC News broadcasts and 18 videos derived from BPI’s YouTube 
Channel, “Beef Products.” These videos ranged in length and content.  The shortest video 
from BPI was a 35 seconds, while the longest video was just over 48 minutes in length.  
BPI’s videos ranged from short interviews with key actors, to informational/educational 
videos designed to inform viewers about key aspects of LFTB (e.g. safety, use of 
ammonia, importance of innovation), to lengthy press conferences.  (Appendix B 
provides a table summarizing the titles, dates released, and brief content descriptions of 
BPI’s YouTube videos.)  It is important to note that some videos released before the 2012 
LFTB food scare were included in the analysis because they were linked to BPI’s 
“BeefIsBeef.com” website created during the scare.  BPI videos were selected from their 
YouTube Channel based upon the criteria that their primary focus was discussing their 
LFTB product.  ABC News videos ranged in length from 30 seconds to 3 minutes of 
longer investigative reports.  All videos were ABC News broadcasts, however, half 
(seven) were from their flagship program, ABC News with Diane Sawyer, while the 
remaining videos were from various ABC News programs including Good Morning 
America, ABC News Nightline, and ABC News Money Matters.  The dates of the ABC 
News videos ranged from early March 2012 to the beginning of April 2012.  (Appendix 
C serves as a guide to the ABC News broadcasts, including details about the program, 
broadcast dates, and brief synopses.)  ABC News videos were selected based upon the 





the ABC News website, abcnews.com.  Taken together, the videos described above 
represent the population analyzed in this study (See Appendices B and C for full listings). 
Research Strategy  
 The research strategy utilized to examine the 2012 LFTB food scare is a case 
study.  It is important to emphasize the distinction of case study as a “research strategy” 
and not a research method because case studies can utilize various methods of which this 
case study happens to employ a qualitative content analysis.  Case study research is 
common and useful in ANT analyses as ANT inquiries often begin by examining local 
sites/interaction (Latour 2007).  This is not to say that ANT studies have no interest in 
“global” interactions, but that for the ANT analyst all local sites are just as much “global” 
as they are “local” since agency is dispersed throughout an actor-network (Latour 2007).  
Thus case studies, whether interested in “global” or “local” affairs, are well suited to an 
ANT analysis as they are an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2003:15).  Boundaries of actor-
networks are often “fuzzy” and difficult to establish as strands of relations can sometimes 
seemingly stretch to infinity.  Additionally, both ANT and case studies are well suited to 
investigating “technically distinctive situations” (Yin 2003:15) like the 2012 LFTB food 
scare.  The LFTB actor-network is a specific type of socio-technical arrangement, and the 
2012 food scare surrounding it was a unique event when compared with other scares (e.g. 
nobody had been knowingly sickened from consuming LFTB, LFTB was not found 





scare required an equally unique research strategy and thus an intrinsic case study was 
pursued.  
 In keeping with the central research question of this study, “how did network-
building actors in the 2012 LFTB food scare attempt to order the LFTB network?,” the 
type of case study utilized was an intrinsic case study.  The purpose of this study was not 
to test hypotheses or generalize findings to other food scares, but to describe, through the 
lens of ANT, the network-building activities of the 2012 LFTB food scare within the 
“real life context in which it occurred” (Baxter and Jack 2008:548).  This places this 
research squarely within the category of an intrinsic case study or a study where “the 
intent is to better understand the case” not “because the case represents other cases,” but 
because the “case itself is of interest” (Baxter and Jack 2008:548).  While this may leave 
some people scratching their heads with regard to why this particular case is so 
interesting, the changes to public policy regarding labeling of ground beef and the 
choices of the National School Lunch Program are reason enough to justify inquiry.   
Study Design 
 Equipped with the methodological principles of ANT, the design of this study 
most closely followed a conventional content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon 2005).  Since 
a conventional qualitative analysis is “used with a study whose aim is to describe a 
phenomenon” when “existing theory or research literature on the phenomenon is limited” 
(Hsieh and Shannon 2005:1279), it is a design compatible with the goal of better 
understanding and describing the network-ordering process of the 2012 LFTB food scare.  





qualitative analyses avoid “using preconceived categories” and instead allow “categories 
and names for categories to flow form the data” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005:1279) – a 
process known as inductive category development.  The advantage of this approach is 
that the “knowledge generated” is based on the actions and perspectives of the actors and 
thus “grounded in the actual data” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005:1280).  The driving 
rationale for this type of research design is that the actors’ actions and their perspectives 
are ‘speaking’ for themselves, strengthening internal validity of the findings.   
Research Procedure 
 Content analyzing video presents challenges for categorizing and coding data 
unique to the medium.  Video content is multi-dimensional in both the manifest and 
latent content as it utilizes language in spoken-word form, language in the form of written 
text appearing in graphics on screen (including how the text is illustrated), tone of voice, 
graphical imagery (e.g. photos, animations), filming location/setting, costume/dress of 
persons, and title or status of persons included/interviewed in the film.  These different 
aspects of content are difficult to account for at the onset of an analysis and require 
prolonged and repetitive engagement with the content.  Additionally, when undertaking 
an ANT analysis the relations and actors involved in the network-building process are 
unknown and must be continuously accounted for as the analyst moves through the 
content.  The need for repeated contact with the video content required a procedure of 
categorization and coding that mirrored this need.  Mayring’s (2000) procedure for 





Following Mayring’s (2000) process for inductive category development (Figure 
2, p.47 in this document), the computer coding software NVivo was used to code all 32 
videos (18 from BPI and 14 from ABC News).   The first step in this process was to 
choose which videos to examine.  As previously stated, videos were utilized because they 
were a key source of communication in the 2012 LFTB food scare and because they were 
the medium through which different relations and network building activities were 
revealed by the network-building actors, BPI and ABC News.  Videos for BPI and ABC 
News were selected based upon the criteria that LFTB be the primary focus of the videos.  
The audio from these videos were transcribed verbatim using NVivo qualitative analysis 
software.   
Several advantages were realized by utilizing NVivo for the coding procedure of 
this study.  Perhaps the greatest general advantage of NVivo was the efficiency attained 
from integrating transcription, coding, and analysis within one piece of user-friendly 
software.  Second, NVivo software allowed for efficient and detailed organization of 
codes (“nodes” in NVivo) including the recording of detailed descriptions of codes as 
well as placing them within broader categories (“classifications” in NVivo).  Third, the 
ability to alter the names and to expand or contract definitions of codes upon the 
discovery of new information was important in this study.  NVivo allows for a user to 
select and make changes to all instances of a certain code without having to move 
through the data code-by-code to do so.  Fourth, nodes in NVivo can be color-coded and 
their overlap quickly examined as they place codes within the margins of text using a 
color-coding system.  Finally, NVivo provides tools to quantify nodes, the frequency 





between certain codes.  This permitted the visual examination of relations between 
certain people, themes, and other actors in the study.  After selecting videos as the source 
of texts and NVivo as the analytical tool used to perform the analysis, it was important to 
think carefully about the research question informing my analysis and how they might 
manifest within the content.  
 In Mayring’s (2000) model, the research question and the theoretical framework 
drive the development and of categories and codes examined.  Furthermore, the 
development of codes is subject to a feedback loop as the researcher is confronted with 
new information and new themes emerge (Mayring 2000).   This study followed the 
feedback loop through extensive notes taken during the transcription process as well as 
coding half of the transcripts, 25 percent from the BPI videos and 25 percent from the 
ABC News videos, and then evaluating these with respect to the research questions and 
actor-network theoretical framework.  Revaluating the codes after analyzing 50 percent 
of the transcripts served as a “formative reliability check” (Figure 2, and Mayring 2000).  
The first step in this process was to identify the network-building actors.   
Although agency is viewed by ANT as a relational effect, some actors have 
stronger investments in the order of their networks.  These “network-building actors” are 
the actors around which a networks are centered and from which network-building 
activities stem.  In this study, BPI and ABC News were identified as the network actors 
as ABC News was a central actor in contesting the order of the LFTB actor-network 
while BPI was the central actor attempting to retain its pre-food scare order.  It is also 
important to point out that both BPI and ABC News are organizations comprised of many 





network.  It is this punctualization, and action as seemingly single entities, which justifies 
the discussion of BPI and ABC News within this study as single network-building actors.  
After all, according to Latour (2007), all actors are at the same time networks – hence the 
term “actor-network.”  After identifying network-building actors, the next step was to 
follow them by locating and examining their practices in the videos.  These practices 
included: 1) key narratives and problematizations of the 2012 LFTB food scare, 2) the 
actors enrolled by BPI and ABC News support their narratives, 3) the images and 
language used to communicate the narratives.  Code development centered on the 
incidence of these practices within the transcribed videos.  (See Appendix D and 





Figure 2. Mayring’s (2000) Model for Inductive Category Development* 
 
         *Model adapted from Mayring (2000) 
 The first category from which codes were derived was the key narratives and 
problematizations of the 2012 LFTB food scare.  A problematization is when an actor 
defines a problem and may propose a solution to resolving the problem.  As displayed in 
the code sheets in Appendix C and D, problematizations in the 2012 LFTB food scare 
primarily involved claims making regarding LFTB, BPI, ammonia, and other actors.  
Overwhelmingly, the codes developed from the transcripts paint conflicting claims 
between the two network-building actors.  For example, while ABC News made claims 
that “LFTB is a filler,” BPI countered those claims and expressed that “LFTB is not a 





network heavily influenced and populated the development of codes.  Also important 
were the actors enrolled to support these claims/frames.   
 Just as important as the narratives themselves, the next step of code development 
included an examination of the actors enrolled by network-building actors to 
communicate and support the narratives.  Exploring the actors enrolled by network-
building actors yielded a cast of actors including academics, politicians, and special 
interest groups.  Identifying these actors provided information about the relations making 
up the 2012 LFTB food scare.  Additionally, understanding the enrolled actors provided 
information about what types of knowledge was preferenced by network-building actors 
as well as adding context to the fissures between their differing narratives.  While it was 
important to identify these actors, their relations, and their narratives, how network-
building actors communicated their messages was also significant.  
 When communicating narratives, how actors communicate a message (i.e. the 
language, tone of voice, gestures, or imagery they use) is sometimes as important as the 
text of the message itself.  Qualitative content analysis encourages the analyst to reach 
beyond the manifest content of the words and into the latent content comprising 
discourse.  When examining the videos, this included special attention to the imagery, 
language, text font, and editing utilized by network-building actors in disseminating their 
discourse.  Mayring’s (2000) procedure for inductive category development was 
especially important in this phase of the coding process as it encourages periodically 
revisiting already-coded data to improve the reliability of codes in their alignment with 
research questions and theoretical framework as well as their representation of both 





examine the framing of events as they were presented by each network-building actor 
through their editing, language, imagery, etc.  For example, a reexamination of BPI’s 
video of a press conference during the 2012 LFTB food scare yielded significant 
differences in editing when compared with the edits of the video by ABC News.  This 
provided an impetus for further comparisons in editing of videos by network-building 
actors and revealed analysis likely missed sans any periodic revisiting of data.  Despite 
the benefits of this coding procedure and the qualitative content analysis within which it 
was employed, some limitations of this study’s methodological approach are noteworthy. 
Limitations of Methodology 
 As with any methodological approach, there are some important limitations to this 
qualitative content analysis.  First, using a case study research strategy along with a 
qualitative content analysis hinders the generalizability of findings beyond the case of the 
2012 LFTB food scare.  The limited generalizability of this case provides challenges 
when attempting to compare this case with other food scares and build coherent theory or 
general principals.  While generalizability was not a goal of this study, it is mentioned as 
a limitation because the current body of food scare literature is lacking unification.  More 
generalizable food scare studies would likely add coherence to the literature and inform 
response policies for government, private companies, and even universities.  The second 
limitation of methods employed in this study stems from a lack of triangulation of coders.  
Using multiple coders to examine and code data would likely improve the reliability of 
the codes within this study.  Coder triangulation in this study demands secondary coders 
with specialized knowledge of ANT and the translation process. Due to budget 





addressed through Mayring’s (2000) coding procedure which stressed a continuous 
evaluation of category and code development.  Despite these limitations, the analysis of 





















- Analysis: Discourse Coalitions - 
Discourse Coalitions  
 The goal of this study was to identify and describe the “discursive and material 
resources” (Lockie and Kitto 2000:14) used by network-building actors to order relations 
during the 2012 LFTB food scare.  This qualitative content analysis of videos released by 
BPI and ABC News revealed distinct discourse coalitions around each network-building 
actor as well as narratives circulated by each coalition reflective of their divergent 
discourses.  Discourse coalitions included what are conceptualized as conflicting central 
discourses along with a number of supportive secondary discourses.  The central 
discourse of the BPI discourse coalition (“pro”-LFTB) was largely aimed at quelling 
concerns about LFTB, while the ABC News discourse coalition (“anti”-LFTB) focused 
on raising concerns about LFTB.  The two discourse coalitions utilized a variety of more 
specific secondary narratives (problematizations) to support their pro- or anti-LFTB 
positions with consumers situated as the obligatory passage point upon which the 
prevailing order depended.  These narratives are conceptualized as arising from divergent 
habitus between the network-building actors, with BPI occupying what is proposed as an 
“agro-industrial habitus” and ABC News occupying a “moral panic” habitus.  Each 
habitus reflects the differences in the relations BPI and ABC News has with LFTB and 
meat in-general.  Prior to delving into the specifics of these narratives, it is important to 
identify actors and map the discourse coalitions forming the 2012 LFTB food scare actor-





Following the process of translation revealed how discourses were performed and 
materially embodied through the enrollment of particular actors, deployment of 
narratives, and communicative techniques (i.e. ordering of language, imagery) used by 
BPI and ABC News.   This analysis yielded two central discourses along with a number 
of secondary discourses.  Central as it is used here is not a claim regarding the power of 
the discourse as in the central discourses being the more powerful discourses.  What is 
meant by central is that these discourses are broader overarching narratives which are 
supported by and can be observed through a number of other subnarratives.  Without the 
support of the various secondary discourses, the central discourse cannot exist.  The 
secondary discourses (and the actors, texts, images, etc. that constitute them) are the 
scaffold upon which the central discourse is built.  The two primary discourses uncovered 
through this analysis were with regard to consumer concern: 1) LFTB is a product worthy 
of consumer concern, and 2) LFTB is a product with which consumers should not have 
concern.  Supporting these discourses were a set of secondary discourses, later 
conceptualized as “problematizations,” along with a variety of other actors all forming 
two discourse coalitions. 
 Controversies include sets of conflicting actors and discourses which coalesce in 
antagonistic groups in order to achieve certain goals (i.e. dominant discourse, stabilized 
network, policy outcomes) (Horowitz 2012).  In the 2012 LFTB food scare controversy 
the two primary conflicting actors were the network-building actors, BPI and ABC News.  
Around these network-building actors and their central discourses formed two “discourse 
coalitions” or “the ensemble of a set of story lines, the actors that utter these story lines, 





(Hajer 1993:47).  The concept of discourse coalition is useful in an actor-network 
analysis because the construction of a discourse coalition mirrors the process of 
translation - the building and maintenance of associations between heterogeneous actors 
with network-building actors working to assign other actors “identity, interests, a role to 
play, a course of action to follow, and projects to carry out” (Callon 1986:24).  
Additionally, the end goal of a discourse coalition, establishing a dominant discourse, 
coincides with the end-goal of the translation process – a stabilized network reflecting the 
network-building actor’s preferred order of the actor-network (Latour 2007).  Examining 
the translation process serves to explain the mechanisms by which discourse coalitions 
form and, ultimately, actor-networks become stabilized.   
 The content analysis of the videos released by BPI as well as ABC News, two 
discourse coalitions that formed in the 2012 LFTB food scare were revealed: 1) “pro-
LFTB” coalition with BPI as the primary network-builder and with the goal of quelling 
consumer concern about LFTB and 2) an “anti-LFTB” coalition with ABC News as the 
primary network-builder and with the goal of raising consumer concern about LFTB.  
What is meant by “pro-LFTB” is that the actors and discourses supporting this discourse 
coalition are centered on providing support for the continued production of LFTB and, 
ultimately, a return to the blackboxed conditions pre-food scare when little public 
concern about LFTB existed.  On the other hand, “anti-LFTB” is conceptualized as actors 
and discourses centered on permanently altering the pre-food scare order of the LFTB 
actor-network as a result of increased public awareness and concern.  Both of these 
discourse coalitions were supported by the relations of various actors including 





Placing actors into categories like “politicians” or “academics” or into “pro-” and 
“anti-” “discourse coalitions” is a simplification of the diversity amongst these actors and 
their relations within the 2012 LFTB food scare.  Not all actors within the category of 
“politicians” likely possess exactly the same interests or occupy the same positions within 
the LFTB actor-network.  Furthermore, as discussed later, not all categories of actors fit 
well within either the anti- or pro-LFTB discourse coalition.  The placement of actors 
into categories serves as a tool for clearer conceptualization of these actors and their 
similar roles within the coalitions into which they were enrolled.  Placing these categories 
within discourse coalitions illustrates their relations with the primary network-building 
actors, BPI and ABC News.  What follows is a description of these discourse coalitions, 
the categories of actors inhabiting them, and the roles these actors filled within the 2012 
LFTB food scare.  Where applicable, also included are discussions of these categories of 
actors within the context of previous food scares.   
Pro-LFTB Discourse Coalition 
 The pro-LFTB discourse coalition centered on BPI as the primary network-
building actor.  However, designating this coalition as “centered on” BPI is not to 
designate it as the “most powerful” actor, but simply the actor involved in enrolling other 
actors to act on its behalf in an attempt to return the LFTB actor-network to its pre-food 
scare configuration.  Actor-network theory views power as a dispersed quality located 
within the relations an actor has with other actors rather than some centralized possession 
(Latour 2007).  BPI is thus only as powerful as those actors with whom it is associated 





academics, politicians, trade associations, government regulators, and consumers that 
ultimately empower BPI and their discourse.   
 Actors forming the pro-LFTB discourse coalition consisted of BPI employees, 
academics, politicians, and trade association and other special interest groups.  Despite 
their diversity and membership to various different organizations, these actors all worked 
to alleviate concerns over the presence of lean finely-textured beef within the US ground 
beef supply.  The 2012 LFTB food scare revealed the extent to which food processors 
depend upon the enrollment of a variety of actors to support the production and sale of 
their products.  What follows is a more detailed description of the actors within each of 
these categories, including their roles and the activities through which they worked to 
support the pro-LFTB discourse. 
BPI Employees 
 Employees of BPI were a ubiquitous presence in YouTube videos produced by 
the company.  Seven upper-level administrators, including founders Eldon and Regina 
Roth, were included in the videos.  Personnel appearing most frequently were Craig 
Letch, BPI’s Director of Food Safety, Rich Jochum, Corporate Administrator, and Jay 
Williams, BPI Plant Manager.  Primarily, the role assumed by BPI’s personnel was 
consumer education.  These educational efforts, described in further detail in the 
“problematizations” discussion, were primarily aimed at demonstrating the safety and 
necessity of LFTB within the ground beef agrifood network.  In the video titled, “Beef 
Products Inc. New Testing for E.coli,” for example, Craig Letch explained BPI’s test-





[T]esting and hold procedures for non-0157 S. tex.  That’s an additional six 
strains of E.coli.  BPI’s hold and test program consists of sampling out of each 
and every box of product.  That product is stored in the freezer and not released in 
our system until negative test results are received from our third party laboratories 
(Beef Products Incorporated 2012m). 
Through this video, Letch is educating viewers on the safety procedures BPI takes to 
ensure the products leaving their facility are tested not only for the commonly infectious 
E.coli 0157H7, but also additional potentially harmful strains of E.coli.  Within the role 
of educator, BPI’s employees are striving to communicate what they see is “the truth” 
behind their product.  BPI’s “truth” is not a singularity, but a collection of claims 
regarding the safety and utility of LFTB.  Beyond BPI employees, a host of academics, 
namely animal and food scientists, were enrolled by BPI to support their version of the 
“truth.”  
Academics 
 Relations between academia, agribusiness, and the food industry have a long and 
complex history (Anderson 2009; Ogle 2013).  University scholars working in the areas 
of food and agriculture conduct research at virtually every point along the agrifood chain.  
While animal scientists at land grant universities may study food at the production level, 
e.g. feed-to-milk production ratios of distiller grain consumption in dairy cattle, nutrition 
scholars working on the other end of the chain at the consumption level might examine 
the snacking habits of low-income youth.  The relations are diverse, complex, and 
sometimes highly political.  Food scholars like Dr. Marion Nestle (2007) of New York 
University and Cornell University act as vocal critics of the connections between “big 
food,” “big ag,” and the university.  At least part of this criticism stems from the fuzzy 





Nestle advocate for a more exclusive and transparent boundary between the two, the 
contemporary reality is that the boundary between the university and industry is difficult 
to see and perhaps nonexistent.  Furthermore, whether a person sees this as troubling, 
beneficial, or perhaps some combination of the two, is largely dependent upon their own 
values.  Regardless of opinion, the relations are there and BPI’s enrollment of academics 
into the pro-LFTB discourse coalition during the 2012 LFTB food scare demonstrates a 
case where the relations between the academy and industry are exposed.  
 The pro-LFTB discourse coalition had strong support from the membership of 
academics out of Iowa State University, Texas A & M, the University of Texas, and 
Kansas State University.  Three of the academics voicing their support for LFTB had 
PhDs in Food Science & Technology, while two others held doctorates in Biology.  
Nearly all of these scientists, with the exception of one, were working in an agriculture-
related department or teaching ag-related courses at their respective universities.  Their 
roles as university educators translated well into their roles as educators in the videos 
produced by BPI.  When appearing in the videos, four of the academics were seated in 
what appeared to be a laboratory classroom with whiteboards, illustrations, and lab 
equipment visible in the background.  This lab environment provided a complimentary 
setting to the educational lessons provided by the scientists.  One such lesson included in 
BPI’s “Ammonia in Foods” video included explanations of what ammonia was, how it 
had been used as a fertilizer in agriculture, and why it is a necessary actor in mitigating 
the presence of E.coli in ground beef.  This video (as well as others covering different 
aspects of LFTB) included diagrams and computer-generated animations to demonstrate 





presence of ammonia in a variety of organisms we interact with in everyday life, 
including ourselves.  Video footage of ammonium-hydroxide’s chemical symbol, “NH3,” 
floating above live-action images of people, dogs, cows, and carrots were meant to 
illustrate the “natural occurrence” of ammonia in many living organisms (see Figure 3).  
As Food Microbiologist Dr. Gary Acuff, Director of Food Safety at Texas A & M, 
explained:  
Ammonia is made up of nitrogen and hydrogen.  We have ammonia and nitrogen 
all over the place [camera pans to view of a town from the sky, cooking line at a 
restaurant].  We find it in food, we have it in the soil [woman in wheat field 
surrounded by mountains]. We have it in our bodies.  It’s just part of our natural 
environment (Beef Products 2012h).  
Figure 3. NH3 above Carrots from BPI video "Ammonia in Foods" 
 
Dr. Acuff’s comments and the lesson-like manner through which they were delivered are 
reflective of statements made by other academics accompanying him in the BPI videos.  
Dr. John Floros, Head of the Food Science Department of Penn State, offered a lesson on 
the necessity of innovations like ammonia fertilizer and LFTB as part of the solution for 





Apart from appearances in the BPI informational videos, the academics of the 
pro-LFTB discourse coalition were also present for fielding questions at press 
conferences and other public events.  One such event held at Iowa State University and 
sponsored by ISU’s Block and Bridle Club was designed, as the title “The Truth: Lean 
Finely Textured Beef” suggests, to provide a forum for a panel of pro-LFTB actors to 
publicly counter the anti-LFTB narratives and answer questions from concerned audience 
members.  Serving on the panel was ISU Professor of Animal Science, Dr. Jim Dickson, 
along with Janet Riley of the industry interest group, the American Meat Institute, Iowa 
Governor Terry Branstad, and Nancy Degner of the Iowa Beef Industry Council.  In 
BPI’s YouTube video covering the ISU forum, “Lean Finely Textured Beef Forum Jim 
Dickson,” Dr. Dickson lays out his work with BPI: 
I’ve been working with BPI and its product for nearly 10 years.  … Dr. Catherine 
Woteki who was a dean here, called me over and said ‘oh by the way, there’s a 
company that’s got a process that will kill E.coli.  And I’d like you to work with 
them.’ … I was kind of a skeptic when I went in there, but what I found over the 
past years of working with that company is that these folks are really serious 
about it.  It’s easy to say the right things, it’s easy to stand up in front of a group 
like this and say the right things.  You know, it’s hard to live it day in and day out.  
It may sound like a commercial for the company, but you know what, that’s what 
they do.  Day in and day out (Beef Products Incorporated 2012p).   
Through this quote Dr. Dickson is not only vouching for the utility of LFTB, but also the 
legitimacy of the BPI company within the LFTB agro-food network.  Dr. Dickson’s work 
for the company coupled with his testament of their good character demonstrate not only 
the role academics play as contracted researchers for BPI, but also their involvement in 
public relations management for the company.  Dr. Dickson and other academics were 
not the only public employees enrolled by BPI to speak on their behalf.  A number of 






 Similar to the relations between academia and the agri-food industry, the relations 
between politicians and government leaders and agri-food corporations are complex and 
contested.  Stretching back to the mid-1950s, policies heralded by then United States 
Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz produced significant changes in the scale, diversity, 
and culture of production agriculture and ultimately contributed the growth of large 
agribusiness corporations (Anderson 2009).  Relations between the agri-food industry 
and political figures, especially in states where agricultural output is high, is at face-value 
not all that scandalous as the relations are part of the necessary framework for building 
regulatory and economic policy.  However, it is the nature of these relations including the 
possibility for conflicts-of-interest that often come under scrutiny by outspoken scholars 
like Dr. Marion Nestle.  Nestle and other scholars critical of the agri-food industry 
vocalize concern regarding the interests ultimately served when former government 
regulators or politicians move from their regulatory and policy posts to high-level 
positions within the agri-food industries (and sometimes vice versa).  Former chief of 
staff at the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service Lisa Wallenda Picard, for 
example, ruffled some feathers when she moved from her regulatory position to the vice 
president of scientific and regulatory affairs at the National Turkey Federation (Food 
Chemical News 2011; Philpott 2011). 
Apart from these much-criticized relations, the role of politicians in past food 
scares (e.g. the March 2007 E.coli spinach scare in California and 2011 US listeriosis 
outbreak from Colorado melons) has largely involved attempts to shield the public from 





tears in regulatory policy (Herrmann, Warland, and Sterngold 1997).  The 2012 LFTB 
food scare differs significantly from these previous scares in that these past scares 
involved undisputed evidence of severe illnesses and even death, while the 2012 LFTB 
food scare involved no such sickness outbreak.  This difference is reflected in the 
predominant role taken by political figures in the 2012 LFTB food scare.  While one 
Democratic Maine Congresswoman Chellie Pingree circulated a petition to ban LFTB 
from the National School Lunch Program, the most vocal politicians were enrolled into 
the pro-LFTB discourse coalition as key spokespeople in a public relations campaign to 
counter the anti-LFTB discourse of the opposing coalition (Associated Press 2012).  
Politicians expressed the goal of mitigating the probable negative economic impacts of 
losing BPI’s LFTB processing plants.   
In terms of numbers, politicians were rivaled only by BPI employees within the 
pro-LFTB discourse coalition at a total of seven representatives.  Pro-LFTB politicians 
included the governors of Iowa, Kansas, and Texas, lieutenant governors from Nebraska 
and South Dakota, and former US and state representatives from Iowa and South Dakota 
respectively.  According to a publication by Iowa State University Extension Livestock 
Economist Shane Ellis (2010), the five states where the politicians work represent five of 
the top ten beef cattle producing states in terms of total head of beef cattle.  Apart from 
former Democratic United States Representative Stephanie Herseth-Sandlin, all other 
politicians in the pro-LFTB coalition are members of the Republican Party.  Hailing from 
top beef-producing states, the politicians of the pro-LFTB coalition presented stern 
warnings and expressed strong concerns regarding the negative economic impacts of 





governors and lieutenant governors voiced their support for BPI and their concerns with 
plant closures and job losses in their states.  In a somber tone, Texas Governor Rick Perry 
told ABC News correspondent Jim Avila: 
But I do want to do that and I think it's important for those of you in the media to 
be able to answer to the public because it's the consuming public that's being hurt 
here.  I have to go back to Texas and explain to people in Amarillo why they may 
not have a job.  And I'm tellin' ya I don't, I don't know the answer to that.  Has 
there been one individual in this country that has been poisoned, or has been sick, 
or has died from a product that came out of this company?  You wouldn't let me 
get away with that.  Stonewallin' ya (Beef Products Incorporated 2012o).   
Governor Perry’s comments reflect his economic concerns following the announcement 
of BPI’s pending Amarillo, TX plant closure (Schulte 2012).  Perry’s statement also 
echoes the frustrations of other political leaders including Governor of Iowa Terry 
Brastad who mentioned that it is “very hard to create jobs within our states in a difficult 
economy” and that the closure of BPI’s plants, including one in Waterloo, IA, “makes it 
even harder” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012o).  As a result of their frustrations, these 
governors along with other political leaders from top beef-producing states joined the 
pro-LFTB discourse coalition and participated in a plant-tour, press conference, BPI 
cookouts, and other events held to support BPI and LFTB.  Politicians were also 
accompanied by actors from various interest groups.  
Interest Groups 
 Interest groups operating at local, regional, and national levels are prolific 
throughout the landscapes of food and agriculture.  An interest group is any organization 
seeking to promote publicly and create advantages for its cause (Baker and Losco 2008).  





promoting particular commodities (e.g. National Cattlemen’s Beef Association), 
consumer advocacy groups (e.g. Community Food Security Coalition), food industry 
labor unions (e.g. United Food and Commercial Workers International Union), 
agricultural labor unions (e.g. United Farm Workers), and many other groups working to 
advance agendas at various points along the agrifood chain.  The goals of these food and 
agriculture interest groups include raising awareness about their respective causes and 
also impacting food and agricultural policies.  As laid out by Wilde (2013), interest 
groups are powerful forces that can shape food and agriculture policy to coincide more 
strongly with their interests.  Interest groups attempt to shape everything from the largest 
piece of US agricultural legislation, the United States Farm Bill, to food labeling polices, 
and even worker wages (Wilde 2013).  Influencing agrifood policy often requires that 
these groups have the attention of key political figures and one way to attract this 
attention is through financial campaign contributions.  While there is no guarantee of a 
return on their investments, there is a body of research suggesting these investments do 
have some impact on agrifood policies in the US (Gawande 2005).  Furthermore, interest 
groups are sometimes in competition with one another and thus must work to establish 
the dominance of their narratives. In the 2012 LFTB food scare, for example, some 
interest groups inhabited the pro-LFTB discourse coalition while others were represented 
in the anti-LFTB coalition. 
 The interest groups enrolled in the pro-LFTB coalition were few in number, but 
diverse in the interests they represented.  Interest groups of the pro-LFTB discourse 
coalition included a trade association and a nonprofit public health organization.  The 





Institute, a “national trade association that represents companies that process 95 percent 
of red meat and 70 percent of turkey products in the US and their suppliers throughout 
America” (American Meat Institute 20141).   
Representing the AMI in the 2012 LFTB food scare was Senior Vice President of 
Public Affairs and Member Services, Janet Riley.  Through Riley, the role of AMI within 
the pro-LFTB coalition was to provide support in communicating “The Facts about Lean 
Finely Textured Beef” as viewed through the lens of BPI and the AMI trade association 
to which they belong (Beef Products Inc. 2013a).  Riley made appearances at the Iowa 
State University rally sponsored by the Block and Bridle Club, defended BPI and LFTB 
on ABC News, and appeared in various other videos produced by BPI to get out “the 
truth” about LFTB.  One “truth” with which Riley was especially concerned was the 
control over defining LFTB.  In a BPI-produced video titled “The Facts about Lean 
Finely Textured Beef,” Riley stated: 
I realize that recent news reports about lean finely textured beef have raised some 
concerns because some have dubbed this beef product, “pink slime.”  And the 
concern is understandable.  What you have been hearing is confusing and it’s 
unsettling because there is a lot of misinformation floating around in media 
coverage and on the internet.  I want to address some of these wild internet 
rumors and the claims that have appeared on some major TV networks.  Lean 
finely textured beef isn’t substandard beef.  It’s not scraps scooped from the floor.  
It’s not so-called salvage meat.  It’s not inedible meat that we somehow make 
edible and it’s not dogfood.  Here’s what lean finely textured beef is.  Now when 
a big beef carcass is cut down into smaller cuts, chunks of lean tissue and fat 
result.  We call them trimmings… Nutritionally it’s equal to ground beef.  It tastes 
like beef and under a microscope it looks like other beef.  The same two proteins 
from beef are found in all beef.  From filets and steaks to ribs and roasts and 
ground beef, as well as in lean finely textured beef (Beef Products Inc. 2013a). 
Here Riley first empathized with consumers’ concerns regarding LFTB by addressing 
consumers’ concerns with the product and agreeing that the information is “unsettling.”  





“media coverage” and “wild internet rumors” and claims from “major TV networks.”  
Finally, Riley redefined LFTB according to the preferred discourse of the pro-LFTB 
coalition by stating that LFTB is not “scraps” or “salvage,” but instead “trimmings” and 
ultimately, as indicated by the pro-LFTB coalition “Beef is Beef” slogan, LFTB is 
technically beef.  The video was an attempt to reach out to consumers and redefine their 
understanding of LFTB.   
 Another interest group enrolled into the pro-LFTB discourse coalition a food 
safety advocacy organization, STOP Foodborne Illness.  According to their website, 
Stopfoodborneillness.org, STOP Foodborne Illness is a “national nonprofit public health 
organization dedicated to the prevention of illness and death from foodborne illness by 
advocating for sound public policy, building public awareness, and assisting those 
impacted by foodborne illness” (STOP Foodborne Illness 2014).  Nancy Donley, the 
founder of STOP, filled the role of a food safety expert vouching for the safety of LFTB 
as well as BPI’s testing methods.  Donley is quoted on BPI’s “BeefIsBeef.com” website 
and served as a panelist at BPI’s press conference featuring governors, an animal science 
professor, and the USDA Undersecretary of Food Safety, Dr. Elisabeth Hagen.  Donley’s 
son died from consuming E.coli-contaminated ground beef and she declared BPI’s 
“commitment to food safety” as the reason why she is speaking to support them and their 
product.  Donley explained that she was “very concerned about campaigns such as” that 
against LFTB because she views LFTB as a “food safety innovation” that has “saved 
lives” (Beef Products Inc.b 2012).  According to Donley, “food safety” is BPI’s “number 
one concern” and their product helps to “make sure tragedies like what happened to [her] 





support for the BPI and the discourse of the pro-LFTB coalition through equating LFTB 
as a technology that saves lives.  As discussed later in this analysis, other actors of the 
pro-LFTB coalition echoed Donley’s safety discourse. 
Anti-LFTB Discourse Coalition 
 The anti-LFTB discourse coalition centered on ABC News as the primary 
network-building actor.  As previously noted with the BPI and the pro-LFTB coalition, 
the power exercised by ABC News through their series of “pink slime” broadcasts 
derived from their successful enrollment of other anti-LFTB actors.  Without investing in 
these relations, the anti-LFTB discourse coalition would not exist.  ABC News broadcasts 
provided a centralized outlet where the claims and stories of other anti-LFTB actors built 
a discourse coalition aimed at raising concerns over LFTB in the US ground beef supply.  
It is the associations with other actors including anchors and reporters, organic butchers, 
food retailers, bloggers, former government regulators, and consumers/viewers that 
ultimately empower ABC News and the collective anti-LFTB discourse coalition build 
around them.   
 The actors enrolled by ABC News to populate the anti-LFTB discourse coalition 
were diverse and fewer in number than those in the pro-LFTB actor network.  One 
possible explanation for the fewer number of actors populating the ABC News broadcasts 
when compared with videos produced by BPI is found in the differing structures between 
nightly television news reports and YouTube videos.  Television news reports delivered 
via nightly evening news programs are typically populated with a series of shorter 





events covered within the short time frame provides limited time for coverage of any 
single newsworthy event or issue and thus limits the number of actors enrolled for any 
particular story.  Additionally, the shorter time frame of evening television news reports 
also translates to more careful decisions regarding how interviews and other content are 
edited and distilled into their delivered format.  In contrast to television news reports, 
YouTube provides a platform for more frequent and lengthier video releases likely 
allowing BPI to include a larger number of enrolled actors and lengthier, more in-depth 
discussions with pro-LFTB actors.  Moreover, in contrast to the wide range of current 
events demanding coverage by ABC News, BPI was singularly focused on alleviating 
concerns over LFTB.  However, it is important to understand that the disparity in 
coverage and number of actors included by each network-building actor does not 
necessarily translate into a disparity in the power of their respective modes of 
communication.   
According to Nielsen Media Research, ABC World News with Diane Sawyer 
averaged just over 7.5 million viewers age for the week of March 5, 2012, the week 
during which the first story on “pink slime” or LFTB aired (Ford 2012).  This made ABC 
World News with Diane Sawyer the second most viewed news program in the United 
States during the week of March 5th, 2012 with just over 1 million fewer viewers than 
NBC Nightly News (Ford 2012).  When contrasting this with the number of BPI YouTube 
video views, BPI’s YouTube videos tallied just over 70,000 total viewers from the time 
the first video was released on July 13th, 2011, to September 13th, 2014 (YouTube 2014).  
This comparison of viewership between the pro-LFTB network-building actor, BPI, and 





News had fewer actors and less total coverage devoted to LFTB, the number of viewers 
reached by its flagship program, ABC World News with Diane Sawyer, far exceeded that 
of BPI’s YouTube videos.  Thus it is difficult to assert that fewer actors and fewer total 
minutes of coverage translated to less power or a less effective message for ABC News.  
Though beyond the scope of this study, the fact that the viewership of ABC World News 
with Diane Sawyer dwarfs that of BPI’s YouTube videos at least anecdotally suggests a 
more far-reaching and perhaps more dominant anti-LFTB message.   
ABC News Cast 
 Historically, the relations between media and the agrifood industry are peppered 
with tension – especially concerning food scares (Beardsworth and Keil 2001).  During 
the 1980s Alar food scare involving apples, for example, the CBS News program 60 
Minutes broadcast an investigative report involving research funded by the National 
Resource Defense Council finding the chemical used to prevent apples from ripening too 
quickly, Alar or daminozide, released carcinogens upon breaking down (Herrmann et al. 
1997).  This report heavily influenced apple consumption in the United States as 
consumers greatly reduced their consumption of apples and apple products (Herrmann et 
al. 1997).  Additionally, the United States Environmental Protection Agency changed 
their policies on Alar and ultimately banned the use of daminozide on food products 
(Hermann et al. 1997).  Uniroyal Chemical Company, the corporation that produced Alar, 
and apple growers from the state of Washington were outraged at the portrayal of Alar 
and organized a pro-Alar response including filing a libel lawsuit against CBS for their 
losses in Alar and apple sales (Hermann et al. 1997).  Alar and other food scares not the 





media often portray industrialized foods as questionable and deserving of scrupulous 
investigation.  In the 2012 LFTB food scare, the cast of ABC News fit within this role of 
“investigative journalists” reporting about a questionable beef product they labeled “pink 
slime.”   
 While “ABC News” is often discussed in this analysis as a singular actor, it is 
important to note that this is merely a punctualized description of a much larger actor-
network.  ABC News broadcasts included a cast of actors including anchors, reporters, 
and correspondents.  The two most noteworthy ABC News actors were ABC World News 
anchor Diane Sawyer and senior correspondent Jim Avila as they were the frequently 
appearing actors in the broadcasts.  Additionally, Avila was the lead correspondent in 
reporting the story of LFTB or, as frequently referred to by Avila and ABC News, “pink 
slime.”  Through their language, graphics, and the roles they assigned to other actors, the 
roles of Sawyer, Avila, and other ABC News reporters were framed as that of 
investigative journalists uncovering the details of a secretive meat industry practice.  As 
depicted in the screen capture below taken from the first ABC News broadcast covering 
LFTB titled “Pink Slime and You,” the caption “ABC News INVESTIGATES” is just 
one example of how ABC News worked to frame their LFTB series as investigative 





Figure 4. Framing as Investigative Journalism  
from ABC News Broadcast “Pink Slime and You” 
 
In addition to graphics, ABC News also used language to frame themselves as 
investigative journalists determined to “get answers” (ABC Newsb 2012).  At the 
beginning of the ABC World News’ third installment of the series titled “Pink Slime 
Outrage: Beef Industry Responds,” Sawyer explained: 
We are back on the case tonight.  Our ABC News investigation of the filler called 
"pink slime" in seventy percent of the ground beef sold at supermarkets in this 
country.  You have flooded us with emails about your attempts to get direct 
answers from your supermarkets.  Which ones allow it?  Which ones don't?  And 
what does the beef industry have to say?  ABC's Senior National Correspondent 
Jim Avila went right to the top to get answers (ABC Newsb 2012, emphasis 
mine).   
Through this quote, Sawyer reassured viewers of ABC News that they were “back on the 
case” and determined to “get answers” to the questions consumers asked via the “flood” 
of emails received by ABC News.  In addition to their investigative journalist role, as the 
central network-building actor, ABC News also held the role of enrolling other actors 





Anti-LFTB actors enrolled by ABC News 
Via their investigative journalism frame, ABC News helped to support the anti-
LFTB discourse coalition goal of raising concerns over LFTB through enrolling various 
other actors to build and support the network.  These actors appeared predominantly on 
ABC World News with Diane Sawyer, with less frequent appearances on other ABC 
News programs like Nightline.  The fewer numbers and diversity of actors enrolled by 
ABC News into the anti-LFTB discourse coalition when compared with that of the pro-
LFTB discourse coalition translated to less robust categorizations of actors.  This 
difference is reflected in the following discussion of enrolled anti-LFTB actors and their 
roles within the anti-LFTB discourse coalition. 
“Whistleblowers” 
 The role of whistleblowers in food scares and other agro-food issues is highly 
politicized and contested, especially with regard to identifying exactly whether someone 
disclosing information about an agrifood corporation is a “whistleblower” or a libelous 
defaming criminal.   According to the nonprofit whistleblower representation group, the 
Government Accountability Project (GAP), a whistleblower is: 
An employee who discloses information that s/he reasonably believes is evidence 
of illegality, gross waste or fraud, mismanagement, abuse of power, general 
wrongdoing, or a substantial and specific danger to public health and safety. 
Typically, whistleblowers speak out to parties that can influence and rectify the 
situation. These parties include the media, organizational managers, hotlines, or 
Congressional members/staff, to name a few (GAP 2014).   
 
Government Accountability Project is a nonprofit organization that provides legal 





action from corporations and other institutions they spoke out against.  Undercover viral 
videos depicting agricultural animal abuse from organizations like People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (PETA) and scares like the Alar food scare of the late 1980s 
prompted the growth of a challenging legal context for people claiming the status of 
whistleblower and the groups that represent them.  Agrifood industries lobbied hard to 
establish food disparagement laws, sometimes deemed “veggie libel laws,” in order to 
protect themselves against forms of speech potentially harmful to their bottom-line 
(Bedermen, Christensen, and Quesenberry 1997).  These laws expose the label 
“whistleblower” as a politically contested term and also reveal the significant roles that 
whistleblowers can play in food scare events.  During the 2012 LFTB food scare, the 
term whistleblower was revealed as a label not always voluntarily assigned.   
 While most of the scientists enrolled by the pro-LFTB discourse coalition were 
academics, the two scientists enrolled by ABC News were former USDA 
microbiologists.  Two actors included in the broadcast through which ABC News 
“broke” the story of LFTB in the US ground beef supply on network television news 
were former USDA microbiologists Gerald Zirnstein and Carl Custer.  Described by 
ABC News’ Diane Sawyer as a “whistleblower” (ABC Newsa 2012), Zirnstein is an 
important figure in the LFTB food scare as it was in his 2002 email to colleagues at the 
USDA that he coined the term “pink slime” (Moss 2009).    Zirnstein’s concern with 
LFTB was with what he felt it was “economic fraud” and not “fresh ground beef,” but 
instead “a cheap substitute being added in” (ABC Newsa 2012).  According to Carl 
Custer, his concern with the product was that he also did not consider it to be beef 





Perhaps equally as important as the opinions expressed by Zirnstein and Custer 
was the framing of their roles by ABC News as “whistleblowers” who have “come 
forward” to reveal that “pink slime” is in Americans’ ground beef (ABC Newsa 2012).  
Although labeled as a “whistleblower” in the March 7th ABC World News broadcast, in an 
interview with Reuters, Zirnstein was reluctant to label himself a “whistleblower” and 
instead referred to himself as “really an involuntary whistleblower” since the email he 
had sent in 2002 was a private internal email between Zirnstein and another work 
colleague (Gillam 2012).  Despite Zirnstein’s reluctance, the assignment of the role of 
whistleblower by ABC News helped to further foster their role as investigative journalists 
uncovering a shocking industry practice.  Zirnstein and Custer were not the only actors 
framed as whistleblowers within the 2012 LFTB food scare.  Another actor enrolled by 
ABC News, who is perhaps more congruently aligned with the face-valid definition of 
whistleblower, was former BPI Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, Kit Foshee.  
Foshee, a client of Government Accountability Project, had previously publicly claimed 
that the blending BPI product with other ground beef would not have any statistically 
significant antimicrobial reduction effect” (GAP 2012).  When appearing on ABC World 
News with Diane Sawyer, Foshee’s comments were used to solidify claims by Zirnstein 
and Custer that “it's not what the typical lay-person would consider meat” and also raised 
questions regarding the nutritional quality of LFTB (ABC Newsc 2012).  Zirnstein, 
Custer, and Foshee were not the only actors enrolled to support these claims.   
Food Retailers 
 Food retailers occupy a unique place within agro-food networks during food 





product suppliers, but are also the gatekeepers to consumers at the household level.  In 
this role, food retailers act like a liaison between the companies that process and 
manufacture foods and the consumers who ultimately purchase and eat the foods.  If 
consumers are unhappy with or have questions regarding a product’s quality, the food 
retailer is often the front line of addressing these consumer concerns and also the actor 
who then relays these concerns onto the supplier or processor.  It is through the relation 
to the food retailer that the customer’s desires and concerns are translated to the supplier.  
Through the food retailer, consumers collectively hold significant power over food 
product suppliers and processors.  During food scares, consumers translate the food 
concerns they encounter via the media and enroll food retailers to take action.   In the 
Alar scare of the late 1980s, food retailers under intense consumer pressure removed 
apples and some apple products from their shelves (Hermann et al. 1997).  This action 
had severe immediate negative consequences for orchards which then stopped using Alar 
which ultimately meant a loss for Alar manufacturer, Uniroyal Inc. (Hermann et al. 
1997).  Throughout the 2012 LFTB food scare, a similar storyline unfolded.  Within this 
scare, however, ABC News played a role in enrolling food retailers into the anti-LFTB 
discourse coalition.  
 As the mediators between BPI and consumers, food retailers played a significant 
role in the 2012 LFTB food scare.  ABC News recognized the mediator role inhabited by 
food retailers and used it to enroll them into the anti-LFTB discourse coalition.  In their 
March 9th broadcast titled “Pink Slime Outrage: Beef Industry Responds,” ABC World 
News with Diane Sawyer began the broadcast with a large red graphic reading “What’s in 





You have flooded us with emails about your attempts to get direct answers from 
your supermarkets.  Which ones allow it?  Which ones don't?  And what does the 
beef industry have to say?  ABC's Senior National Correspondent Jim Avila went 
right to the top to get answers (ABC Newsb 2012).   
 
ABC News then enrolled food retailers through soliciting comment on LFTB and 
including interviews with some retailers in their broadcasts.  This action positioned ABC 
News as a mediator between food retailers and their consumers.  ABC News enrolled 
consumers through soliciting emails from viewers to comment on the LFTB issue and 
then, after successfully enrolling these consumers, acted as the voice for consumers by 
enrolling food retailers to provide comments regarding their use of LFTB.  In the course 
of their interviews with food retailers, ABC News discussed LFTB with a well-known 
organic meats retailer, Joshua Applestone of Fleisher’s Pasture-Raised Meats.  
Applestone remarked that LFTB was an “unnatural process” and something that he said 
he “wouldn’t serve or sell his family” (ABC Newsb 2012).  Costco Wholesale’s Vice 
President for Food Safety, Craig Wilson, was also interviewed and commented that he 
personally didn’t know how he “could explain to a Costco member that we put a trim 
that's been treated with ammonia in their ground beef” (ABC Newsb 2012).  As seen 
below in Figure 5, ABC News displayed the Costco Wholesale and other larger retailers 
in a graphic reading “Contains No Pink Slime” juxtaposing their positions against other 
large retailers who “did not respond or comment,” said that they “complied with 





Figure 5. ABC News as a Mediator between Consumers and Food Retailers 
 
ABC News also provided “Tips for Checking Your Beef” to consumers who were 
concerned about whether they were purchasing LFTB (ABC Newsc 2012).  Through 
these actions ABC News framed themselves as an information source for LFTB in 
ground beef and further positioned themselves as a mediator between consumers and 
food retailers.  By identifying which retailers did and did not use “pink slime,” ABC 
News also likely placed further pressure on the retailers to reconsider their use of LFTB.  
Many retailers, including Safeway – the second largest supermarket chain in the country, 
were then mobilized by ABC News to divest of their LFTB use and by doing so were 
translated as anti-LFTB actors.  
Food Writers 
In addition to whistleblowers and food retailers, ABC News also enrolled food 
writers into the anti-LFTB discourse coalition.  While only two food writers were 
actually enrolled, these actors, especially blogger Bettina Siegel, are significant for their 





writers enrolled by ABC News were the Associated Press’ Food Editor J.M. Hirsch and 
food blogger Bettina Siegel.  Hirsch was enrolled as a food critic to conduct a “pink slime 
taste test.”  After cooking one burger with LFTB and one not containing the product, 
Hirsch’s on-air conclusion was that the “ground beef without the pink stuff in it is 
definitely a much better burger” (ABC Newsd 2012).  Food blogger Bettina Siegel was 
active in enrolling other actors into the anti-LFTB discourse coalition though her 
Change.org petition, “Tell USDA to STOP Using Pink Slime in School Food.” Siegel’s 
petition was launched on March 6th, 2012 and in just nine days collected over 200,000 
signatures.  During her interview on ABC World News with Diane Sawyer, Siegel 
commented that she thought “consumers have every right to know what they're eating” 
and that she thinks LFTB “needs to be labeled” (ABC Newse 2012).  Enrolling Hirsch 
and Siegel into the anti-LFTB discourse coalition only continued to add support for the 
concerns over LFTB raised by ABC News. 
Actors Occupying Both Coalitions 
 Within the 2012 LFTB food scare, some categories of actors are difficult to place 
completely within the pro- or anti-LFTB discourse coalitions.  As illustrated in Figure 6, 
human actors like government regulators and consumers, as well as nonhuman actors like 
E.coli bacteria and ammonia, occupy associations within the pro- and anti-LFTB 
discourse coalitions during the 2012 LFTB food scare.  For example, while USDA 
Undersecretary of Agriculture Dr. Elisabeth Hagen voiced that BPI’s product LFTB 
meets USDA and FDA regulations, the USDA also altered policies to permit school 
districts to select between ground beef containing LFTB and non-LFTB ground beef.  





however, the reality is that relations are complex and often messier than heuristic 
conceptualizations.   
Figure 6.  The 2012 LFTB Actor-Network and Discourse Coalitions 
 
Government Regulators 
 Even an adequate description of the role government regulators play in food 
scares could fill an entire tome.  Government regulators within the United States 
Department of Agriculture and Food and Drug Administration handle a broadly sweeping 
diverse array of tasks from conducting testing and risk assessments on the safety of 
foods, packaging, and ingredients, to regulating cultivation practices and labeling of 
organic foods (Wilde 2013).  Outside of the USDA and FDA, the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency is also involved in the regulation of certain chemical 
and biological agents used in the production and processing of agricultural products 





media, consumer advocacy groups, and contingents of concerned citizens.  In the midst of 
the Alar scare of the late 1980s, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the 
American Academy of Pediatrics along with a strong contingent of nervous consumers 
levied enough pressure on the EPA that they classified it as a “probable carcinogen” in 
1987 and later banned it in 1989 despite significant pushback from orchards and Alar 
manufacturer Uniroyal Inc. (Hermann et al. 1997; Nestle 2013).  The policy outcomes 
during the Alar scare are not unique.  In the 2012 LFTB food scare, the pro- and anti-
LFTB discourse coalitions jockeyed to enroll key government regulators to support their 
respective discourses.   
 Government regulators including United States Secretary of Agriculture Tom 
Vilsack and Undersecretary of Food Safety Dr. Elisabeth Hagen were two actors within 
the USDA enrolled by both the pro- and anti-LFTB discourse coalitions.  While publicly 
some statements appear as though regulators occupy firm roles of government support 
within the pro-LFTB discourse coalition, their policy actions under pressure from anti-
LFTB actors reflect that the inadequacy of placing these regulators wholly within one 
coalition.  In a BPI YouTube Channel video, Secretary Vilsack was questioned in March 
2012 regarding his concerns with LFTB and gave a response strongly supportive and 
reflective of pro-LFTB discourse, while also noting the policy changes with the USDA: 
First and foremost, it’s safe.  And in fact the treatment basically assures that there 
aren’t pathogens that can cause foodborne illness.  Which is important for people 
to know that we want to make sure that whatever is fed to our children is safe.  
Secondly, its fat content is substantially below what you would see with 
traditionally ground beef.  It’s about 95% lean, so those of us who are concerned 
about obesity and making sure youngsters are getting good, nutritious calories 
intake at school, obviously are looking at the low fat content.  And historically, 
it’s been less expensive, so it’s been an opportunity for school districts to fit 
through tight budget times, uh adequate resources and adequate nutrition for their 






Secretary Vilsack’s comments supporting the claims of safety, nutrition, and affordability 
of LFTB were later echoed by Undersecretary Hagen when she spoke at a press 
conference held at BPI headquarters in Dakota Dunes, SD.  Dr. Hagen highlighted that 
products approved by the USDA such as LFTB “meet the highest most rigorous food 
safety standards” and that LFTB had “never been found to be unsafe” (Beef Products 
Incorporatedd 2012).  Additionally, Hagen also reiterated the benefits of LFTB’s 
affordability or “value” and “nutrition content” for the National School Lunch Program 
(Beef Products Incorporatedd 2012).  Secretary Vilsack and Undersecretary Hagen’s 
comments echo discourse used by BPI and other pro-LFTB actors to quell consumer 
concerns over LFTB.   
Despite the pro-LFTB comments offered by Vilsack and Hagen, both government 
regulators also followed their praise of LFTB with the acknowledgment that a significant 
contingent of consumers had concerns about LFTB and demanded changes.  Secretary 
Vilsack framed the consumer concerns as “folks” who had “raised an issue about the 
appearance” of LFTB with a solution to provide consumers a “choice” in the 
“marketplace” (Beef Products Incorporatede 2012).  Undersecretary Hagen also 
mentioned that their “customers,” “the school districts of the United States,” “showed 
[the USDA] in an overwhelming fashion that they wanted to have a choice” (Beef 
Products Incorporatedd 2012).  Ultimately, anti-LFTB consumer pressure influenced the 
USDA’s NSLP to alter their policy on purchasing options for ground beef and to allow 
school districts to purchase ground beef with or without LFTB.  It is the public support 
for LFTB and the response to the will of consumers through policy changes that placed 





said, Secretary Vilsack rounded out his announcement of the new choice-based policy 
with a warning that consumers should make “an informed choice” knowing that choosing 
ground beef without LFTB means choosing a “more expensive” product with a “higher 
fat content” and perhaps even “more difficult to shape into patties” (Beef Products 
Incorporatede 2012). 
Consumers 
 Consumers are an important actor within any agrifood actor-network.  
Widespread concern regarding an item of food among consumers is a central factor in 
what constitutes a food scare (Beardsworth and Keil 2001).  This factor makes consumers 
an especially valuable actor to enroll in a discourse coalition during a food scare as their 
support or lack thereof can significantly tip the scales to decide the outcome of the scare.  
In the Alar food scare of the 1980s, for example, anti-Alar actors like the NRDC and the 
television program 60 Minutes enrolled apple consumers through publicizing their 
framing of Alar as a carcinogen (Hermann et al. 1997).  The successful enrollment of 
apple consumers meant that those who actually purchased and thus created the demand 
for the fruit halted their consumption of apples and by doing so negatively impacted the 
orchards forcing them to divest their use of the Alar product altogether (Hermann et al. 
1997).  In the 2012 LFTB food scare the pro- and anti-LFTB discourse coalitions were 
structured around trying to extinguish or raise consumer concerns respectively.   
The role of consumers in the 2012 LFTB food scare was what actor-network 
theorist Michael Callon (1986) referred to as an obligatory passage point, or a central 
focal point around which network-building actors converge and must negotiate in order to 





as a funnel through which network-building actors must successfully pass to establish 
their preferred ordering of the network.  In the 2012 LFTB food scare, consumers 
occupied this OPP as it was their level of concern with the inclusion of LFTB in ground 
beef that ultimately impacted the order of the ground beef actor-network – namely the 
degree to which LFTB (and BPI) remained a significant part of the network.  Figure 7 
illustrates that ABC News and BPI had to work to enroll consumers into their respective 
discourse coalitions to ensure that their respective outcomes were achieved.  While for 
ABC News this meant increasing consumer concern regarding the use of LFTB in ground 
beef and ultimately impacting the network order to address these concerns, BPI worked 
to ensure the opposite with their attempts to extinguish consumer concerns and ultimately 
return to the pre-LFTB food scare order of the ground beef network.   






While ultimately the successful enrollment of consumers into the anti-LFTB 
discourse coalition caused significant damage to the pro-LFTB coalition and BPI’s 
bottom line, it is difficult to place consumers completely within the confines of either 
coalition.  Where to place consumers depends upon the moment of the scare and not all 
consumers completely divested of their LFTB consumption.  Closer to the pre-LFTB 
food scare blackboxed stated of the ground beef actor-network, consumers had relatively 
little concern regarding LFTB as they had largely yet to be alerted to its presence within 
the ground beef supply.  With the ABC News broadcasts, however, some consumers were 
subsequently enrolled into the anti-LFTB discourse coalition by ABC News through 
viewing their reports and via ABC News requests that consumers submit their concerns 
via email or uploaded videos.  Emily Anderson, a consumer and ABC News viewer from 
Albuquerque, NM, submitted a video asking “Which grocery stores near me do or don’t 
sell ground beef that contains ammonia-treated pink-slime?”  ABC News aired Emily’s 
video along with a handful of other clips of consumers expressing their concerns 
regarding LFTB.  Despite these displays of consumer concern, other consumers were not 
as convinced that LFTB should warrant any worry.   
While 43 states enrolled in the National School Lunch Program declined to renew 
purchase orders for ground beef containing LFTB, seven states (South Dakota, Iowa, 
Nebraska, Illinois, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) continued to serve ground beef 
containing LFTB in their public schools (Knowles 2013).  Moreover, there were also 
groups of consumers who formed pro-LFTB rallies, such as that held by Iowa State 
University’s Block and Bridle Club, and who appeared in BPI videos as consumers 





Sandlin, for example, appeared alongside her son in one BPI video to voice her support 
for BPI.  Sandlin stated that the comparison between LFTB and dog food was 
“outrageous” and reassured other consumers that she had visited BPI plants and felt 
“assured” “as a mother” that BPI was doing what was “good for agriculture” and 
“feeding families here and abroad”  (Beef Products Incorporatedf 2012, Beef Products 
Incorporatedg 2012).  Clearly placing consumers wholly within the pro- or anti-LFTB 
discourse coalition is a misstep.  Another misstep is to identify the roles of only human 
actors within the 2012 LFTB food scare.  
Nonhuman Actors: E.coli and Ammonia 
 One important theoretical innovation offered by actor-network theory is the 
recognition of the social as extending beyond relations solely between human actors.  
Actor-network analysts must thus include in their visualization of relations the 
differences nonhuman actors make within any particular set of relations (i.e. the agency 
of nonhuman actors), and food scares are certainly no exception.  Bacteria, viruses, and 
chemicals (e.g. pesticides, herbicides, processing agents) and their adverse (perceived or 
actual) relations with human physiology are often what ignite food scares.  In order to 
have an environment in which these categories of nonhuman actors can act, however, 
there must also be a set of relations favorable for the exercise of their agency.  For 
example, Dondaldson et al. (2002) highlighted how the normal operation of the livestock 
production actor-network in the United Kingdom facilitated the spread of Food and 
Mouth Disease (FMD).  The movement and contact of animals, farm machinery, farmers, 
and other important actors in livestock production provided an environment in which 





zero’s farm gates (Dondaldson et al. 2002).  Beyond the 2001 FMD food scare in the 
U.K., inorganic actors are also capable of forming relations and influencing food scares.  
Apart from viruses, chemical agents and other inorganic actors are also prominent 
features of some food scares.  While media and celebrities were strong influences in the 
Alar food scare of the late 1980s, it was the relations inhabiting the apple production 
actor-network that prompted growers to enroll Alar.  Coupled with the demand for 
unblemished fruit by consumers, the mass storage of apples and their shipment over 
thousands of miles from orchard to retailers facilitated a need for an apple that would not 
ripen too quickly and would thus remain firm and red throughout the journey (Herrmann 
et al. 1997).  Alar is a growth regulating chemical that inhibits an enzyme necessary for 
production of a plant growth hormone, slowing the aging (ripening) of the fruit (Currey 
and Lopez 2010).  After observing this relation between Alar and the chemistry of apples, 
apple growers enrolled Alar as an important actor for the production of the “perfect” fruit 
– one that will arrive on shelves ripe and blemish-free (Hermann et al. 1997).  In 
laboratory experiments exposing rats to Alar, however, it has adverse relations with rat 
physiology ultimately resulting in cancer (Hermann et al. 1997).  While the level of 
exposure remains a contentious issue, the research finding that Alar produced cancer in 
rats was enrolled by the National Resource Defense Council and other groups critical of 
conventional agriculture in order to build an anti-Alar discourse coalition aimed at 
removing its use in fruit production (Hermann et al. 1997).  The Alar scare and the 
associations between the actors that produced it is important because it bares similarity to 





 Two significant nonhuman actors inhabiting the 2012 LFTB food scare actor-
network were the organic actor E.coli, a bacterium, and an inorganic chemical actor, 
ammonia.  Three significant factors about these actors make them worthy of discussion 
within the 2012 LFTB food scare: 1) it was the relations of the ground beef actor-network 
that were favorable for E.coli and ultimately necessitated the enrollment of ammonia, 2) 
both actors were enrolled by the pro- and anti-LFTB discourse coalitions.   
 The structure of relations within the conventional ground beef actor-network, 
including within LFTB production, are a favorable set of associations for E.coli to enroll 
actors and thus multiply.  First, conventionally produced ground beef consists of meat 
from multiple cattle carcasses, so if one carcass is harboring E.coli then one contaminated 
carcass can contaminate a large amount of ground beef product when mixed with the 
meat from other uncontaminated carcasses (Beef Checkoff 2014).  Second, both ground 
beef and LFTB are made from trimmings from the outsides of steaks, roasts, and other 
prime cuts of a cattle carcass (Aubrey 2012; Beef Checkoff 2014).  According to Dr. Don 
Schafer, food scientist at Rutgers University, these “pieces that are being cut away from 
the outside of the meat” are more likely to harbor bacteria like E.coli (Aubrey 2012).  
Grinding trimmings together can mix the bacteria throughout the product and pose a 
danger to humans if consumed (USDA FSIS 2013).  From an actor-network perspective, 
the grinding process can be viewed as an act of translation where the E.coli can express 
its agency because human actors have given it a space in which to act.  Thus it is not 
necessarily the E.coli that alone poses a danger, but the way humans have ordered beef 
(through grinding) so that E.coli can enroll human hosts.  If the ground beef is formed 





a human host upon consumption and spread throughout the gastrointestinal tract of the 
consumer.  This increased susceptibility of ground beef to E.coli contamination and 
consumption within ground beef (and LFTB) led BPI to search for a method to kill the 
bacteria.  The consumer demand for ground beef is thus what, at least partially, can be 
said to facilitate the propagation of E.coli.  Since it would mean loss of profit, the 
solution is not to reorder the network to exclude ground beef, but to utilize a technology 
that can prevent E.coli organisms from exercising their agency.     
 Since the conventional ground beef actor-network is such a favorable set of 
relations for E.coli, BPI needed a strategy to ensure E.coli could not survive, reproduce, 
and ultimately enroll, and thus sicken, human hosts.  Using ammonia as a processing 
agent in the production of LFTB was BPI’s answer to making the ground beef actor-
network less favorable to the spread of E.coli bacteria.  Ammonia gas (i.e. anhydrous 
ammonia) is sprayed on LFTB prior to freezing to raise the pH level of the product and 
by doing so make it a less favorable habitat for E.coli bacteria (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012c).  Without the mitigation of E.coli using the ammonia or some other 
means, it is unlikely that LFTB could be used in ground beef production as the USDA 
has a zero-tolerance policy for many toxic E.coli bacteria (USDA 2011).  In the 2012 
LFTB food scare, both of these nonhuman actors, E.coli and ammonia, were enrolled by 
pro- and anti-LFTB discourse coalitions to support their respective framings of LFTB and 
the scare. 
 E.coli was primarily enrolled by the pro-LFTB discourse coalition as a dangerous 
bacteria for which BPI had a method of preventing within the ground beef actor-network.  





explained that E.coli is “one of the most deadly pathogens that we deal with today” and 
that it is “a real problem in the entire food industry that” everyone in the industry needs 
to “work together to combat” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012h).  BPI used the E.coli 
and the dangers it presents to humans as a way to highlight the steps they take to ensure 
food safety, including their “hold and test” program and enrollment of ammonia to treat 
the product.  As a male narrator in their “Ammonia in Foods” video explained, “One 
company, BPI, came up with an innovation that slightly elevates the ammonia already 
present in the beef.  Their reason?  E.coli” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012i).  BPI 
framed the role of ammonia as a “natural” and necessary agent to mediate the enrollment 
of ground beef by E.coli bacteria.  In their video “Ammonia in Foods,” for example, BPI 
highlighted the fact that the human “body produces about 4200 milligrams of ammonia 
every day” and that in a cheeseburger there is “more ammonia in the bun, condiments and 
the cheese than the beef” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012i).  Despite these pro-LFTB 
discourse coalition enrollments of E.coli and ammonia, the anti-LFTB coalition also 
assigned roles to these nonhuman actors which favored a more anti-LFTB enrollment.  
 Within the anti-LFTB discourse coalition, ammonia occupied a point of concern 
rather than being viewed as a “natural” food product.  The concern over the use of 
ammonia as a processing agent may have been partially fueled by the dramatization of 
the LFTB production process by celebrity chef Jamie Oliver on his ABC television 
program, “Jamie Oliver’s Food Revolution.”  In his show, Oliver poured household 
ammonia cleaner over a vat of beef trimmings before grinding them and throwing them 





to human consumption and thus it comes as no surprise that some consumers would have 
concerns over the association between ammonia and the food they eat.   
 Although ABC News did not enroll Oliver or his show’s footage in their 
broadcasts, they did include numerous clips from the 2008 documentary Food Inc. in 
which filmmakers toured BPI’s plant and interviewed founder Eldon Roth.  Also in Food 
Inc., however, was a discussion about the process of treating the beef with ammonia 
coupled with footage of a porthole at the BPI factory with clear liquid splashing against 
its glass.  The pairing of the ammonia-treatment discussion and the footage of a porthole 
with the liquid set up a context where a viewer might connect the two – that the beef 
trimmings are washed in some kind of liquid-ammonia bath.  As previously discussed, 
this is not how the process actually works.  Nonetheless, ABC News enrolled footage 
from the Food Inc. film in their coverage of LFTB.   
 Consumers writing and uploading footage to ABC News expressed their concerns 
with wanting to know which “grocery stores” near them “do or don’t sell ground beef 
that contains ammonia-treated pink slime” (ABC News 2012c).  An ABC News interview 
with Costco’s Vice President of Food Safety, Craig Wilson, also revealed concerns of 
consumers with Wilson remarking, “I personally don’t know how I could explain to a 
Costco member that trim that’s been treated with ammonia is in their ground beef” (ABC 
News 2012b).  From this data it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which the enrollment 
of ammonia by BPI impacted consumers’ decisions regarding their LFTB consumption.  
This said, it is clear from the statements from consumers and retailers, and by BPI’s 





the LFTB actor-network and the 2012 LFTB food scare.  Moreover, it is also clear that it 







- Analysis: Problematizations - 
Problematizations 
Problematization: Moment of translation where key actors propose certain 
framings of a problematic situation (the actors involved, their identities and 
reciprocal relationships) and the strategies to resolve it (alliances to be 
established, necessary detours and translations) (F. Schneider et al. 2012:244).  
 Whenever controversies ensue, there are a variety of “obligatory passage points” 
(Gray and Gibson 2013:85) through which actors, especially the primary warring 
network-building actors, must pass.  These are points of friction – the specific points of 
contact along which the embattled actors aim to assert the frame of reality that is most 
favorable to their supported order of an actor-network.  Problematization is the point in 
the translation process where these obligatory passage points are revealed.  Regardless of 
the “objective facts” which may be presented, problematizations are a battleground of the 
subjective where network-building actors “propose certain framings of a problematic 
situation (the actors involved, their identities and reciprocal relationships) and the 
strategies to resolve it (alliances to be established, necessary detours and translations)” 
(Schneider et al. 2012:244).  While the term “moment” is often used to describe the 
various stages of the translation process, it is important to note that problematization, like 
other stages in translation, is an ongoing event with new obligatory passage points 
arising, closing, and being revisited at any time and, oftentimes, simultaneously.  What is 






 The key problematizations making up the 2012 LFTB food scare controversy are 
varied, somewhat unresolved, and range in the approaches and strategies actors employed 
to address them.  Primarily, network-building actors utilized language, actors, and 
imagery to support their pro- and anti-LFTB discourse.  As detailed in Table 2, the key 
problematizations of this analysis ranged from the definition of LFTB as beef to the role 
of LFTB in “feeding the world.”  These various problematizations supported either the 
pro-LFTB discourse coalition’s primary discourse that consumers should have no 
concern about eating LFTB or the central anti-LFTB narrative that LFTB is an issue 
worthy of consumer concern.  Table 2 also displays that not all problematizations were 
equally supported or given equal attention by each discourse coalition.  While the pro-
LFTB discourse coalition problematized LFTB as an “environmentally sustainable” 
product, for example, anti-LFTB actors gave no attention to the products environmental 
impacts.  The following analysis lays out the various problematizations, alternatively 
conceptualized as ‘secondary discourses’, which each pro- and anti-LFTB discourse 











Table 2. Problematizations – Primary and Secondary Discourses  
Primary Discourse 






Consumers should not be 
concerned about LFTB 
Consumers should be 




LFTB is beef LFTB is not beef 
Safety  Lean finely-textured beef (LFTB) 
is safe  
Is LFTB safe? 
Health  LFTB is a healthy and nutritious 
beef product.  
LFTB is not as nutritious as 
ground beef   
Cost LFTB reduces the price of ground 
beef for consumers.  
LFTB cheats consumers 
Environmental 
sustainability  
LFTB is an environmentally-
sustainable beef product.  
 
Feeding the World LFTB is part of the solution to 
“feeding the world.” 
 
 
Defining LFTB as Beef 
 “Food” is a socially constructed category representing pieces of material culture 
we ingest generally for the purpose of sustenance and pleasure.  What people define as 
“food” has no real objective basis and therefore what some cultures view as an everyday 
gustatory delight, other cultures may writhe in disgust at simply the thought of eating the 
very same item.  The very premise of popular television programs like the Travel 
Channel’s “Bizarre Foods with Andrew Zimmern” is built around the fact that food is a 
social construct – one culture’s “bizarre” is another culture’s “delicacy” (Travel Channel 
2014).  Beardsworth and Keil pointed out that when we consume food, “we are also 
consuming meanings and symbols” ((2001:51), but these meanings and symbols are 
sometimes met with competing interpretations (e.g. controversies surrounding animal 





quality of food provides ample space for debate and controversy as various stakeholders 
jockey to exert control over discourse that favors their gustatory position.  The 2012 
LFTB controversy is no exception as the anti- and pro-LFTB discourse coalitions formed 
opposing problematizations of LFTB.  While the pro-LFTB coalition held that LFTB is 
“100 percent beef,” the anti-LFTB discourse questioned this claim and problematized 
LFTB’s beef designation as a concern for consumers.  
Beef is beef?  
 The framing of LFTB by the anti-LFTB discourse coalition most closely 
resembled that of an adulterant – or a substitution of a high-quality product, ground beef, 
with a lower-quality constituent.  According to US Federal Law 21 U.S. Code § 342(b), 
one form of adulteration is by the “absence, substitution, or addition of constituents” 
other than those constituents advertised or included in the listed ingredients of an item 
(Cornell Law School 2014).  Public concern with food adulteration has a long and 
tenuous history stretching back to the early 1820s when a publication by chemist 
Frederick Acum revealed “the use of copper to color pickle’s green, the use of sulfuric 
acid to ‘age’ beer, the use of verdigris to give a green bloom to dried hedgerow leaves to 
pass them off as tea, and the use of red lead to color the rind of cheese” (Beardsworth and 
Keil 2001:151).  Nearly a century later in 1906, Upton Sinclair published his exposé of 
the unsanitary conditions pervading Chicago’s meat-packing industry (Wilde 2013).  
Sinclair’s muckraking novel spawned a subsequent government study commissioned by 
President Theodore Roosevelt, and ultimately influenced the passing of the Federal Pure 
Food and Drug Act of 1906 (Wilde 2013).  Included in the Federal Pure Food and Drug 





Despite this milestone legislation that attempted to rationalize definitions of food, the 
term “adulterant” is abstract enough to allow for ample controversy.  Additionally, some 
substances in food, like the ammonia used in LFTB, are classified as “processing agents” 
by the United States Food and Drug Administration and thus do not require listing on any 
labels (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2014).  The abstract nature of food and food 
ingredients thus provide fertile ground for political conflict.   
While the pro-LFTB discourse coalition produced slogans like “Beef is beef!” and 
“Dude, it’s beef!” to support their framing of LFTB as “100 percent ground beef,” the 
label overwhelmingly favored by the anti-LFTB coalition was “pink slime.”  This term 
was enrolled by the anti-LFTB discourse coalition in place of “lean finely-textured beef” 
as well as employed in ABC News graphics as detailed in Figure 8 below.   
Figure 8: "Pink Slime" Graphic in ABC News Report 
 
In the above broadcast, ABC News correspondent Jim Avila reported that Safeway, the 
second largest grocery retailer in the U.S., stopped using “pink slime” in their ground 





industry experts agree that lean finely-textured beef is safe and wholesome” (ABC News 
2012f).  Avila also detailed that “critics” contended:    
Seventy percent of all store-bought ground beef contained pink slime, but since 
ABC News exposed its widespread use, many grocery stores have told shoppers 
their meat counters are free of the mixture.  Safeway now joins Publix, HEB, 
Whole Foods, and Costco promising their ground beef is additive-free.  No pink 
slime (ABC News 2012f).   
These statements not only demonstrate the use of the label “pink slime” by ABC News, 
but also reveal the way in which ABC News and the anti-LFTB discourse coalition were 
defining the term.  According to the anti-LFTB discourse coalition, LFTB was “pink 
slime” more than “ground beef” because it was, as Avila mentioned above, an “additive” 
and not “pure ground beef” (ABC News 2012f).  ABC News and the anti-LFTB discourse 
problematized the definition of LFTB as “beef” as a point of concern and made 
suggestions that it was perhaps more appropriately viewed as an undisclosed low-quality 
additive and, though they never employed the term, an adulterant.    
From their very first broadcast covering LFTB on March 7th, 2012, ABC World 
News’ Diane Sawyer referred to LFTB as a “cheaper filler” used to “pad” ground beef.  
The label of “filler” was used to describe LFTB in all fourteen of the ABC News videos 
(ABC News 2012a).  Through claiming that LFTB is a “filler” to “pad” ground beef, 
ABC News suggested that ground beef contains ingredients not representative of its 
portrayal by BPI and labelling practices.  Though not explicitly stated as such, ABC 
News’ charge of “padding” seems to suggest the ground beef consumers buy was 
adulterated by the substitution of some of the ground beef for a “lower quality” and 
“cheaper” constituent, LFTB (Cornell Law School 2014).  ABC News supported this 





butcher Joshua Applestone who declared that ground beef “should be whole muscle 
ground, made into a patty and put into a freezer” and described the making of LFTB as 
“an unnatural process” (ABC News 2012b). ABC News also supported the frame of 
LFTB as a low-quality adulterant through highlighting the use of LFTB in dog food.  As 
ABC News’ Senior National Correspondent Jim Avila explained: 
Gerald Zirnstein grinds his own hamburger these days.  Why?  Because this 
former USDA scientist, now whistleblower, knows that seventy percent of the 
ground beef we buy at the supermarket contains something he calls "pink slime.” 
Beef trimmings that were once used only in dog food and cooking oil now 
sprayed with ammonia to make them safe to eat and then added to most ground 
beef as a cheaper filler.  It was Zirnstein who in a USDA memo first coined the 
term "pink slime."  And is now coming forward to say, ‘he won't buy it’ (ABC 
News 2012a). 
Through his association of LFTB with dog food, Avila raised questions about the quality 
and designation of LFTB as “food” fit for human consumption.  Additionally, ABC News 
questioned the exclusion of LFTB from the label and questioned whether the labeling of 
ground beef containing LFTB is necessary.   
In an interview with Janet Riley, Senior Vice President of the American Meat 
Institute, ABC News correspondent Jim Avila asked “what’s being hidden here?” to 
which Riley firmly responded “What are you asking me to put on the label?  It's beef!  It's 
on the label.  It's a beef product, it says beef, this is beef!  So we are declaring it, it's 
beef!” (ABC News 2012b).  In the ABC News broadcast “Tips for Checking Your Beef” 
(ABC News 2012c), Avila also provided advice for consumers when examining labels of 
their ground beef:  
[K]now this, if your meat is stamped "USDA ORGANIC,” it's pure meat.  No 
questionable filler.  But everything else is suspect say critics, because pink slime 





Avila’s reference to LFTB as a “questionable filler” while designating LFTB-free beef as 
“pure meat” problematizes LFTB as something other than beef.  Avila’s concerns with 
the labelling of the product arose again at a press conference held at BPI headquarters.  
The conference included governors, academics, and other pro-LFTB actors.  During the 
question and answer portion of the conference, Avila asked if LFTB is not considered an 
additive then “why is it not sold as a standalone product?  Why must it be added to fresh 
ground beef?  Isn't that the very definition of additive?” (Beef Products Incorporated 
2012d).  Craig Letch, BPI’s Director of Food Safety, explained that it was a “very 
appropriate question” and that it is not sold as a standalone product because it has too fine 
of a “texture” for consumer tastes (Beef Products Incorporated 2012d).  When Avila 
asked once more why there is no label for LFTB, Governor Terry Branstad (R – IA) 
angrily replied “Because it's beef, but it's leaner beef!  Which is better for ya!  You don't 
get it!” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012d).  These tense exchanges represent a synthesis 
of the struggle between anti- and pro-LFTB discourse coalitions to control the way LFTB 
was defined in public discourse.  They also represent the chasm between the 
problematizations employed by these two discourse coalitions.  
 “Dude, it’s beef!”  
 Lean finely-textured beef falls under the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s designation as “meat derived by advanced meat/bone separation and meat 
recovery systems” and since it does not contain “more than 150 milligrams of calcium 
per 100 grams product” it can be labelled “beef” (USDA FSIS 2013b).  When this 
definition was problematized as a point of concern by the anti-LFTB discourse coalition, 





anything but “100 percent beef.”  The pro-LFTB discourse coalition thus problematized 
anti-LFTB actors’ labelling of LFTB as anything other than beef as resulting from a 
misinformed idea of the product.  BPI and other pro-LFTB actors deployed slogans like 
“Dude, it’s beef!” to assert that LFTB is indeed beef.  
 The two slogans employed by the pro-LFTB discourse coalition to support the 
definition of LFTB as beef were “Dude, it’s beef!” and “Beef is beef!.”  While “Beef is 
beef!” was used predominantly on BPI’s pro-LFTB website, Beefisbeef.com, “Dude it’s 
beef!” was the more ubiquitous slogan.  The slogan appeared mostly in signage and other 
media produced by BPI, but also made appearances in news media and even satirical 
news media with a mention on a broadcast of the satirical news program, The Colbert 
Report (Colbert 2012) (Figure 9). 
Figure 9. "Dude, it's Beef!" Slogan on The Colbert Report 
 
Additionally, “Dude, it’s beef!” was the prevailing mantra of the 2012 pro-LFTB rally at 





giveaway t-shirts worn by pro-LFTB discourse coalition actors such as Republican 
Governor Terry Branstad of Iowa (Beef Products Incorporated 2012k).   
Figure 10. Governor Terry Branstad (R - IA) Wearing "Dude it's Beef!" Shirt 
 
“Dude, it’s beef!” went beyond the Iowa State University rally to make frequent 
appearances elsewhere in the pro-LFTB discourse.  Other politicians outside of Iowa 
echoed the message during the March 30th, 2012 press conference at BPI’s headquarters.  
Lieutenant Governor of Nebraska, Rick Sheehy, and Governor of Kansas, Sam 
Brownback, proclaimed “Dude, it’s beef!” when rounding out their words of support 
during speeches at the press conference (Beef Products Incorporated 2012d).  The phrase 
“Dude, it’s beef!” is significant because it is the slogan that embodied the pro-LFTB 
claim that, as stated by Lt. Gov. Sheehy, “lean finely-trimmed [sic] beef is 100 percent 
beef” that “goes through a USDA-approved, science-based process” (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012d).  The slogan was employed as a counter-narrative to the anti-LFTB 





percent beef.”  This slogan, however, was not the only strategy employed by the pro-
LFTB coalition to support their claim.  
 Beyond simply asserting that “Dude, it’s Beef!,” the pro-LFTB discourse 
coalition also worked to demonstrate that although it may undergo a somewhat different 
process than other beef products, LFTB is technically ground beef.  One way the pro-
LFTB discourse coalition communicated this point was through associating the 
production of LFTB with the production of other beef products.  Images and animations 
like those seen in Figure 11 were paired with dialog from scientists and other actors to 
draw parallels with the production of ground beef, steaks, and other cuts of meat.  These 
animations and the interviews accompanying them erved as short educational lessons on 
BPI’s process of manufacturing LFTB.   
Figure 11. LFTB Process Animation 
 
As Dr. Jim Dickson, Professor of Animal Science at Iowa State University, explained:  
 What the BPI process does is separate the lean meat from the fat.  And it’s the 





on the plate, but it’s really no different than the ground beef that you buy (Beef 
Products Incorporated 2012f).   
 
In a separate video, Dr. Dickson also refuted the label of LFTB as “filler” explaining that 
“filler is” like the “bread crumbs” combined with ground beef to make “meatloaf” (Beef 
Products Incorporated 2012g).  Dickson remarked that LFTB is “not filler,” but “BPI’s 
product is 95 percent lean beef” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012g).   In addition to the 
animations and remarks by Dr. Dickson, pro-LFTB actor Janet Riley, Vice President of 
Public Affairs for the American Meat Institute, also provided a demonstration using cuts 
of beef to clear up what pro-LFTB actors saw as “misinformation [about LFTB] floating 
around in media coverage and on the internet” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012c).  First, 
Riley explained to consumers what the pro-LFTB discourse coalition felt LFTB was not: 
Lean finely-textured beef isn’t substandard beef.  It’s not scraps scooped from the 
floor.  It’s not so-called salvage meat. It’s not inedible meat that we somehow 
make edible.  And it’s not dog food.  But here’s what lean finely-textured beef is.  
Now when a big beef carcass is cut down into smaller cuts, chunks of lean tissue 
and fat result.  We call them trimmings.  Now, some trimmings are lean like these 
here.  Some trimmings have more fat like these here.  And historically it was 
nearly impossible to recover beef from a trimming like this.  A surgeon’s skill 
would have been required to separate the meat from the fat (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012c).  
 
After reviewing the process of making LFTB, Riley explained that LFTB is beef, but “it 
does have a finer texture, which is why it’s called lean finely-textured beef” and that 
“nutritionally it’s equal to ground beef,” “it tastes like beef,” and “under a microscope it 
looks like other beef” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012c).  Riley also explained the 
protein profile of LFTB as being the “same two proteins that are found in all beef…from 
filets and steaks to ribs, roasts, and ground beef.  As well as in lean finely-textured beef” 
(Beef Products Incorporated 2012c). These points made by Riley and other pro-LFTB 





but also formed part of their legal defense when laying out their defamation lawsuit 
against ABC News.  
When outlining their defamation case against ABC News, one of the key places in 
which BPI felt they had been defamed was with regard to the questioning of LFTB as 
beef.  BPI and their chief counsel, Dan Webb, asserted that ABC News made over “250 
false statements” about BPI and LFTB (Beef Products Incorporated 2012l).  Webb 
asserted that these statements fell in “nine categories,” including one category of 
statements through which BPI asserted ABC News claimed that “the product is not beef 
or meat,” but “only some kind of filler” or “substitute” for ground beef (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012l).  Webb also restated BPI’s point that “all of the protein” in LFTB is 
“made from muscle meat, every bit of it” and not “inferior connective tissue” or cartilage 
(Beef Products Incorporated 2012l).  Webb’s statements coupled with those of Janet 
Riley and other actors in the pro-LFTB discourse coalition demonstrate the great 
significance placed upon any questions of LFTB as beef.    
Translating their definition of LFTB as beef through legal action demonstrated 
that BPI’s definition went beyond slogans and demonstrations.  BPI was willing to 
defend the definition in a court of law and thus formally challenge any description of 
LFTB that counters their pro-LFTB discourse.  Since BPI’s lawsuit against ABC News is 
ongoing, it is difficult to gauge whose definition will ultimately prevail. Furthermore, any 
analysis of this nature is beyond the scope of this study.  What is significant, however, is 
how the discursive battle over the definition of beef highlights the way in which the 





While LFTB is defined as “beef” via the scientific rationality of governmental 
bodies like the USDA, animal and food scientist academics, meat trade associations like 
AMI, and industrial agrifood processor BPI, this is clearly not the only definition of 
significance in terms of LFTB’s existence within the ground beef actor-network.  
Statements from anti-LFTB actors like organic butcher Joshua Applestone and Costco’s 
VP of Food Safety Craig Wilson represent the existence of counter-narratives to the view 
of beef (and food) as solely a scientifically-defined product.  Though a definition of beef 
was never fully articulated by the anti-LFTB discourse coalition via the videos in this 
analysis, it is clear that what constituted “beef” for anti-LFTB actors is more than its 
protein or biochemical similarities to other cuts of beef, as suggested by Janet Riley and 
Jim Dickson. 
Safety of Lean Finely-Textured Beef 
 While eating food certainly provides pleasure for most consumers, it is also a 
source of anxiety and ambivalence (Beardsworth and Keil 1999).  What makes food an 
especially distressing product for consumers is its corporeality.  Through the act of 
eating, food is ingested and becomes part of the eaters’ body.  Eating provides obvious 
nutritional and life-sustaining benefits, but it is also an opportunity for the eater to 
introduce potentially damaging pathogens, chemicals, or other harmful foreign agents 
into her/his body.  The possibility of illness or death from eating an item of food has led 
consumers to view food through a lens of suspicion.  The suspicion with which 
consumers view all foods is not uniformly distributed as some foods are viewed as more 





Apart from concerns regarding animal welfare, consumer concern with meat 
stems from its material characteristic as a highly perishable (decaying) piece of animal 
flesh.  If improperly preserved, either through drying/dehydration, curing, or 
refrigeration, the bacterial and fungal actors playing natural roles in meat’s 
decomposition process are candidates for an eater’s ingestion. Immediately after the 
death of an animal, the flesh of the animal’s carcass (the meat) begins to decompose and 
invite a host of bacteria including Clostridium botulinum (bacteria that causes botulism), 
salmonella, and Escherichia coli.  If ingested by the eater, these bacteria can cause mild-
to-severe illness and possibly even death.   
Consumers and meat industry personnel have long been aware of and concerned 
with the presence of harmful microorganisms in meat and, as documented by Susanne 
Friedberg’s (2009) book Fresh: A Perishable History, the meat industry has gone to great 
lengths (including transcontinental import/export of ice) to preserve meat from 
decomposing and fostering pathogens.  Ultimately, efforts to prevent bacterial, fungal, 
and/or viral contamination of meat and other commercial foods became rationalized 
through scientifically-developed safety controls and institutionalized into a system of 
regulatory practices overseen by government bodies like the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).  
Despite this highly complex structure of regulatory oversight and improved safety 
technologies, contemporary outbreaks of large-scale food poisoning, along with the food 
scares that sometimes accompany them, persist.  In the same year as the 2012 LFTB food 





its use of bean sprouts as they were linked to at least five major mass food poisoning food 
scares (Flynn 2012).   
Within the consumer-producer relationship resides a high level of trust that 
consumption of a food item will not induce a negative physiological reaction for the 
consumer.  Even if no known negative outcomes directly resulting from human 
consumption of a product exists, the possibility alone, as in the 1980s Alar food scare, is 
enough to reduce consumer trust in a product and/or producer and thus reduce or 
eliminate their consumption of the suspect product.  During the 2012 LFTB food scare, 
the question of safety also arose as the anti-LFTB discourse coalition raised consumer 
concerns about the product.  Anti-LFTB actors problematized LFTB as a possible safety 
concern, while BPI and other pro-LFTB actors aimed to problematize food safety as the 
primary driver behind the production and success of LFTB.  
Is LFTB Safe? 
As with many other aspects of LFTB, the anti-LFTB discourse coalition raised 
some questions regarding the safety of LFTB.  While never stating bluntly that LFTB 
was not safe or that it was connected with any illnesses, anti-LFTB discourse from ABC 
News included subtle discussion of safety concerns regarding LFTB.  When discussing 
the process of making LFTB, ABC News correspondent Jim Avila remarked that LFTB 
was “once used only in dog food and cooking oil” and was “now sprayed with ammonia” 
to “make it safe to eat, and then added to most ground beef as a cheaper filler” (ABC 





food because it requires ammonia treatment.  Beyond this statement, however, there were 
no other remarks specifically directly questioning the safety of the product.   
It is possible that anti-LFTB actors’ reference to the product as “cheaper filler” or 
“pink slime” in some way led to consumers questioning the safety of the product.  
Though this is not discernable without further analysis of the impact of these descriptions 
upon consumer perceptions of the product, Pro-LFTB actors certainly felt that the “pink 
slime” label implied the product was unsafe.  BPI’s Director of Food Safety Craig Letch 
and BPI’s chief counsel Dan Webb expressed that the way in which ABC News 
portrayed LFTB via language like “slime” and “filler” was congruent with describing the 
product as, according to Webb, “unsafe for human consumption” and thus caused alarm 
among consumers about possible safety concerns of the product (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012l).  The pro-LFTB discourse coalition rejected any safety concerns over 
the product and instead problematized LFTB as existing because of its positive impact 
upon the safety of ground beef.  Additionally, any exclusion of LFTB from the ground 
beef agrifood network, according to pro-LFTB actors, constituted a threat to consumer 
safety.   
LFTB is Safe 
Although subtle and indirect, the problematization of LFTB as questionably safe 
by anti-LFTB actors elicited a strong pro-LFTB counter-problematization of LFTB as a 
product that embodies food safety.  BPI and the pro-LFTB discourse coalition utilized 
two key narratives to establish the safety of LFTB: 1) LFTB is safe because it is 





food safety technology.  As with their definition of LFTB as beef, each of these 
narratives employed reliance on scientific rationality as the preferred knowledge to 
improve food safety.  Further solidifying their scientifically rationalized claims, BPI 
enrolled academic scientists and USDA regulators into the pro-LFTB discourse coalition 
to support their problematization of LFTB as a model product of modern food safety 
science.  
 One way BPI problematized LFTB as safe was through highlighting their testing 
procedures and the regulatory system within which LFTB is produced.  In a BPI-
produced video discussing their testing procedures, Director of Food Safety Craig Letch 
explained how BPI exceeded regulatory expectations through testing for more strains of 
E.coli than what is required by federal law.  Letch detailed that BPI tested for: 
…non-0157 S. tex.  That’s an additional six strains of E.coli.  BPI’s hold and test 
program consists of sampling out of each and every box of product.  That product 
is stored in the freezer and not released in our system until negative test results are 
received from our third party laboratories (Beef Products Incorporated 2012m). 
 
While detailing BPI’s testing procedure, Letch’s narration was accompanied by footage 
of lab equipment and gleaming laboratories where workers donning lab coats, protective 
eyewear, and surgical gloves were testing LFTB for pathogens (See Figure 12).  These 
kinds of images provide visual reinforcement for the framing of LFTB as product 
undergoing rigorous scientific testing for safety.  In addition to utilizing this scientific 





Figure 12. Scientifically Safe: Laboratory Worker at BPI 
 
 Actors in the pro-LFTB discourse coalition reasoned that LFTB was safe because 
it was approved by and produced under the scientific scrutiny of government regulation, 
namely by the United States Department of Agriculture.  The USDA approval of LFTB 
was frequently touted as a strong indicator of LFTB’s safety.  Both the Lieutenant 
Governor of Nebraska, Rick Sheehy, and the Governor of Iowa, Terry Branstad, 
emphasized the USDA approval of LFTB as a marker of safety.  Governor Branstad 
remarked that because LFTB “consistently achieves high levels of safety,” the “USDA 
allowed it into the School Lunch Program” and that “Secretary of Agriculture Tom 
Vilsack” confirmed “USDA’s continued support for the product” (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012d).  Secretary Vilsack did indeed appear with Governor Branstad at a 
“joint press conference on beef safety” where Vilsack remarked that he could “guarantee 
you that if we felt that this [LFTB] was unsafe, we wouldn’t allow it to be marketed and 
we wouldn’t allow it to be part of our school lunch program” (Beef Products Incorporated 
2012n).  The USDA’s support for the safety of LFTB went beyond Secretary Vilsack’s 





Undersecretary of Food Safety, Dr. Elizabeth Hagen, also supported the safety of LFTB 
via the system of regulation under which it is produced: 
…let me first talk about food safety because that is an issue I'm personally 
responsible for at USDA.  It's a big one and we take it very seriously this mission 
of food safety.  Our public health policies are based on science and they're 
executed through inspection.  We have over seven-thousand inspectors in over 
sixty-two hundred meat, poultry, and egg products establishments every single 
day.  Those of you who took the tour today probably saw some of our inspection 
team there.  They're there, they are inspecting the food, they are reviewing food 
safety plans, food safety systems, ensuring that they're working the way that the 
company says that they're working, they are watching what's going on, they may 
be sampling and testing product.  They are ensuring that those products meet the 
highest most rigorous food safety standards that we at the USDA set for the 
American consumer.  One, they are sure that that is the case, then, and only then, 
do they apply the USDA mark of inspection.  When we put that mark of 
inspection on a product, we stand behind, it means something.  And it has meant 
something for over 100 years.  So lean finely-textured beef is a product that 
undergoes that degree of scrutiny every single day.  The process itself and the 
processing aid used to make this product have long been considered safe both by 
the FDA and the USDA.  But that is something separate starting with the process 
that we feel is safe is something separate from determining that the product 
coming out of those plants on a daily basis is safe for American consumers.  And 
that's why we're there.  That's why we're there every single day doing those things 
that I just talked to you about.  The mark of inspection means something and a 
product needs to earn it. If a product does not earn the mark of inspection, it does 
not receive it, and it never reaches consumers.  It's really that simple.  So that's the 
food safety piece (Beef Products Incorporated 2012n).   
While clearly meant to support the problematization of LFTB as a safe product, 
Undersecretary Hagen’s speech also captures the scientific rationality and trust in 
complex regulatory structure characteristic of modern agrifood systems.  Similar themes 
were echoed when other pro-LFTB actors went beyond simply explaining the safety of 
LFTB via regulation and oversight and ventured into warnings of excluding technologies 
like LFTB. 
 Apart from exalting the extensive regulations and testing LFTB undergoes as a 





for in modern food safety technology.  The process of framing LFTB as a necessary 
answer to food safety problems began first with pro-LFTB actors outlining in the dangers 
of modern meat production – namely the human illness-inducing E.coli bacterium.  In 
their videos “Ammonia in Foods” and “Innovations in Food Safety,” BPI first lays out 
the dangers of E.coli followed by framing LFTB as their answer to E.coli contamination 
in beef.  Nick Roth, engineer at BPI and son of Eldon and Regina Roth, identified E.coli 
0157:H7, a particular strain of the bacteria, as “one of the most deadly pathogens that we 
deal with today” that the food industry needs to “work together to combat” (Beef 
Products Incorporated 2012h).  It is at this point in both the “Innovations in Food Safety” 
and “Ammonia in Foods” videos that BPI enrolled a lawyer who specializes in foodborne 
illness lawsuits, Bill Marler, to explain how E.coli can cause “devastating illness,” 
“death,” and can “leave victims scarred for life” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012h).  As 
displayed in Figure 13, these warnings were sometimes accompanied by animations of 
E.coli bacteria and data detailing the number of deaths connected with E.coli (Beef 





Figure 13. Animated E.coli Warning 
 
After laying out the dangers of consuming E.coli contaminated foods, BPI then 
framed LFTB as the innovation needed to combat the problem of E.coli-contaminated 
ground beef.  Marler, for example, explained that the “most important thing” that BPI’s 
product will do is “save lives” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012h).  Other pro-LFTB 
actors like Dr. Jim Dickson warned that “it would be a mistake for us to have a 
technology, whether it’s ammonia or anything, that’s available to us that can reduce the 
risk of E.coli O157 in humans and then not use it” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012h).  
Here Dickson not only framed LFTB as safe, but also problematized the exclusion of 
LFTB from the ground beef agrifood chain as potentially dangerous to consumer health.  
Dickson was not the only pro-LFTB actor to warn against a food system that rejects a 
technological innovation like LFTB.  As discussed later, Dr. John Floros, Dean of the 
College of Agriculture at Kansas State University, also raised concerns with failing to 





actors felt that excluding LFTB from the ground beef supply may endanger the health of 
consumers.  
Health of LFTB 
 Debates over the health of consuming red meat, primarily beef, consistently 
populate mass media and scholarly literature (Flynn 2012; McAfee, McSorley, Cuskelly, 
Moss, Wallace, Bonham, and Fearon 2010).  While various past studies have connected 
eating red meat with increased risks of heart disease, cancer, and other physiological 
maladies, there is also a healthy portion of literature highlighting the benefits of red meat 
consumption (McAfee et al. 2010).  Even within the ABC News broadcasts included in 
this analysis, one segment discussing LFTB was accompanied by an interview with a 
physician discussing a Harvard School of Public Health study positively linking red meat 
consumption and cancer risk (ABC News 2012f).  Despite the breadth of literature and 
media coverage, red meat consumption has no monopoly over corporeal controversy.  As 
detailed in Janet Colson’s (2011) book Taking Sides: Clashing Views in Food and 
Nutrition, media coverage and academic journals are full of health debates covering 
everything from the consumption of bread and carbohydrates to eggs and butter.  Though 
not growing to the scale of the red meat debate, the 2012 LFTB food scare added another 
food item to the list of nutritional controversies with actors in the anti-LFTB discourse 
coalition framing the health of LFTB as questionable and pro-LFTB actors framing the 







Is LFTB Healthy? 
 Similar to their coverage of LFTB’s safety, the anti-LFTB discourse coalition 
made very few direct claims regarding the healthfulness of LFTB.  The claims that were 
made problematized the health of LFTB as a possible consumer concern and were 
interconnected with ABC News’ questioning of LFTB’s designation as beef.  When 
discussing LFTB in ABC News’ first broadcast covering the product, correspondent Jim 
Avila referred to LFTB as “more like gelatin and not as nutritious as ground beef” (ABC 
News 2012a).  To support this problematization of the product, ABC News enrolled 
former BPI Quality Assurance Manager, Kit Foshee (ABC News 2012a).  According to 
ABC News, Foshee claimed that the product was less nutritious “because the protein 
comes mostly from connective tissue, not muscle meat” (ABC News 2012a).  When 
referencing the nutrition of LFTB, Foshee claimed that “it will fill you up, but it’s not 
going to do you any good” (ABC News 2012c).  Apart from repeated references to 
Foshee’s comments, ABC News made no other direct references to the nutritional aspects 
of LFTB.  Indirectly, it is possible that the references to LFTB as “pink slime,” “filler,” 
and “low quality” were perceived by some viewers and consumers as reflecting 
negatively upon the nutritional quality of the product.  Without an analysis of consumer 
preferences, these possibilities are impossible to discern and thus beyond the scope of this 
study.  Despite the limited direct references to the nutritional quality of LFTB by anti-
LFTB actors, it is clear that their problematization of LFTB was that it is nutritionally 







LFTB is Healthy 
 Actors within the pro-LFTB discourse coalition heavily contested any discourse 
questioning the nutritional quality of LFTB.  In their attempt to counter any consumer 
concerns regarding the health of LFTB consumption, pro-LFTB actors framed the 
production of LFTB as a response to consumer demand for healthier lower-fat ground 
beef.  Additionally, the pro-LFTB discourse coalition insisted that its lower fat content 
makes ground beef an overall healthier food for consumers, and warned of the dangers of 
not including LFTB within the American ground beef supply.  Governors, USDA’s 
Undersecretary of Food Safety, and BPI employees successfully enrolled in the pro-
LFTB discourse coalition communicated these points within the BPI-produced YouTube 
videos. 
 The ground beef that is sold in supermarkets comes in a variety of lean to fat 
ratios, running from 73 percent to 96 percent (USDA 2012).  The percentage of “lean” 
indicates the fat content of the ground beef – with lower percentage of “lean” meaning 
more fat and higher percentage of “lean” meaning less fat content.  Actors within the pro-
LFTB discourse coalition problematized LFTB as a product demanded by consumers 
because consumers wanted “healthier” beef with a lower fat content.  Responding to a 
question asked by ABC News correspondent Jim Avila during a press conference at BPI 
headquarters in Dakota Dunes, SD, Dr. Gary Acuff, Professor of Animal Science at 
Texas A & M, explained that:  
I think it's important to realize that you have all these different lean and fat levels. 
This gives us the opportunity to combine this and produce what the consumers 
want.  I mean, you and I are old enough to remember, you went to the store and 





beef."  And now look what we have, you know, 96% lean, 80% lean, they're all 
different types of ground beef that are produced now because we have the options 
to mix this together.  But offering that as a single option, it's not a product that 
grinds up and produces a hamburger patty, it's a product that allows us to adjust 
the lean and fat levels.  But it is exactly lean beef (Beef Products Incorporated 
2012d).   
Here Acuff makes the case the “consumers want” lean beef, so LFTB is a product that fill 
this consumer need.  Additionally, Acuff also responds to the questions of LFTB’s 
labeling as “beef” through asserting that LFTB is “exactly lean beef.”  At a later press 
conference where BPI announced their lawsuit against ABC News, Craig Letch, BPI 
Director of Food Safety, added support to Acuff’s statements.  Letch claimed that not 
only was LFTB a response to consumer demand, but it was also a product offering 
consumers a healthier option:   
In the 80s consumers demanded leaner ground beef and lean finely-textured beef 
played a great role is supplying consumers with that.  This business grew from 
that demand, and when I think back to my own childhood, you couldn’t buy 93, 
96% lean ground beef at the retail markets. It was ground beef and that’s all you 
could get.  Now consumers have healthy alternatives.  Through innovations and 
ingenuity, we were able to deliver that to consumers (Beef Products Incorporated 
2012l).   
 
Letch’s statement also revealed another narrative used to frame LFTB as a healthy 
product – that removing LFTB from ground beef might pose a threat to consumer health. 
 While anti-LFTB discourse coalition problematized the inclusion of LFTB as a 
possible negative impact to the nutritional quality of ground beef, pro-LFTB actors 
problematized the exclusion of LFTB from the ground beef supply as a possible threat to 
consumer health.  Since mixing LFTB with ground beef can result in an overall lower-fat 
product, dependent upon the ratio of LFTB to ground beef, pro-LFTB actors reasoned 
that excluding LFTB from ground beef results in a fattier and less-healthy product.  In an 





warned that ground beef without LFTB would be “less nutritious because we’re 
consuming a fattier product than we would be consuming otherwise” (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012j).  Pro-LFTB actor and Iowa Governor Terry Branstad echoed 
Jochum’s concerns when he described LFTB as: 
…95% lean.  And you know we're trying to combat obesity in this country.  We 
just had the First Lady, Michelle Obama, in Des Moines.  Ten-thousand kids 
came and the focus was on exercise and nutrition and eating right and eating 
leaner products.  And this is a product that meets that need (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012d) 
Governor Branstad was not alone in his expression of concern for the possible health 
consequences of removing LFTB from the diets of children.  During the same press 
conference at which Gov. Branstad made these remarks, U.S. Undersecretary of Food 
Safety Dr. Elizabeth Hagen also claimed that LFTB “allows the National School Lunch 
Program to offer a lower fat offering in terms of ground beef” (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012d).  Additionally, Hagen explained that even though some school 
districts wanted to “eliminate this product from the National School Lunch Program,” the 
USDA would not exclude ground beef mixed with LFTB “because [they] are comfortable 
with the with the safety profile, with the quality, with the nutrition content, and with the 
value that this product offers to the National School Lunch Program” (Beef products 
Incorporated 2012d).  Collectively, these pro-LFTB statements reflect a the 
problematization that it is not the inclusion of LFTB in ground beef that presents a health 
concern, but its exclusion that would have negative consequences.  Other actors like BPI 
Plant Manager Jay Williams warned that unless “people that want to consume leaner 
healthy beef act” by visiting BPI’s “BeefIsBeef.com” website and sharing the 





Products Incorporated 2012j).  Statements made by Kansas Governor Sam Brownback 
also reflected Williams’ concerns as Brownback explained that excluding LFTB from 
ground beef would “drive up the price of lean beef” making it more difficult to “get 
people to eat better” all “because of this unmerited, unwarranted food scare, and that's 
what this is, it is unmerited it is unwarranted and it's a food scare” (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012d).  Brownback’s comments highlight another way in which the 
exclusion of LFTB from the ground beef agrifood network was problematized by the pro-
LFTB discourse coalition, the financial costs to consumers. 
Beef Prices 
 Similar to the problematizations of safety and health, the issue of monetary cost 
was primarily waged in the context of exclusion versus inclusion of LFTB within the 
ground beef agrifood network.  While anti-LFTB actors portrayed the negative cost to 
consumers as a result of the inclusion of LFTB as a constituent of ground beef, pro-LFTB 
actors portrayed the exclusion of LFTB as resulting in negative costs to consumers.  
Costs to consumers by anti- and pro-LFTB discourse coalitions were problematized in 
divergent ways.  Following their problematization of LFTB as “lower-quality filler,” anti-
LFTB actors raised questions regarding whether consumers were really buying what they 
thought they were when purchasing ground beef containing LFTB.  In contrast, the pro-
LFTB discourse coalition warned that the price of ground beef would increase as retailers 








 The concern over cost as it was problematized by the anti-LFTB discourse 
coalition was strongly related to other anti-LFTB problematizations – namely, the 
framing of LFTB as a low-quality adulterant versus a high-quality beef product.  Through 
questioning the nutritional quality and designation of LFTB as beef, anti-LFTB actors 
also questioned the whether consumers were actually getting what they thought they were 
paying for.   
 In ABC News’ first “pink slime” broadcast, Diane Sawyer, head anchor for ABC 
World News with Diane Sawyer, questioned whether the ground beef that consumers 
purchase at the supermarket is what they “think it is?” or if it is “padded with a filler” 
called “pink slime?” (ABC News 2012a).  During a subsequent broadcast, Sawyer also 
asked if referred to LFTB as a “kind of filler used to pump up the volume of meat” (ABC 
News 2012c).  Through these statements Sawyer suggested the misrepresentation of the 
material constituting the ground beef that consumers purchase from food retailers.  
Sawyer’s statements were further reinforced via additional commentary from other anti-
LFTB actors enrolled by ABC News, including former-USDA employee Gerald 
Zirnstein.  In an interview with ABC News’ Jim Avila, Zirnstein labeled the inclusion of 
LFTB in ground beef as “economic fraud” because he thought it is “not fresh, ground 
beef,” but a “cheap substitute being added in” (ABC News 2012a).  As previously 
mentioned, ABC News also aired comments from former BPI employee Kit Foshee who 
made comments questioning the nutritional quality of LFTB, referring to it as “not what 





“connective tissue” that would “fill you up,” but “not gonna [sic] you do any good” in 
terms of nutritional benefit (ABC News 2012c).   
 Through their implications that LFTB is something other than beef and of low 
nutritional quality, anti-LFTB actors questioned whether consumers were actually 
purchasing the product they thought they were, ground beef, or if they were economically 
swindled into buying a product “padded” with something of lower nutritional quality.  In 
contrast to these suggestions, the pro-LFTB discourse coalition warned just the opposite.  
Pro-LFTB actors cautioned that it was the exclusion rather than the inclusion of LFTB in 
ground beef that had negative economic costs for consumers.   
High Price of LFTB-Free 
In addition to problematizing the exclusion of LFTB from the ground beef 
agrifood network as both a safety and health concern, actors within the pro-LFTB 
discourse coalition advised that its exclusion would raise the price of ground beef for 
consumers.  When responding to questions from the media at a BPI press conference, 
pro-LFTB actor Gov. Terry Branstad explained that the “problem with taking this 
[LFTB] off the market” is that “we end up with a fatter product that's gonna [sic] cost 
more that's gonna [sic] increase the obesity problem in this country” (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012d).  Governor Branstad was not alone in his concerns with costs at the 
press conference as Governor Rick Perry of Texas, Lieutenant Governor Matt Michels of 
South Dakota, and Governor Sam Brownback of Kansas all expressed concerns that the 
price of ground beef would increase as a result of excluding LFTB (Beef Products 





The governors were not the only enrolled pro-LFTB actors to sound alarm over 
rising costs of ground beef.  In an appearance on Rural Free Delivery Television, the 
Senior Agricultural Economist and Director of the Livestock Agricultural Marketing 
Center, Jim Robb, also expressed his concerns about the cost implications of excluding 
LFTB from the ground beef agrifood network for both producers and consumers.  Robb 
stated that “fresh beef prices” were at a “record high” and that as the demand for LFTB 
quickly decreased, the beef that went into making LFTB had to be “reduced in price 
dramatically to force it into alternative market channels” (Beef Products Incorporated 
2012j).  According to Robb, the quick diversion of LFTB’s source product and lower-
priced sale of the product to non-LFTB producing buyers had negative impacts upon beef 
processors (Beef Products Incorporated 2012j).  Robb also laid out his concerns for 
increased consumer costs.  Robb warned that as large retailers and school districts 
stopped purchasing LFTB, it “raised hamburger prices to consumers” and “raised the cost 
of the Federal [sic] School Lunch Program” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012j).   
The consensus among the pro-LFTB discourse coalition was that, in addition to 
increased risks in food safety and health, excluding LFTB from the ground beef agrifood 
network would ultimately hurt consumers by increasing their food costs.  Safety, health, 
and price, however, were not the only costs with which pro-LFTB actors warned 
consumers should be concerned.  
Environmental Sustainability 
 As stated earlier, pro- and anti-LFTB discourse coalitions allocated unequal 
attention to problematizations concerning LFTB.  While pro-LFTB actors problematized 





coalition did not address the issue of environmental sustainability as it relates to LFTB.  
Contested claims of the sustainability of meat production, and especially beef-production, 
are nothing new as it is an issue at the center of intense political debate.  Especially 
contested is the sustainability of conventional intensive grain-fed versus organically 
raised grass-fed beef production (Capper 2012).  Although some research highlights the 
sustainability of grass-fed alternative methods of beef production (Gwen 2009), other 
researchers have argued that conventional methods are less resource-intensive, thus more 
efficient, and ultimately more sustainable (Capper and Bauman 2013).  Within the 2012 
LFTB food scare, pro-LFTB actors fall within the purview of actors that hold the 
efficiencies of conventional food production and processing, at least as it relates to 
LFTB, as a solution to environmental sustainability.   
Actors in the pro-LFTB discourse reasoned that LFTB is an environmentally 
sustainable product because by harvesting meat from pieces of the carcass otherwise 
unused for human consumption, less cattle, and thus less resources, are needed to produce 
ground beef with LFTB versus without LFTB.  Pro-LFTB sustainability discourse 
included animations and illustrations as well as dialog from pro-LFTB actors.  Below, 
Figure 14 displays an illustration produced by BPI that illustrates pro-LFTB 
problematizations of LFTB as increasing the affordability and sustainability of ground 
beef (Beef Products Incorporated 2012a).  The title “Same Beef Different Process” 
highlights the pro-LFTB definition of LFTB as beef, while the remainder of the 
illustration claims that ground beef containing LFTB costs less money and uses less 
resources (i.e. cattle, corn, water, farmland) when compared with ground beef without 





Figure 14. LFTB Sustainability - "Same Beef Different Process" 
 
Dialog from pro-LFTB actors also supported the problematization of LFTB as an 
environmentally-sustainable product.  As Janet Riley of the American Meat Institute 
explained,  
[L]ean finely-textured beef is a sustainable product.  Without lean finely-textured 
beef we would need 1.5 million additional head of cattle to make up the 
difference in the beef supply.  In our view making sure that we harvest as much 
beef from an animal and waste as little as possible is just the right thing to do.  It 
shows respect for the animal, it ensures a steady supply of beef, and it prevents 
waste (Beef Products Incorporated 2012d).   
Riley’s suggestion that using as much of the animal as possible coupled with the idea that 
it “shows respect for the animal” is reminiscent of the revival in the “nose-to-tail” eating 
philosophy (Henderson 2004).  This “waste not” philosophy has taken root in modern 
“foodie” culture, people for whom food and food knowledge is a form of recreation, and 
is based on the idea that meat-eaters have a moral obligation, based on an animal welfare 
and environmentalist ethic, to consume all edible parts of a food animal (Henderson 





contemporary concerns with animal-welfare and sustainability in food production.  Dr. 
Gary Acuff, Professor of Food Science at Texas A & M University, referenced these 
concerns and held LFTB as a technology that addresses them: 
Today we all want sustainability and environmental awareness, the beef industry 
has responded by improving animal welfare and increasing efficiency. Helping to 
make sure that we're good stewards of the life of an animal that will be used to 
provide food on our tables.  Lean finely-textured beef or LFTB is a lean, safe, 
sustainable product that's been born from consumer demands over the last 30 
years (Beef Products Incorporated 2012d).   
Similar to the problematizations of LFTB as a technological solution to problems of food 
safety, health, and affordability, Acuff’s comments reinforced the agro-industrial value of 
applying scientific-rationality to alleviate animal welfare and environmental 
sustainability concerns.  Additionally, Acuff, Riley, and other actors in the pro-LFTB 
discourse coalition warned that in the face of a growing population, LFTB is also a 
necessary technological solution to help “feed the world.”   
Feeding the World 
 One of the major contemporary challenges facing agriculture and the 
sustainability of human life is how to provide food for the growing world population, 
currently at 7 billion people (Carolan 2012:181).  Intertwined with the issue of global 
food security is also the problem of how to feed industrializing countries (e.g. China) 
whose appetite for meat, a particularly resource-intensive food, continues to increase as 
their populations experience upward socioeconomic mobility.  With the world population 
expected to hit 9.5 billion people by 2015, Carolan estimated that “if current trends hold, 
we are going to have to produce twice as much animal protein by 2050 just to keep up 
with demand” ( (2012:181).  Currently livestock consume enough “basic food [e.g. 





“In other words, if the world continues to eat meat at the rates that we are expecting, the 
world’s effective population in 2050 will be 13.5 billion, as opposed to the 9.5 billion 
predicted by most models” (Carolan 2012:181).  Additionally, heightened pressure for 
increasing meat production coupled with the resources necessary to produce meat 
translate to further strain on already strained resources like arable land and fresh water.   
 At a basic level, humans are thus faced with three choices related to meat 
consumption and production: 1) alter diets to include less meat, 2) increase the efficiency 
with which meat is produced, and/or 3) some combination of 1 and 2.  Although Carolan 
(2012) pointed out that demand is currently outpacing improvements of efficiency in 
meat production, conventional food and agriculture actors, including those in the pro-
LFTB discourse coalition, primarily focus on choice two (increasing efficiency) as the 
solution for increasing demands for meat.  In other words, the dominant discourse reflects 
a reliance on scientific innovation to increase meat supply versus decreasing meat 
consumption to free up land for production of crops directly consumable by human 
beings.  
More Meat 
The “feed the world” narrative is nothing new to the industrial production of food.  
What is meant by “industrial” or “conventional” food production is the “capital-intensive, 
large-scale, highly mechanized agriculture with monocultures of crops and extensive use 
of artificial fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides, with intensive animal husbandry” 
(Knorr and Watkins 1984 as cited in Beus and Dunlap1990:594).  Conventional 





commodity agriculture like the South Dakota Corn Growers Association (SDCGA), the 
trade association the American Meat Institute, and a number of other pro-conventional 
agriculture actors all employ the “feed the world” narrative to support the discourse and 
actions of conventional agriculture (DuPont 2014, Monsanto 2014, SDCGA 2014, 
American Meat Institute 2011).  At the heart of the “feed the world” narrative is the idea 
that hunger is a problem of inadequate food supply (Carolan 2012).  According to 
conventional agriculturalists, alleviating hunger thus requires “science-based solutions” 
(DuPont 2014) including “investing in technology and using advanced management 
techniques” (SDCGA 2014) like “better seeds with higher yields” (DuPont 2014) in order 
to “grow more food per acre” (Charles 2013) or more head of cattle with less inputs (e.g. 
grain, water, land).  During the 2012 LFTB food scare, LFTB was problematized as a 
technical solution to help “feed the world.” 
Along with addressing concerns over food safety, health, costs, and 
environmental sustainability, the pro-LFTB discourse coalition also problematized LFTB 
as an innovative technical solution to meeting the meat consumption demands of a 
growing world population.  In the BPI-produced video “Innovations in Food Safety,” the 
male narrator of the video asked the question “Why is innovation important when it 
comes to food?” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012h).  BPI enrolled Dr. John Floros, Dean 
of the College of Agriculture at Kansas State University, and other pro-LFTB actors to 
answer this question.  Floros explained: 
China consumes a lot more meat today than they consumed 30 or 40 years ago.  
And the projections are that they will continue to consume more meat 40 or 50 
years from now.  So not only do we have to increase the amount of food we’re 
producing, but we also have to also produce more food with more protein such as 





Floros’ explanation is thus to increase meat production to meet rising demands versus a 
shift in consumption habits of animal products.  The male narrator of BPI’s “Innovations 
in Food Safety” video then explained that LFTB is a “safe and efficient way” of meeting 
the challenge of “increasing protein demands” in the context of “limited natural 
resources” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012h).  Floros echoed the narrator’s statements 
explaining that: 
Every resource we have is limited. So we must produce more food with the 
resources we have today. And in order to do that we’re gonna [sic] need to really 
take advantage of every possible scientific or technological breakthrough that we 
can get our hands on (Beef Products Incorporated 2012h).   
Coupled with the narrator’s comments, Floros’ warning suggests that the challenge of the 
rising demands of meat consumption and the strain it creates on resources is not a 
problem solved by altering consumption habits (i.e. consuming less meat), but by relying 
on the use of “scientific or technological breakthroughs” like lean finely-textured beef.  
In a separate video, Janet Riley of the American Meat Institute echoed Floros’ narrative 
when she explained that as global population has increased, more people “move into the 
middle-class every day and they alter their diets to include more animal protein” because 
they “understand the importance of animal protein as part of their diet” (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012c).  These comments from Riley and Floros are congruent with other 
“feed the world” narratives employed by conventional agriculture and food production 
companies.  The “feed the world” narrative within the context of the 2012 LFTB food 
scare was utilized by the pro-LFTB discourse coalition to problematize LFTB as an 






Inclusion vs. Exclusion of LFTB 
 Collectively, the actors enrolled and discourses deployed by pro- and anti-LFTB 
discourse coalitions revealed a rift in perceptions regarding the concerns they felt 
consumers should have over the inclusion versus the exclusion of LFTB within the 
ground beef agrifood network.  According to anti-LFTB actors, the inclusion of LFTB 
within the ground beef actor-network was an issue worthy of scrutiny and deserving of 
consumer concern.  Anti-LFTB discourse problematized LFTB as a lower-quality 
adulterant, as a possible safety concern, and as less nutritious than non-LFTB ground 
beef.   
 While anti-LFTB actors raised concern over LFTB in the ground beef supply, 
Pro-LFTB actors problematized these consumer concerns as unwarranted and as 
potentially harmful to consumers.  In support of this position, the pro-LFTB discourse 
coalition built discourse and enrolled actors aimed at alleviating consumer concerns over 
LFTB consumption and therefore supporting a ground beef network including LFTB.  
Juxtaposed with the anti-LFTB warnings, the pro-LFTB discourse coalition 
problematized the exclusion of LFTB from ground beef as the true worry for consumers.  
Pro-LFTB actors framed LFTB as “100 percent beef” and warned consumers that the 
elimination of LFTB from the ground beef agrifood network meant increased risks in the 
safety, health, affordability, and environmental sustainability of ground beef.  
Additionally, pro-LFTB actors employed a “feed the world” narrative to frame LFTB as a 
technological solution to meeting the growing demands of worldwide animal-protein 





These observations are the outcome of following network-building actors through 
their activities during the 2012 LFTB food scare.  The network-building activities of BPI 
and ABC News included deploying discourses and enrolling actors supportive of their 
preferred orders of the ground beef actor-network.  While these findings do accomplish 
the major goals of this study, they do not explain how the actors selected their discourses 
or the actors they chose to enroll.  Moreover, given the political context of the food scare 
(e.g. the BPI v. ABC News lawsuit), it was difficult to question the actors directly to gain 
these insights.  Despite these limitations, there is a theoretical framework within which 
network-building activities can be couched in order to explain the actions of BPI and 
ABC News.  Through employing Bruno Latour’s conceptualization of Pierre Bourdieu’s 
“habitus,” this study provides a way to explain the network-building practices of BPI and 














- Discussion - 
Discussion 
Actor-network theorists insist that researcher studying relations not impose any a 
priori “frameworks,” “structures,” or “themes” upon the actors followed in an ANT 
analysis (Latour 2007).  Instead, Latour (2007) suggests that researchers follow actors 
and examine their network-building practices (e.g. discourses, actors enrolled) in order to 
describe them as they are expressed by the actors’ own accounts.  This said, actor-
network theorists also see the value in employing theoretical frameworks to make sense 
of empirical generalizations (Venturini and Guido 2012).  Actor-network theorists 
recognize the value and possibilities of multiple theoretical avenues, but insist that these 
"speculations must follow data and not the other way around” (Venturini and Guido 
2012:2).   
As an actor-network analysis, this study followed network-building actors, BPI 
and ABC News, to provide an account of their practices as they attempted to establish 
their preferred order of the LFTB actor-network.  Beyond this description of network-
building practices, the remainder of the study focuses on applying theory to explain these 
practices.  Through merging Bruno Latour’s reconceptualization of Bourdieu’s concept 
of habitus with scientism and moral panic, this study suggests that the network-building 
practices of pro- and anti-LFTB actors can be understood through envisioning them as 
resulting from two distinct habituses: 1) BPI’s scientist habitus, and 2) ABC News’ moral 






Latour, ANT, and Habitus 
 Employing Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of habitus as reconceptualized by Bruno 
Latour provides a way to better understand the rift between the practices and discourses 
employed by BPI and ABC News during the 2012 LFTB food scare (Ritzer 2011).  The 
concept of habitus is congruent with this actor-network analysis of the 2012 LFTB food 
scare for three primary reasons: 1) the theory dismisses the agency (micro-) and structure 
(macro-) dualism – a dualism also dismissed by ANT, 2) it is a theory aimed at 
explaining relations – also congruent with the goals of ANT, and 3) it is a constructivist 
theory that views society as the work of actors constantly working, through their 
practices, to build, transform, destroy, and rebuild relations.   
Habitus in this study is employed as it is reconceptualized within the framework 
of actor-network theory by Bruno Latour (2007).  While Latour recognized the value of 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, in his book, Reassembling the Social (2007), Latour 
reconceptualized habitus in three important ways.  First, while Bourdieu viewed habitus 
as a “structuring structure” or particular orientation toward viewing reality, Latour 
viewed habitus as discrete skills or competencies (Kindley 2010).  In Bourdieu’s version 
of habitus, individuals internalize the objective conditions (or structure) around them and 
these conditions become part of their subjective structure unconsciously shaping their 
behaviors, ideas, etc.  According to Bourdieu, for example, a person’s position within the 
class structure imbues them with a certain class habitus including tastes and types of 
capital (e.g. cultural capital) (Ritzer 2011).   
Rather than viewing habitus as the product of some external force working upon 





selective.  According to Latour (2007), actors exercise this selectivity through “plugging 
into” specific competencies or skills appropriate for particular situations (207).  Latour 
illuminated this idea through the metaphor of downloading “plug-ins” in order to view 
web content: 
When you reach some site in cyberspace, it often happens that you see nothing on 
the screen. But then a friendly warning suggests that you might not have the right 
plug-ins’ and that you should ‘download’ a bit of software which, once installed on 
your system, will allow you to activate what you were unable to see before.  What 
is so telling in this metaphor of the plug-in is that competence doesn’t come in 
bulk any longer but literally in bits and bytes. You don’t have to imagine a 
‘wholesale’ human having intentionality, making rational calculations, feeling 
responsible for his sins, or agonizing over his mortal soul. Rather, you realize that 
to obtain ‘complete’ human actors, you have to compose them out of many 
successive layers, each of which is empirically distinct from the next. Being a fully 
competent actor now comes in discreet pellets or, to borrow from cyberspace, 
patches and applets, whose precise origin can be ‘Googled’ before they are 
downloaded and saved one by one (2007:207).   
 
Through this metaphor of a person requiring a ‘plug-in’ to access web content, Latour 
also highlighted the dependency actors have upon one another in exercising agency.   
 This is the second of Latour’s reconceptualizations of habitus – that it is not 
simply a set of competencies from some objective social context upon which an 
individual can draw in a given situation, but a skill or competency that is an exercise of 
agency just as dependent upon other actors.  In other words, without other actors the 
habitus is not something an individual can necessarily exercise.  Latour’s metaphor of a 
consumer navigating a supermarket helps to illuminate this point: 
Even when one has to make the mundane decision about which kind of sliced ham 
to choose, you benefit from dozens of measurement instruments that equip you to 
become a consumer—from labels, trademarks, barcodes, weight and measurement 
chains, indexes, prices, consumer journals, conversations with fellow shoppers, 
advertisements, and so on.  The crucial point is that you are sustaining this mental 
and cognitive competence as long as you subscribe to this equipment. You don’t 
carry it with you; it is not your own property. You might have internalized it 





plug-in! If you try to make a rational calculation away from such equipment—
deciding for example to buy Universal Panoramas in order to become the World 
Company—you might have nothing more to make your ‘macro-decision’ with 
than rough estimates on the back of an envelope; you will no longer possess the 
competence to be rational at all. Here again, it makes much more realistic sense to 
bypass entirely the two sites: the market forces and the individual agent 
(2007:210).   
 
 Third, and somewhat interrelated to his second reconceptualization of the habitus, 
Latour viewed the habitus as something that involves constant work.  For Latour, people 
do not simply soak in some objective “social context” that becomes a deeply embedded 
part of their habitus.  Rather, the habitus  “is not ‘in’ the agent, it is those many layers of 
competence builders that we have to ceaselessly download in order to gain some sort of 
ability for a while” (Latour (2007:212).  Thus the habitus requires active maintenance on 
the part of the actor.  It requires an actor to constantly “plug-in” to relations with various 
other actors to form a supportive scaffold.   
 This idea of routine maintenance most closely mirrors Bourdieu’s idea of 
‘practice’ with the difference being that practice for Bourdieu’s agent is a subconscious 
act, while practice for Latour’s (2007) actor is a conscious, active, and networked 
engagement (Ritzer 2011).  It is this upkeep of habitus that became the starting point for 
this analysis.  Following the practices of the two network-building actors, BPI and ABC 
News, through their translation processes revealed differences between the habitus of 
these actors and the translation process through which they support them.  I have 
conceptualized these different habitus as the “scientist habitus” and the “moral panic 
habitus.”   





 The concept of the scientist habitus is proposed as an explanation of the 
discourses deployed and actors enrolled by pro-LFTB network-building actor BPI during 
the 2012 LFTB food scare.  The term “scientist” describes the reliance of BPI and other 
pro-LFTB actors on scientism or the ontological preference of scientific knowledge as 
constituting the authoritative worldview around which the ordering of relations within 
agrifood systems should take place (Busch 2000; Sorrell 1994).  Busch and others at the 
Michigan State University School of Agrifood Governance and Technoscience suggest an 
increasing reliance of modern food systems on the utilization of scientism to build 
regulatory standards and support industrial food-production practices (Konefal and 
Hatanaka 2010).  Within the context of food scares, actors subscribing to scientism view 
“scientific knowledge” as the “ultimate arbitrator for settling controversies” (Skaldany 
2008:185).   
 Through this lens of scientism, other forms of knowledge (i.e. indigenous and 
local knowledge) are seen as subservient since they do not extol science as the ultimate 
way of knowing.  Those food scholars critical of scientism point out that this viewpoint 
threatens a democratic process within food production because it silences the voices of 
consumers and other stakeholders who do not share the scientist position (Busch 2000; 
Delind and Howard 2008; Skaldany 2008).  Whether debating safety, health, cost, or the 
definition and labelling of a food, actors with a scientist habitus plug into relations that 
support, or appear to support, a scientific position with regard to these controversies 
(DeLind and Howard 2008).  The analysis of the discourses deployed and actors enrolled 
by pro-LFTB actors within the 2012 LFTB food scare revealed that utilizing the concept 





 In accordance with Latour’s reconceptualization of habitus, describing BPI as 
having a scientist habitus lends an explanation to the way in which BPI “plugged in” to 
discourses and other actors to “download” a scaffolding of support for their scientistic 
view of the agrifood system and LFTB’s place within it.  When examining the 
problematizations of BPI and other pro-LFTB actors, it is apparent that they relied 
heavily upon claims made under the authority of scientific rationality.  The pro-LFTB 
problematizations of LFTB were mediated through a scientist habitus where pro-LFTB 
actors plugged into scientific discourse to support the inclusion of LFTB within the food 
system as providing a technological solution to problems of food safety, health, food 
costs, environmental sustainability, and even food supply issues.  When these 
problematizations were challenged, the pro-LFTB discourse coalition mounted resistance 
based upon their superior scientific relation with food.  Furthermore, the actors enrolled 
by network-building actor BPI are also representative of a scientific habitus in that many 
of the actors held the roles of credentialed food scientists or worked within the 
rationalized regulatory system held as the standard for scientifically evaluating food 
before it can be sold to consumers.  Perhaps the most visible example of BPI’s scientist 
habitus was with regard to their support of their problematization of LFTB as beef.  
Discourse concerning the definition of LFTB revealed the way in which the actors 
within the pro-LFTB discourse coalition had a relationship with beef mediated by 
scientific understanding.  Actors within the pro-LFTB discourse coalition defined LFTB 
as ground beef in accordance with its protein content and molecular constituents.  Janet 
Riley of the American Meat Institute explained that LFTB is beef because it contains the 





other beef” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012c).  When their definition of beef was 
challenged, pro-LFTB actors also mounted resistance relying upon scientific rationality.  
Responding to criticisms of LFTB from celebrity chef Jamie Oliver, Professor of Food 
Science Dr. Gary Acuff questioned Oliver’s understanding of the “biochemical makeup” 
of beef and charged that Oliver’s explanation of LFTB “is not science, it’s entertainment” 
(Beef Products Incorporated 2012f).  Dr. Acuff and other scientific food experts were 
enrolled by BPI to mobilize support for the pro-LFTB definition of LFTB.  Through 
plugging into these scientists, BPI accessed their scientific authority and used it to 
problematize any definition of LFTB outside scientific rationality as misinformed anti-
LFTB propaganda.  The question of LFTB’s safety followed a similar pattern. 
When discussing the safety of LFTB, pro-LFTB actors problematized LFTB as 
safe and as a technological solution to the problems of food safety related to ground beef.  
Primarily, BPI asserted that their scientific management of safety coupled with the 
rationalized evaluation and approval of the product by government regulatory bodies was 
scientific proof of LFTB’s safety.  In BPI’s “Innovations in Food Safety” video, imagery 
of BPI scientists testing LFTB samples is coupled with dialog from actors that reinforce 
the scientifically-evaluated safety of LFTB.  When describing the safety of LFTB, Dr. 
Gary Acuff explained: 
I mean, everything in the plant has been built to enhance sanitation.  You know, 
it’s all stainless steel, it’s, it’s extremely clean.  I mean, to see how much they’ve 
engineered safety and sanitation into the whole process – it’s a magnificent 
facility (Beef Products Incorporated 2012h). 
Acuff’s comments highlight the idea that safety is not only important to BPI, but 
something that is scientifically engineered into the production of LFTB.  In another video 





consumers that “not a single pallet of product is released to consumers until the test 
results are back from our third party labs” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012m).   
 This reliance of BPI on third-party certification (TPC) is an example of the 
rationalized food safety controls characteristic of modern food production (Konefal and 
Hatanaka 2010) and another illustration of safety as scientifically-defined.  In addition to 
third-party certification, BPI also touted the USDA approval of LFTB as a marker of 
safety.  BPI enrolled Dr. Elizabeth Hagen, USDA Undersecretary of Food Safety, to 
support this discourse.  In a BPI press conference, Dr. Hagen explained that the “USDA 
mark of inspection” is an indicator that LFTB has met “rigorous food safety standards” 
“based on science,” so consumers should not have concern about the safety of the product 
(Beef Products Incorporated 2012d).  When the safety of LFTB was questioned, pro-
LFTB actors like Dr. Jim Dickson warned that “it would be a mistake” to not utilized a 
food safety “technology” like LFTB as failing to do so represents a threat to food safety 
(Beef Products Incorporated 2012h).  Not only is LFTB safe, but, according to Dr. 
Dickson and the pro-LFTB discourse coalition, it is thus also a technological answer to 
problems with ground beef safety.  These examples of discourse and actors enrolled are 
again suggestive of BPI’s scientist habitus at work in their effort to problematize LFTB 
as scientifically safe.    
 Problematization of the healthfulness of LFTB is another area in which BPI’s 
scientist habitus was enacted.  Again, discourse employed by BPI and other pro-LFTB 
actors focused on the regulatory hurdles of LFTB as a marker of its health benefits to 
consumers.  Dr. Elizabeth Hagen of the USDA highlighted that the USDA’s “health 





“lower fat offering in terms of ground beef” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012d).  
Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack echoed these statements when he explained that 
LFTB is a “leaner beef product,” which “is one of the reasons why we [the USDA] have 
made it a staple of the school lunch program” because “we are concerned with obesity 
levels” and want to make sure “youngsters are receiving a product that is lean and 
contains less fat” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012n).  Lean finely-texture beef was thus 
problematized as a technological solution to tackling the issue of obesity in the United 
States.   
 According to BPI and pro-LFTB actors, the cost of food is also a problem which 
LFTB helps to alleviate.  Within the modern industrialized food system, producing as 
much food at the lowest cost is of great concern (Anderson 2009).  BPI problematized 
LFTB as a technological solution to help achieve this goal through lowering the overall 
prices of ground beef for consumers.  Some pro-LFTB actors, like Governor of Kansas 
Sam Brownback, warned that excluding LFTB from ground beef would “drive up the 
price of lean beef” and ultimately result in consumers selecting “higher fat content 
ground beef” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012d).  Economist Jim Robb was enrolled as a 
technical expert to provide further support for this problematization with his analysis of 
the negative economic impact of the 2012 LFTB food scare upon the global beef market, 
the National School Lunch Program, and for consumers (Beef Products Incorporated 
2012j).  Robb expressed that the exclusion of LFTB from the ground beef actor network 
would also take “industry resources away from food research” and thus the “bottom line, 





process” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012j).  Clearly BPI and pro-LFTB actors viewed 
LFTB as a key technology for reducing food prices.   
 BPI’s scientist habitus was also apparent in their view of LFTB as a technological 
solution to issues of environmental sustainability.  Scientists enrolled by BPI including 
Dr. Gary Acuff spoke on behalf of LFTB proclaiming that the “beef industry” has 
responded to issues of “environmental awareness and sustainability” through “increasing 
efficiency” and producing a “sustainable product” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012d).  
According to Janet Riley of the American Meat Association and BPI, LFTB translates to 
the use of “1.5 million less cattle,” less grain, less water, and less land used to produce 
the same amount of beef without LFTB (Beef Products Incorporated 2012a; Beef 
Products Incorporated 2012d).  BPI thus problematized LFTB as a technology aimed at 
increasing environmental sustainability of beef production.  Perhaps somewhat 
juxtaposed to this claim, however, was also the view of an increased demand for beef 
production and LFTB’s role in helping to meet this “need.” 
 Finally, LFTB was also problematized as a technological solution for addressing 
problems with global food insecurity.  BPI enrolled Dr. Jim Dickson of Iowa State 
University and Dr. John Floros of Kansas State University to deploy discourse on world 
population growth and the accompanying increased demand for food – including animal 
products like beef (Beef Products Incorporated 2012i).  Dr. Dickson explained that due to 
world population growth, “we need to double the world’s food supply in the next twenty 
to thirty years” (Beef Products Incorporated 2012h).  Dr. Floros echoed this statement, but 
also added that “we need to produce more food with more protein, such as meat” and that 





technological breakthrough that we can get our hands on” (Beef Products Incorporated 
2012h).  Floros’ statement reflects the view that what is needed to address the increasing 
pressure on the food supply is the use of technological innovations like LFTB rather than 
a reduction in more resource-consumptive foods like beef.   
 Following Latour’s assertion that habitus is like a “plug-in” through which actors 
invest in certain practices and relations, this analysis suggests that the plug-ins 
downloaded by BPI were strongly reflective of scientism and thus a “scientist habitus.”  
This scientist habitus was apparent in the discourses deployed and actors enrolled by BPI 
in the 2012 LFTB food scare.  By asserting that LFTB was ground beef because it fit a 
certain protein profile and looked the same as ground beef “under a microscope,” BPI 
preferenced a technical scientific definition of beef and revealed their relation with beef 
as mediated by scientific knowledge.  Though ABC News and anti-LFTB actors provided 
alternative conceptualizations of LFTB, these were resisted by BPI with their claims that 
these alternate definitions were “misinformation” because they were not utilizing 
principles of science to arrive at their conclusion. Additionally, BPI laid out a variety of 
food-related problems (i.e. food safety, health, food costs, environmental sustainability, 
and food security) and problematized LFTB as a necessary technological innovation for 
addressing these concerns.  Finally, the BPI’s selection of actors enrolled into the pro-
LFTB discourse coalition also reflect a scientist habitus in that many of the actors support 
and embody scientism through their discourse and positions as scientific experts within 







Moral Panic Habitus 
 Latour’s reconceptualization of habitus is also useful as a way to construct an 
explanation for the practices of ABC News during the 2012 LFTB food scare.  Somewhat 
juxtaposed to the scientist habitus of BPI, the discourses and actors accessed and 
deployed by ABC News are conceptualized as reflective of a “moral panic habitus.”  Two 
primary characteristics of ABC News’ practices support this idea of the moral panic 
habitus: 1) practices employed by ABC News to “plug in” to consumer concerns 
regarding LFTB including establishing a “feedback loop” of public concern, and 2) 
evidence that ABC News employed a strategy of exaggeration in their portrayal over the 
concerns of LFTB.  Prior to delving into either of these, however, it is necessary to 
provide a brief background on the concept of “moral panic.” 
 Along with the Alar food scare of the late 1980s, some sociologists and might 
categorize the 2012 LFTB food scare as a moral panic.  The concept of moral panic helps 
to categorize a specific type of collective reaction to something perceived to be a threat 
by a significant group of people.  The world “panic” denotes both the considerable size of 
the reaction and that the reaction is disproportionate to the actual measurable threat or 
within the context of other existing demonstrable threats not yielding such reactions 
(Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009).  The panics are “moral” in the sense that they involve a 
perceived threat to a value seen as significant by a large group of people (Goode and 
Ben-Yehuda 2009).  Goode and Ben-Yehuda (define moral panic as a: 
[S]care about a threat or supposed threat from deviants or “folk devils,” a 
category of people who, presumably, engage in evil practices and are blamed for 





Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) also highlighted that the word “scare” emphasizes that 
“the concern over, fear of, or hostility toward the folk devil is out of proportion to the 
actual threat that is claimed” (2).   
 The term “scare” here has a nuanced difference from how it is employed in “food 
scare” as food scares may include both overreactions to a perceived problem (e.g. 
bacterial or viral contamination, harmful chemical agent, etc.) and reactions to an actual 
measurable widespread contamination or danger in the food system.  Additionally, within 
a food scare the “folk devil” or deviant targeted as responsible for the panic is not 
necessarily a “person” or even group of people (e.g. a corporation), but rather the 
chemical, bacteria, virus, or even food item that is perceived as the threat.  Though 
beyond the purview of this study, this is perhaps where actor-network theory, a theory 
that extends agency beyond human beings, can contribute to expanding the concept of 
moral panic.  Lean finely-textured beef or “pink slime” was the folk devil of concern in 
the 2012 LFTB food scare, but this concern cannot be examined without another 
important component of the moral panic – the mass media. 
 According to Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009), the mass media, and especially the 
news media, are an important component of moral panics as they help to “inflame” and 
“generate public concern” (90).  The mass news media have “institutionalized the need 
for moral panics” (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009:90) as they depend upon plugging into 
public concern, another component of moral panics, in order to “sell papers, entertain 
readers, and generate further news” (Garland 2008:12).  Generating concern is especially 
effective if it is regarding a latent concern already existing among the public and if the 





2009:91) with the public through which their coverage actively feeds and is fed by public 
concern.  This feedback loop of concern allows media not only to plug into and generate 
public concern, but also to expand or continue coverage because the panic is kept alive by 
the public concern that the news media has helped generate.  It is possible that the 
increased availability of lines of quick electronic communication via online social media 
has only strengthened these feedback loops of concern.  The coverage of LFTB by ABC 
News certainly mirrors a “feedback loop of concern” with ABC News using their 
coverage to generate concerns and then further publicize the concerns amongst 
consumers regarding LFTB in ground beef.   
Past research suggests that consumers have a highly ambivalent relationship with 
food (Beardsworth and Keil 1997; Lockie 2006).  While consumers enjoy the flavor and 
other benefits of food, they are also aware of the possibility that eating could introduce 
harmful substances into their bodies with sometimes devastating physiological 
consequences (Beardsworth and Keil 1997).  Through food scares, news media are able 
to harness these latent consumer concerns with food and utilize them to generate viewers 
and possibly even amplify concern (Lockie 2006).   
The suggestion that ABC News possesses a “moral panic habitus” implies that 
they may also have used the “pink slime” story as a way to benefit from the gustatory 
concerns of consumers.  During the 2012 LFTB food scare, LFTB provided ABC News 
with an opportunity to plug into a sensitive issue for consumers and thus enroll consumer 
attention over the issue of “pink slime” in their ground beef.  Beyond simply alerting 
consumers to the presence of LFTB, ABC News also constructed a feedback loop of 





broadcast material covering LFTB.  ABC News solicited responses from viewers through 
stating “If you have questions about “pink slime,” email us at 
ABC.WorldNews@abc.com” (ABC News 2012a).  After viewers submitted their 
questions, ABC News remarked that they were “flooded with questions” and aired 
various video clips of concerned consumers asking questions like “Which grocery stores 
near me do or don't sell ground beef that contains ammonia-treated pink slime?” (ABC 
News 2012c).   
These consumer questions were reproductions of ABC News’ previously aired 
concerns and provided the subject matter for a subsequent broadcast.  ABC News’ next 
broadcast titled “Pink Slime: Tips for Checking Your Beef” provided consumers with 
instruction regarding how to tell if the ground beef in their supermarket contained 
“questionable filler known as pink slime” (ABC News 2012c).  This activity is indicative 
of the feedback loop of concern discussed by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) as a 
significant component of moral panics.  Furthermore, Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) 
suggested that when generating these concerns, news media also employ exaggerations of 
the threat posed by the folk devil. 
 In the midst of a moral panic, Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) charge that mass 
media “flourish on at least a measure of sensationalism or exaggeration” (102).  This 
claim of exaggeration is not some subjective opinion of whether claims are in-fact 
accurate, but instead a measurable aspect of the moral panic (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 
2009).  That is, exaggeration can actually be quantified in comparing empirical 
observation with subjective claims about the threat of a folk devil.  According to Goode 





(1) Inflating the size, scope, danger, harm, and seriousness of the phenomenon 
reported; (2) making untrue claims about phenomenon; (3) devoting considerably 
more attention to a less serious or dangerous phenomenon than to a more serious 
one; (4) devoting more attention to a phenomenon at a point in time when it is less 
serious than when it is more serious; (5) devoting more attention to a phenomenon 
among certain groups in which it is less common than those in which it is more 
common (2009:101).   
Additionally, to exaggerate a story the media plug into discourse comprised of 
“sensational headlines, melodramatic vocabulary, and deliberate heightening of the 
elements in the story that the press and the public consider news” (Goode and Ben-
Yehuda 2009:101).  Within the context of food scares, this might involve selective focus 
on the harm of a particular bacteria or processing agent without detailing the context of 
such harms – i.e. probability of exposure, level of exposure, etc.  Sometimes, as in the 
case of government reaction during the 2001 foot and mouth scare in the rural United 
Kingdom, this exaggeration and the resulting amplification of concerns may spur strong 
reactions by consumers or governments that have negative consequences far beyond that 
of the actual measured perceived threat (Donaldson et al. 2001).   
Another way in which ABC News’ practices were reflective of a moral panic 
habitus was through their use of exaggeration as a way to generate concern.  First, despite 
safety concerns raised by ABC News, there were no clear indications that any consumers 
had been physiologically harmed from consuming LFTB and no publications of research 
to suggest that something in the product presented a threat.  While the 2012 LFTB food 
scare did partially unfold blackboxed processes of ground beef production, none of this 
information indicated that LFTB was a clear immediate threat to consumer health.   
Second, the language that ABC News employed arguably sensationalized certain 





Diane Sawyer of ABC World News explained that a “whistleblower has come forward to 
tell consumers about the ground beef a lot of us buy at the supermarket.  It is what we 
think it is?  Or is it padded with a filler the whistleblower calls "pink slime"? (ABC News 
2012a).  Sawyer’s labelling of USDA scientist Gerald Zirnstein as a “whistleblower” who 
has “come forward” is somewhat of an exaggeration because Zirnstein’s concerns with 
“pink slime” were only revealed through an internal email that was obtained by a 
Freedom of Information Act request from a New York Times story on ground beef (Moss 
2009).  Zirnstein was enrolled by ABC News, not the other way around.   
Finally, ABC News also used editing techniques that made certain aspects of their 
story appear more shocking than they might be if presented differently.  When ABC 
News raised ethical questions regarding the approval of LFTB by former Undersecretary 
of Agriculture Joann Smith, correspondent Jim Avila highlighted that when Smith left her 
job at the USDA she went to work for Iowa Beef Processors (IBP), a “principal supplier 
of BPI” Iowa Beef Processors (ABC News 2012a).  In Smith’s post-USDA role, ABC 
News correspondent Jim Avila highlighted that, as displayed in Figure 15, she “at least 
$1.2 million dollars over 17 years” (ABC News 2012a).  This monetary figure might 
seem shocking at first glance, but when Smith’s total compensation is divided by her 17 
year tenure at IBP, her average annual compensation comes out to around $70,500 – a 
much less shocking figure when compared with the “$1.2 million over 17 years” laid out 





Figure 15. ABC News Raises Ethical Question about LFTB Approval 
 
 Though the purpose of the study was to reveal the process by which network-
building actors built discourse and enrolled actors during the 2012 LFTB food scare, the 
concept of moral panic habitus is suggested as a possible explanation for these practices 
employed by anti-LFTB network-building actor ABC News.  Goode and Ben-Yehuda 
(2009) highlighted the important role mass news media plays in generating and 
amplifying concerns as well as utilizing a strategy of exaggeration to amplify these 
concerns to foster a moral panic.  The moral panic habitus thus helps to characterize the 
way in which ABC News utilized already present latent consumer concerns to capture 
consumer attention and enroll it to provide further content for their “pink slime” 
broadcasts.  This represents the actor-network employment of habitus in that ABC News’ 
agency is viewed as only possible because they were able to “plug in” and “download” 
these consumer concerns for further support of their anti-LFTB discourse.  Their moral 
panic habitus thus was not “possessed” by them, but something enabled via their relations 





 Another expression of the moral panic habitus was through ABC News’ use of 
exaggeration to support their anti-LFTB discourse.  ABC News accessed sensationalized 
investigative-journalist language like “whistleblower” and claimed that they were 
covering a “startling investigation” in order to convey the importance and urgency of 
their message to consumers.  This concept of a moral panic habitus, however, is not 
without limitations.  
Limitations 
 Explanations for the discourses deployed and actors enrolled by network-building 
actors in the 2012 LFTB food scare are limited by the data utilized in this study.  Both the 
concept of the scientist habitus and moral panic habitus are based upon a qualitative 
content analysis of videos from ABC News and BPI.  This data is limited in its ability to 
interrogate and explain the way in which network-building actors made decisions about 
their discourse.  Why, for example, did BPI enroll a team of food science and animal 
science professors to appear in their videos?  Though the statements of these academics 
appear closely intertwined with examples of scientism found within the dialogue of top 
BPI employees, drawing these connections from the videos does not allow for a rich 
multidimensional exploration of the associations between BPI and these academics.   
 Similar critiques can be made of the practices employed by ABC News.  One 
major question that looms is why ABC News chose to construct and broadcast a story on 
LFTB?  Though this study suggests the fact that food is a latent concern for consumers, 
this conclusion is still likely only part of the attraction of covering LFTB.  Interviews 





these questions and thus more detailed explanations of their network-building practices.  
Despite these concerns, the reality is that while ABC News and BPI are in litigation it is 
difficult to gain access to these data.  Perhaps future research might focus on interviewing 



















- Conclusion – 
Conclusion 
 
 Among the more durable conflicts over genetically modified organisms, 
environmentally sustainable agriculture, and ethical concerns of animal foods, food 
scares stand out as the fads of food and agriculture controversies.  Food scares swiftly 
capture the nervous attention of large groups of people, but exit just as quickly from the 
airwaves of the mass news media and the consciousness of consumers.  Despite their 
more intermittent impacts upon some actors, food scares can make more durable changes 
upon the agrifood networks in which they occur.  As a result of the 2012 LFTB food 
scare, the USDA introduced new LFTB labels and changed their ground beef purchasing 
policies within the National School Lunch Program to include choices for states who 
wished to opt-out of using ground beef products containing LFTB.  Additionally, various 
major grocery retail chains also divested of their LFTB use in their ground beef products.  
 These shifts in public and private ground beef policy reduced the demand for 
LFTB and consequently negatively impacted the sales of LFTB producer BPI.  Reduced 
sales led BPI to suspend production at three of its four facilities and although their 
Kansas facility reopened in November of 2014, two plants remain closed as the demand 
for LFTB remains below pre-scare levels.  The significant changes in the ground beef 
agrifood network resulting from the 2012 LFTB food scare display a need for the 
attention of sociologists studying controversies in food and agriculture.  Developing a 
better understanding of these controversies contributes to understanding the impacts of 






Summary of Findings  
The 2012 LFTB food scare opened the black box of the LFTB actor-network and 
revealed a variety of actors enrolled and discourses deployed to support pro- and anti-
LFTB orderings of the ground beef agrifood network.  In answer to my first question, this 
analysis revealed two discourse coalitions formed around each network-building actor 
including an “anti-LFTB” discourse coalition constructed by ABC News and a “pro-
LFTB” coalition formed by BPI.  Discourse coalitions were classified as “anti” and “pro” 
based upon their divergent problematizations of LFTB.  In answering the second 
question, actors forming each discourse coalition represented two different key 
problematizations (primary discourses) of LFTB: 1) anti-LFTB actors problematized 
LFTB as a cause for consumer concern, and 2) pro-LFTB actors problematized LFTB as 
unworthy of consumer concern.   
At the center of the anti-LFTB discourse coalition was ABC News, the network-
building actor who enrolled a variety of actors into the anti-LFTB coalition including 
former USDA inspectors (“whistleblowers”), food writers, journalists, and food retailers.  
Similarly, BPI, the network-building actor forming the pro-LFTB coalition, enrolled 
trade associations, academics, and politicians to support their discourse.   
Other actors, however, were not as easily placed within either coalition.  
Government regulators, consumers, and nonhuman actors like E.coli and ammonia 
demonstrated an overlap of both coalitions as they were enrolled by each in different 





variety of secondary problematizations to support their primary discourses over raising 
(anti-LFTB actors) or alleviating (pro-LFTB actors) consumer concerns.  
  Discourse coalitions were divided over two primary discourses with anti-LFTB 
actors problematizing LFTB as a product worthy of consumer concern, while pro-LFTB 
actors problematized concerns over LFTB as unwarranted and worked to form discourses 
and enroll actors to alleviate concerns.  Primary discourses were supported by a variety of 
secondary problematizations of LFTB.  Both discourse coalitions formed competing 
problematizations of the definition, safety, and health of LFTB.   
Not all problematizations of LFTB were balanced between both coalitions.  The 
pro-LFTB discourse coalition also problematized LFTB as an innovation that addresses 
environmental sustainability concerns as well as worries over world food supply 
shortages in the face of population growth.  While problematizations of the anti-LFTB 
discourse coalition were based upon raising concerns about the inclusion of LFTB within 
ground beef, pro-LFTB problematizations warned that the real concern for consumers is 
the exclusion of the product from the food supply.  According to pro-LFTB actors, food 
safety, health, environmental sustainability, and world food supply would all be 
compromised by the exclusion of LFTB from ground beef.   
 To explain the practices of network-building actors within the anti- and pro-LFTB 
discourse coalitions, the third goal of this research, I used Latour’s (2007) 
reconceptualization of Bourdieu’s habitus.  Latour (2007) viewed habitus as a useful 
description of the skills and competencies actors access through their associations with 





Latour’s mind, a possession of actors, but resides within the relations between actors who 
“plug-in” to relations with other actors in order to “download” agency – i.e. act (Latour 
2007).  In this study, network-building actors “plugged in” to other actors in order to 
“download” support for their discourses.  Resulting from their expressed reliance upon 
scientific rationality and enrollment of scientists to support their discourse, the practices 
of BPI are described as following a “scientist habitus.”  BPI problematized LFTB as an 
important technological innovation for improving food safety, consumer health, 
environmental sustainability, and problems of world food supply.  BPI also enrolled 
academics within the fields of animal science and food science to support these 
problematizations.   
 In contrast to BPI’s scientist habitus, the practices of ABC News are categorized 
using the concept of a “moral panic habitus.”  This concept combines Goode and Ben-
Yehuda’s theory of “moral panics” with Latour’s conceptualization of “habitus” to 
explain the practices of ABC News.  The moral panic habitus of ABC News is 
characterized by their employment of a “feedback loop of concern” to plug into consumer 
concerns over food by questioning LFTB, soliciting concerned consumer comments, and 
using the consumer attention they garner to further fuel concerns over the product.  
Additionally, this study also suggests that ABC News employed exaggeration and 
sensationalist language when communicating the threat of LFTB.   
Limitations & Future Study 
Though this study provides insights into the practices employed by network-





The primary limitations to this study are twofold: 1) generalizability – it is difficult to 
generalize the findings of this study to the understanding of other food scares, and 2) 
level of detail – utilization of qualitative content analysis translated to a lack of detail 
with regard to the specifics of interactions between actors.   
Though it was not the stated goal of the study, this analysis is limited with regard 
to the generalizability of conclusions that can be drawn from the 2012 LFTB food scare 
to other food scares.  Variations in the type of food involved (e.g. meats, produce, shelf-
stable processed foods) and the nature of the scare (i.e. bacterial contamination, concerns 
over chemical agent, adulteration) present challenges for generalizing findings from any 
one food scare study to providing insights into other food scares.  This study examined 
the 2012 LFTB food scare, which involved an animal-derived food that undergoes a 
highly-specialized process (e.g. spun in centrifuge, ammonia treatment).  These unique 
characteristics thus limit the degree to which insights derived from studying the 2012 
LFTB food scare can be generalized to other food scares.  Problems of generalizability in 
the study of food scares translate to difficulties in forming and testing theories about why 
food scares happen, how they impact agrifood networks, and what policies, if any, should 
be in place for policy makers to better evaluate the threats scares pose.   
One recommendation to address this limitation is for future studies to focus on 
examining similarities and differences of multiple food scares versus utilizing a case-
study approach that examines one specific event.  Perhaps through some comparative 
comprehensive analysis of food scares, researchers might build stronger theories 
explaining the processes by which food scares occur, how they are typically handled by 





contrast to the limitation of generalizability, this study is also limited in the degree of 
detail provided explaining the relations between actors. 
Utilizing a content analysis of video footage translated to sacrifices in the degree 
of detail obtained regarding the processes by which network-building actors enrolled 
other actors into their respective discourse coalitions.  The video analysis is limited, for 
example, regarding the depth of the relationships between BPI and the various academics 
they enrolled to support their discourses.  Though analyzing videos revealed the relations 
during the food scare, this method could not examine relations prior to the scare and 
consequently raises some important questions.  What were the relations between various 
actors of the pro-LFTB discourse coalition (e.g. BPI, politicians, academics) prior to the 
2012 LFTB food scare?  What practices within ABC News influenced, out of many 
possible newsworthy events, the decision to pursue an exposé-style report on lean finely-
textured beef?  What specific information or actions taken within the ABC News story 
captured consumer concerns and ultimately influenced many of them to revolt against 
LFTB?  Answering any of these questions would provide a more detailed understanding 
of actors’ practices during the 2012 LFTB food scare, including the credibility of the 
“scientist” and “moral panic” habitus concepts used to explain them.   
Pursuing these answers requires gathering data directly from actors through 
interviews or perhaps, at least for consumer perspectives, surveys.  The fleeting nature of 
food scares, however, means that data collected through obtrusive methods need to 
consider the temporal dimensions of the scares – especially as they relate to consumers 





legal context (e.g. food disparagement laws) that may heighten barriers of access to key 
actors.   
One possible avenue for future food scare research is to explore methodological 
avenues to overcoming these temporal and political barriers.  This study partially 
circumvented these challenges through utilizing a non-obtrusive approach, but it was not 
without sacrifices to specificity.  Developing methodology for food scare studies that 
more directly accesses key actors is a key for yielding a more detailed analysis.   
Final thoughts 
 The discussion of limitations above revealed that, along with some important 
insights, this study unearthed more questions than answers.  Perhaps the most important 
of these questions, at least to critical scholars of food and agriculture, involve the 
intersection of the university and food scares.  BPI’s enrollment of various academics to 
support their discourse raises a question regarding boundaries between land-grant 
universities and industrial food and agriculture companies.  Specifically, how do food 
scares like the 2012 LFTB scare reflect contemporary relations between land-grant 
universities and agrifood industry?  With decreasing public dollars available for 
university research, land-grant universities are increasingly reliant upon private money, 
especially from industry, to fund research activities (National Science Foundation 2012).  
This trend raises concerns regarding the degree to which changes in funding relocates the 
locus of control over research agendas (i.e. what agendas are supported and which are 





of industry.  Though public and private needs may overlap, food scares and other food 
controversies reveal that they are not always in harmony with one another.  
  Food scares like the 2012 LFTB scare unpack blackboxed relations within 
agrifood chains and thus provide avenues for scholars to interrogate the extent to which 
contemporary land-grant universities serve as extensions of private agrifood industry.  
The challenge for food and agriculture scholars is how to navigate the relations 
constituting food scares while conscious of their own preconceptions. 
As the 2012 LFTB food scare revealed, discourse, especially as it is filtered 
through the lenses of network-building actors, is fragmented.  While LFTB is a product 
of modern industrial food technology, it can arguably be contextualized as embodying a 
“nose-to-tail” eating philosophy more reflective of upper middle-class foodie culture and 
thus a less wasteful and more sustainable way to feed a population that insists animal 
flesh be included in their menu options.  Some anti-LFTB actors like food blogger 
activist Bettina Siegel heralded the removal of LFTB from school lunches as a triumph of 
consumer choice (ABC News 2012e).  If we are to hold the exclusion of LFTB from the 
ground beef supply as reflective of a democratic food system, then, if the sustainability 
claims by BPI are accurate, we also must accept the reality that a more democratic food 
system is not always more environmentally sustainable.  However, even if LFTB makes 
consuming beef more sustainable, perhaps the most sustainable option is for a society to 
eschew consumption of animal products altogether (Eshel and Martin 2006).   
Food scares are events that expose the relations and discourses where these murky 





the controversies” as suggested by Latour (2007), food scholars will also contribute to a 
discussion that moves food politics beyond the false dichotomies like “sustainable” and 




















Appendix A. Timeline of the 2012 LFTB Food Scare 
YEAR EVENT 
2001 United States Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and United 
States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) approve BPI’s ammonia 
pH enhancement system for use in 
production of LFTB (Greene 2012) 
2002 The term “pink slime” is coined in 
an internal email of USDA scientist 
Gerald Zirnstein (Moss 2009) 
2008 BPI and founder Eldon Roth appear 
in the nationally-syndicated 
documentary, Food, Inc. (Food Inc. 
2008) 
2009 Article discussing the safety of 
LFTB is published in The New York 
Times (Moss 2009) 
2011 ABC television program, Jamie 
Oliver’s Food Revolution airs 
episode on “pink slime” (Oliver 
2011) 
2012 – February 1 McDonald’s restaurants 
discontinues the use of LFTB 
(Flock 2012) 
2012 – March 7 ABC World News with Diane 
Sawyer airs the first of a six-part 
investigative report on “pink slime” 
(ABC News 2012a) 
2012 – March 7 Food blogger Bettina Siegel 
launches Change.org petition “Tell 
USDA to Stop Using Pink Slime in 
School Food!” (Siegel 2012)   
2012 – March 9  BPI launches “Beefisbeef.com” 
website where it posts a variety of 
pro-LFTB videos and resources  
2012 – March 15 USDA announces change of 
National School Lunch Program 
Policy to allow states a choice of 
purchasing ground beef with or 
without LFTB (Greene 2012) 
2012 – March 20-23 Major grocery retail chains 
announce plans to stop selling 






2012 – March 25 BPI suspends operations in three of 
its four plants (ABC News 2012e) 
2012 – March 29 Governors and Lt. Governors from 
five states along with 
representatives from USDA and 
interest groups hold press 
conference at BPI (Beef Products 
Incorporated 2012d) 
2012 – March 29 to April 2  Restaurant chain Red Robin 
commissions a survey of consumers 
regarding “pink slime.”  88 percent 
of respondents claim to have heard 
of “pink slime,” 76 percent at least 
somewhat concerned about it 
(Caulfield 2012) 
2012 – April 2 USDA approves LFTB labels 
(Greene 2012) 
2012 – April 10 Iowa State University Block and 
Bridle club hold rally in support of 
LFTB. Students, faculty, 
politicians, and BPI personnel 
attend (Furfaro 2012) 
2012 – September 13 BPI announces it will sue ABC 
News for the sum of $1.2 billion 
(Beef Products Incorporated 2012l) 
2013 – September 10 Four states return to purchasing 
LFTB for school lunches (Knowles 
2013) 
2014 – August 18 BPI reopens Garden City, Kansas 












Appendix B. Beef Products Incorporated YouTube Videos 
Video Title Date 
Posted* 
Content Description 
“Beef Products New Testing for 
E.coli” 
07/13/2011 Craig Letch, BPI Director of Food 
Safety describes BPI’s “test and 
hold” E.coli testing program 
“Ammonia in Foods” 11/07/2011 BPI discusses the presence of 
ammonia in food as well as its use 
of ammonia in LFTB.  Discuss 
“feeding the world.”  
“Innovations in Food Safety” 11/07/2011 Various PhD scientists discuss the 
“NEED FOR INNOVATION.”   
“Jamie Oliver Mischaracterizes 
Lean Beef” 
03/08/2012 Scientists and male narrator discuss 
J. Oliver’s portrayal of the LFTB 
on his Food Revolution ABC show. 
“Food Inc. was Wrong on 
Portraying Lean Beef” 
03/08/2012 Plant manager from BPI, Jay 
Williams, discusses the portrayal of 
the LFTB process in the film Food 
Inc. 





Jay Williams and Rich Jochum 
appear on RFD-TV (Rural Free 
Delivery) to discuss LFTB critics 
and the production process.  
“BPI Press Conference” 09/17/2012 
(Aired on 
09/13/12) 
Press conference announcing BPI’s 
lawsuit against ABC News.   
“BPI Responds to USDA 
Decision on Lean Finely 
Textured Beef” 
10/05/2012 Craig Letch, BPI Dir. Of Food 
Safety, responding to USDA’s new 
policy on LFTB in the NSLP.  
“Myth: Ordinary Household 
Ammonia is Used to Make Some 
Hamburgers”  
8/28/2013 Dr. Acuff (TX A&M) and Janet 
Riley (American Meat Institute) 
discuss use of ammonia in LFTB.  
“The Facts About Lean Finely 
Textured Beef” 
09/24/2013  Janet Riley, AMI VP of Public 
Affairs & Member Services, 
discusses “misinformation” and 
“wild rumors” of LFTB.  Explains 
LFTB. 
“Lean Finely Textured Beef 








IA Gov. Terry Branstad at Iowa 
State University speaking about 
“misinformation circulated in 





“Lean Finely Textured Beef 




Jim Dickson, ISU Professor 
answers questions at “The Truth: 
LFTB” rally. 
“Lean Finely Textured Beef 




Jim Dickson, ISU Professor, lays 
out process and responds to 
“misconceptions” about LFTB.  
“Lean Finely Textured Beef 




Janet Riley, AMI, discusses the 
“misinformation” about LFTB and 
ABC News broadcasts.  Heavily 
criticizes modern media.  





Press conference with 2 Lieut. 
Governors, 3 Governors, USDA 
Undersecretary of Food Safety, and 
media to discuss LFTB.  
“Gov Branstad US Ag Sec Tom 
Vilsack hold join press 




IA Gov. Branstad and US Ag. Sec. 
Tom Vilsack discuss safety and 
“misinformation” about LFTB.  
Vilsack discusses importance of 
educating “population 3, 4, 5 
generations removed from the 
farm.”  
“Dr. Russell Cross Talks about 
the Safety of LFTB” 
09/24/2013 Dr. Cross, Head of TX A&M 
Animal Science Dept, answers 
questions about LFTB. 
“USDA Secretary Vilsack on 





US Ag. Sec. Tom Vilsack vouches 
for safety and allowing LFTB in 
NSLP.  Also discusses new policy 
of allowing schools in the NSLP to 
choose between LFTB and LFTB-
free ground beef. 
* “Date Posted” reflects latest date as displayed on YouTube.  Some videos were posted before this date, 
later received edits in content or textual description, and were reposted subsequently reflecting more 
recent date. 
 
Appendix C.  ABC News Videos 
Video Title Air Date Content Description 
“Pink Slime and You” – ABC 
World News with Diane Sawyer 
03/07/2012 First broadcast with Jim Avila 
reporting on “pink slime.”   
“ABC News Update – ‘Pink 
Slime’ in Hamburger” – ABC 
News 
03/08/2012 Recap of previous night’s “Pink 
Slime and You” broadcast  
“ ‘ Pink Slime’ – Tips for 
Checking your Beef” – ABC 
World News with Diane Sawyer 
03/08/2012 Sawyer and Avila report on “How 
to tell if there is pink slime in your 





“ ‘PINK SLIME’ Outrage: Beef 
Industry Responds” – ABC 
World News with Diane Sawyer 
03/09/2012 Sawyer and Avila air consumer 
questions and interview with 
Costco and Janet Riley of AMI.   
“ ‘Pink Slime’ in School 
Cafeterias, Supermarkets” – ABC 
News Nightline 
03/15/2012 David Muir and David Kerley 
reports on supermarkets, the NSLP, 
and their use of LFTB.  
“Pink Slime Taste Test” – ABC 
News Nightline 
03/16/2012 David Muir and David Kerley 
report on a cookbook author who 
does a “taste test” comparing 
ground beef with and without 
LFTB.    
“ ‘Pink Slime’ – Safeway Pulls 
Meat Filler from Shelves” – ABC 
News – Good Morning America 
News 
03/21/2012 Jim Avila announces that Safeway 
stops using LFTB as a response to 
consumer demands.  
“ ‘Pink Slime’ Discontinued at 
Safeway” – ABC World News 
with Diane Sawyer 
03/21/2012 Sawyer and Avila report on 
Safeway and other supermarkets 
who discontinued the use of LFTB.  
Discuss that they will have a list on 
their website where consumers can 
see who does or does not use 
LFTB.     
“ ‘Pink Slime’ Manufacturer 
Suspends Operations” – ABC 
World News with Diane Sawyer 
03/26/2012 Sawyer and Avila report that 
because so many grocery chains 
dropped LFTB, BPI is suspending 
operations in 3 plants.  
“ABC News Update” – ABC 
News  
03/29/2012 Report about Governors touring 
BPI’s factory in Dakota Dunes.  
“ ‘Pink Slime’ Factory – A Look 
Inside” – ABC World News with 
Diane Sawyer 
03/29/2012 Sawyer and Avila report on Avila’s 
tour of BPI’s plant in South Sioux 
City, NE.  Includes Q & A with 
Governors, BPI personnel, and 
USDA Undersecretary of Food 
Safety.  
“Stock Market Outlook for 
Second Quarter” – ABC News 
Money Matters  
04/02/2012 Male and Female reporter discuss 
AFA foods, a smaller maker of 
LFTB, filing for bankruptcy 
protection.   
“ ‘Pink Slime’ Labels on Ground 
Beef Packaging” – ABC World 
News with Diane Sawyer 
04/03/2012 Sawyer and Avila report on 
pending approval of new proposed 
labels for LFTB.  Say that “USDA” 
is trying to “split-the-baby” by 






Appendix D. Coding sheet for BPI Videos 
Category/Classification CODES  
Actors   Ammonia  
 Beef Industry  
 BPI Personnel 
 Rich Jochum – Corporate Administrator  
 Craig Letch – Director of Food Safety 
 Eldon Roth – Founder & CEO 
 Nick Roth – Engineering  
 Regina Roth – Co-founder 
 Dan Webb – Chief Counsel    
 Jay Williams – Plant Manager  
 Consumers 
 E.coli  
 Foodborne illness  
 Economists/Lawyers 
 Bill Marler – Foodborne Illness Lawyer 
 Jim Robb – Senior Ag. Economist & 




 Gerald Zirnstein – Former USDA Meat 
Inspector 
 Dr. Elisabeth Hagen – Undersecretary of 
Food Safety, USDA 
 Tom Vilsack – US Secretary of 
Agriculture  
 Grocery Store Chains 
 Hy-Vee 
 Safeway 
 Interest Groups  
 American Meat Institute  
 Janet Riley – Senior VP of Public 
Affairs and Member Services 
 Animal rights groups 
 Protect the Harvest 
 Erik Helland – Spokesperson 
 Former Republican IA State 
Representative 
 STOP Foodborne Illness  









 ABC News 
 Jim Avila – Senior National 
Correspondent  
 Diane Sawyer – Anchor, ABC World 
News with Diane Sawyer 
 Jamie Oliver  
 Local Reporters 
 Ben Dunsmoor – KELO TV Sioux Falls 
 RFD-TV 
 Mark Oppold – Host of RFD-TV Live 
 Politicians 
 Terry Branstad – Republican Gov. of IA 
 Sam Brownback – Gov. of KS 
 Erik Helland – Former Republican IA State 
Representative  
 Stephanie Herseth Sandlin 
 Former Democratic US Rep. from SD 
 Matt Michels – Republican Lt. Gov. of SD 
 Rick Perry – Republican Gov. of TX 
 Rich Sheehy – Republican Lt. Gov. of NE 
 Scientists and Academics  
 Gary Acuff – PhD Food Science & 
Technology 
 Professor and Director of the Center for 
Food Safety at Texas A&M University 
 Jim Dickson – PhD Food Science & 
Technology 
 Professor of Animal Science, Iowa State 
University 
 John Floros – PhD Food Science & 
Technology 
 Dean of College of Agriculture, Kansas 
State University 
 Lawrence Reitzer – PhD Molecular & Cell 
Biology 
 Professor of Biology, University of 
Texas at Dallas 
 David M. Theno – PhD Microbiology 
 Worked as a food safety consultant for 
Gray Dog Partners, Inc. 
 Senior VP and Chief Food Safety 
Officer for Jack-in-the-Box restaurants 
Claims about Ammonia  Ammonia is safe 
 Ammonia is natural 
 Ammonia is not an ingredient or additive  






Claims about BPI    BPI is a good company 
 BPI is a family company (owned and 
operated) 
 BPI has Midwestern values 
 Strong work ethic, value family 
 BPI values food safety 
 BPI is an industry leader  
 Food safety 
 Innovation 
 
Claims about consumers   Consumers want lean beef 
 Consumers want LFTB 
 Consumers have been misled/lied to/given false 
info. 
 
Claims about LFTB    LFTB is safe 
 LFTB is wholesome/nutritious 
 LFTB is USDA approved  
 LFTB is beef 
 LFTB makes ground beef more affordable 
 LFTB makes ground beef more nutritious 
 LFTB is not an additive 
 LFTB is not filler/scraps 
 LFTB provides jobs 
 LFTB is desired by consumers 
 LFTB is efficient  
 LFTB is sustainable 
 LFTB will help feed the growing world 
population  
 LFTB is not dog food 
 
Claims about the media  ABC News 
 ABC defamed BPI 
 ABC made false statements  
 ABC news blacklisted BPI customers 
 Media misled consumers 
 Media has hidden agenda  
 Media uses scare tactics  
 Media has caused job loss  
 
Communicative techniques  Imagery 
 Animations 
 Scientific imagery 
 Language 
 Terms for LFTB 
 “Dude, it’s beef!”  
 Filler 








 Use of second person 
 Posing questions to viewer 
 Telling view what “you need to know” 
   
 
Appendix E. Coding sheet for ABC News Videos 
Category/Classification CODES   
Actors   Ammonia 
 Beef Industry  
 BPI Personnel 
 Kit Foshee – Former BPI Employee 
 Rich Jochum – Corporate Administrator  
 Craig Letch – Director of Food Safety 
 Eldon Roth – Founder & CEO 
 Nick Roth – Engineering  
 Regina Roth – Co-founder 
 Dan Webb – Chief Counsel    
 Jay Williams – Plant Manager  
 Consumers/Viewers 
 Emily Anderson – Albuquerque, NM 
 Critics  
 Food Retailers 
 Grocery Store Chains 
 Costco 
 Craig Wilson – VP of Food Safety 
 Fred Meyer 






 Sam’s Club 
 Stop & Shop 
 Wal-Mart 
 Whole Foods  
 Fleisher’s Grass-fed & Organic Meats 
 Joshua Applestone – Organic Butcher, 
Brooklyn, NY 
 Government  
 USDA 







 Dr. Elisabeth Hagen – Undersecretary 
of Food Safety, USDA 
 Jo Ann Smith – Former USDA 
Undersecretary of Agriculture 
 Former president of Denver-based 
National Cattlemen’s Association 
 Founder of National Beef Promotion 
and Research Board 
 Cofounder of Beef Check-off 
 Served on boards for Iowa Beef 
Producers, Purina Mills, and Tyson 
Foods  
 Gerald Zirnstein – Former USDA Meat 
Inspector 
 Interest Groups 
 American Meat Institute  
 Janet Riley – Senior VP of Public 
Affairs and Member Services 
 The Lunch Tray 
 Bettina Siegel – Blogger, Food Author, 
Former Lawyer 
 Labels 
 LFTB Label 
 USDA Organic  
 Media  
 ABC News 
 Jim Avila – Senior National 
Correspondent 
 David Kerley – Washington 
Correspondent  
 Janice McDonald – Producer in Atlanta, 
GA 
 David Muir – Weekend Anchor, World 
News 
 Diane Sawyer – Anchor, ABC World 
News with Diane Sawyer 
 Candace Smith – Producer in NY, NY 
 Associated Press 
 J.M. Hirsch – Food Editor 
 National School Lunch Program 
Claims about ABC News  ABC News is “on the case” 
 ABC News “broke the story”  
 





Claims about BPI   Conflicts of interest  
 Using LFTB is economic fraud 
 
Claims about consumers  Consumers are outraged  
 Consumers are concerned  
 Consumers want LFTB free ground beef  
 
Claims about LFTB  LFTB is pink slime 
 LFTB is hidden in ground beef 
 LFTB was once only used in dog food and 
cooking oil 
 LFTB is a filler 
 LFTB is not real ground beef 
 LFTB is in 70% of the US ground beef supply 
 LFTB is a cheap substitute  
 LFTB is an additive 
 LFTB is made from low-grade trimmings 
 LFTB is less nutritious than ground beef 
 
Communicative techniques  Editing 
  
 Imagery 
 Raw beef  
 Images of beef scraps 
 Text font 
 Use of CAPS  
 Language 
 Investigative reporting language 
 Number manipulation  
 Use of second person 
 Posing questions to viewer 
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